Opinion
05-22-00919-CV
06-30-2023
SERGIO SCHAAR, Appellant v. ENVOY AIR, INC., Appellee
On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-04296
Before Justices Molberg, Carlyle, and Smith
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CORY L. CARLYLE, JUSTICE
Sergio Schaar appeals from the trial court's decision to deny his request for attorney's fees following a jury trial. We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
Envoy Air, Inc. hired Mr. Schaar to work as a commercial pilot. As part of the hiring process, Mr. Schaar signed two commitment letters. The first provided that, as a condition of employment, Mr. Schaar would complete an Airline Transport Pilot Certification Program required by the FAA. Envoy agreed to "advance" Mr. Schaar's tuition for that program, characterizing it as a "bonus" valued at $5,000. The second commitment letter provided that Envoy would pay Mr. Schaar a "new hire incentive bonus" of $17,100. Envoy conditioned these "bonuses" upon, among other things, Mr. Schaar remaining employed by Envoy for two years.
Under the commitment letters' terms, if Mr. Schaar did not remain employed for two years, Envoy could recoup all or a pro-rated portion of the bonuses, depending on the type of bonus and the length of Mr. Schaar's service. But Mr. Schaar would have no obligation to repay any portion of the bonuses if Envoy terminated his employment without cause. The commitment letters referred to the repayment amount Mr. Schaar would owe as the "Make Whole Fee."
Envoy terminated Mr. Schaar's employment within three months of his hire, alleging as cause that Mr. Schaar failed to complete its training program. Envoy took steps to recoup the "bonuses" it paid under the commitment letters. Mr. Schaar went to work for a competitor and filed this lawsuit asserting claims for promissory estoppel, breach of contract, tortious interference with prospective relations, and business disparagement. Mr. Schaar later amended his petition to add claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and declaratory judgment. The declaratory judgment claim asked for a declaration, both on his own behalf and on behalf of a purported class of similarly situated pilots, that the "Make Whole Fee" provisions in Envoy's pre-hire commitment letters are unenforceable restraints on trade. Envoy counterclaimed, seeking to recover the "Make Whole Fee."
Before trial, Mr. Schaar filed a motion to certify a class on his declaratory judgment claim, which the trial court denied. He also filed a motion seeking traditional summary judgment on the declaratory judgment claim, as well as traditional and no-evidence summary judgment on Envoy's breach of contract counterclaim. The trial court did not rule on those motions before trial. At trial, however, the court stated that it agreed with Mr. Schaar that the "Make Whole Fee" provisions were unenforceable, and indicated it would grant his request for a declaratory judgment. The trial court submitted the remaining fact issues on Mr. Schaar's claims to the jury, which ruled in Envoy's favor.
After trial, the court entered judgment on the verdict, stating that Mr. Schaar and Envoy would each take nothing on their respective claims, except that the court granted: "Judgment for Plaintiff, Sergio Schaar, on his Declaratory Judgment motion to Dismiss Defendant, Envoy Air, Inc.'s Breach of Contract Claim." The court denied all other requested relief, including Mr. Shaar's request for $146,830 in attorney's fees. Mr. Schaar appeals only the trial court's equitable decision to deny those fees in the face of him prevailing on the declaratory judgment claim.
The trial court has sole discretion to grant or deny attorney's fees in a declaratory judgment action, and we will not reverse its judgment without a clear showing that it abused that discretion. Marion v. Davis, 106 S.W.3d 860, 868 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied). "The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does not mandate an award of attorney's fees or costs, even to a prevailing party." Sanchez v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc., 308 S.W.3d 521, 526 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.009 (court “may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney's fees as are equitable and just”). Indeed, a “trial court may conclude that it is not equitable or just to award even reasonable and necessary fees.” Sanchez, 308 S.W.3d at 526.
We have repeatedly held that where, as here, there are no findings of fact establishing the basis for the trial court's fee decision, "we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the court abused its discretion in declining to award fees." Marion, 106 S.W.3d at 868; see also Hazzani, LLC v. Richardson Bus. Center, Ltd., No. 05-18-00346-CV, 2019 WL 3244175, at *7 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 19, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); Sanchez, 308 S.W.3d at 526. Nothing in the record establishes Mr. Schaar's entitlement to attorney's fees as a matter of law, especially given the lack of an evidentiary showing that Mr. Schaar reasonably and necessarily incurred those fees pursuing the declaration that the "Make Whole Fee" provisions were unenforceable as to him-the sole claim on which he prevailed in the trial court. We overrule Mr. Schaar's sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgment.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee Envoy Air, Inc. recover its costs of this appeal from appellant Sergio Schaar.
Judgment entered this 30th day of June, 2023.