This statute became law in 1990, replacing the then-existing probationary teacher renewal statute, which was identical in substance but enforced a notification date of April 15. While this court has not previously interpreted section 22-63-203(3), it has interpreted the pre-1990 statute. In that case, School District RE-11J, Alamosa County v. Norwood, 644 P.2d 13, 18 (Colo. 1982), we found that the statute required that timely, written notice of termination be given to the teacher on or before April 15. Norwood concerned the attempted termination of a probationary teacher by verbal advisement.

(Emphasis added.) If the board fails strictly to comply with the notice requirements of § 22-63-203(3), the probationary teacher is automatically reinstated for an additional school year. Sch. Dist. RE-11J v. Norwood, 644 P.2d 13 (Colo. 1982) (notice of nonrenewal was insufficient when received by teacher one day after statutory deadline); Wooten v. Byers Sch. Dist. No. 32J, 156 Colo. 89, 396 P.2d 964 (1964) (written notice of nonrenewal after the statutory deadline was insufficient even though teacher was provided with oral notice before the deadline); Day v. Prowers County Sch. Dist. RE-1, 725 P.2d 14 (Colo.App. 1986) (written notice was insufficient when it did not unequivocally state that teacher's contract would not be renewed). Although generally the TECDA is to be construed in favor of the board, see Marzec v. Fremont County, 142 Colo. 83, 86, 349 P.2d 699, 701 (1960), it is the district's burden to prove that it provided a statutorily adequate notice pursuant to § 22-63-203(3).

This statute became law in 1990, replacing the then-existing probationary teacher renewal statute, which was identical in substance but enforced a notification date of April 15. While this court has not previously interpreted section 22-63-203(3), it has interpreted the pre-1990 statute. In that case, School District RE-11J, Alamosa County v. Norwood, 644 P.2d 13, 18 (Colo. 1982), we found that the statute required that timely, written notice of termination be given to the teacher on or before April 15. Norwood concerned the attempted termination of a probationary teacher by verbal advisement.

The cases in other jurisdictions are even more explicit — especially in cases related to teacher dismissals. For example, in School Dist. RE-11J, Alamosa County v. Norwood, 644 P.2d 13 (Colo. 1982), the Colorado Supreme Court addressed a statute that required a school seeking not to renew a teacher's contract to "cause[] written notice . . . to be given to said teacher on or before April 15." The school in that case "argue[d] that the only reasonable meaning of the statutory words is that the mechanics of the giving of notice must be set in motion by April 15, and that the notice need not be received by the teacher by April 15.

Welo v. District School Board, 24 Or. App. 443, 545 P.2d 921, 922 (1976). It is not enough merely to set in motion the mechanics of giving notice. School District RE-11J v. Norwood, 644 P.2d 13, 15 (Colo. 1982). Since Martinez did not receive timely actual delivery under any theory, the real question before the court is whether the notice requirement of AS 14.20.140(b) may be satisfied by substantial compliance.

Thus, as a general rule, when a statute requires written notice, the notice is not effective until it is received. School Dist. RE-11J, Alamosa County v. Norwood, 644 P.2d 13, 15 (Colo. 1982); Flanders v. Waterloo Community School Dist., 217 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1974); Costello v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 441, 333 N.E.2d 210, 212 (1975); State ex rel. Peake v. Board of Educ. of S. Point Local School Dist., 44 Ohio St.2d 119, 339 N.E.2d 249, 251 (1975). Our Court of Civil Appeals recognized the general rule in 1910 when it held:

The cases on which plaintiff relies for the proposition that late notice results in automatic reemployment are all readily distinguishable. In Norwood v. School District Re-11J, 44 Colo. App. 40, 613 P.2d 343 (1980), aff'd, 644 P.2d 13 (1982), La Temple v. Wamsley, 549 F.2d 185, 188 (10th Cir. 1977), and Burkett v. Tuslaw Local School District Board of Education, 380 F. Supp. 812 (N.D.Ohio 1974), a statute or contract specifically indicated that unless notice to the contrary were given by a specified date, the teacher would be automatically reemployed. In contrast, plaintiff's contract had no such clear language.

Although there is no California teacher case directly on point, out-of-state decisions applying analogous education statutes on similar facts, have so held. (See, e.g., School District No. 6 of Pima County v. Barber (1958) 85 Ariz. 95, 96-97 [ 332 P.2d 496, 497-498]; School Dist. RE-11J, etc. v. Norwood (Colo. 1982) 644 P.2d 13, 15-16; Weckerly v. Board of Education (1972) 388 Mich. 731, 733-734 [ 202 N.W.2d 777, 779]; Kiel v. Green Local School Dist. (1994) 69 Ohio St.3d 149, 152-153 [ 1994 Ohio 21, 630 N.E.2d 716, 719].) III.

al of complaint as untimely, complaint would be considered filed on date it reached post office box); Sears, Roebuck de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Soto-Rios, 920 F. Supp. 266, 272 (D.P.R. 1996) (characterizing government's conduct as "bad and perhaps even illegal," though not rising to the level of a constitutional violation, where government had established a post office box for receipt of payment and then declared Sears' premium payment untimely when the payment reached the box on time but was not picked up and processed until the following day); but see United States v. Peters, 220 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1955) (claims for tax refunds that reached post office box on Sunday were not filed, within meaning of tax code, until they reached Internal Revenue Service offices on Monday). Nor is a different conclusion warranted because S W chose to send the demand by express mail, which requires a signature upon delivery unless the sender waives the signature requirement, which S W did not do. Citing School District RE-11J v. Norwood, 644 P.2d 13 (Colo. 1982); Aetna Finance Co. v. Summers, 44 Colo. App. 491, 618 P.2d 726 (1980), aff'd, 642 P.2d 926 (Colo. 1982); and Dodge v. Meyer, 793 P.2d 639 (Colo.App. 1990), plaintiff argues that a sender who places restrictions on a letter, e.g., by sending it return receipt requested, bears the risk of non-delivery if the letter is not delivered because the addressee's signature could not be obtained.

The trial court acknowledged that Butler had, indeed, served defendants with notice in the manner prescribed by the statute. However, citing School District RE-11J v. Norwood, 644 P.2d 13 (Colo. 1982), the trial court stated that, as a general rule, statutorily required notice must be received to be effective. And, inasmuch as the evidence here was to the contrary, Butler's claim could not proceed to trial. Butler's primary contention on appeal is that the trial court's analysis was in error.