See RSA 491:19. The petitioner contends that this court's interpretation of RSA 491:19 in Scarborough v. R.T.P. Enterprises, Inc., 120 N.H. 707, 422 A.2d 1304 (1980), compels a finding that the procedure outlined in the statute is mandatory. Scarborough involved an employment discrimination case before the New Hampshire Commission for Human Rights (commission). The defendant was summoned to the commission hearing by subpoena. Id. at 708, 422 A.2d at 1306.

(quotation omitted)). A review of Scarborough v. R.T.P. Enterprises, Inc., 120 N.H. 707, 422 A.2d 1304 (1980), shows that it does not establish a “substantial possibility,” Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 110 comment d at 172 (2000), that a tribunal would accept the contention that a claimant may bring an RSA chapter 354-A public accommodation action for damages without having suffered the slightest direct harm. Scarborough centered upon an employment dispute and the defendant-employer's challenged misconduct was directly applied to the plaintiff.

Blagbrough Family Realty Trust v. A & T Forest Prods., 155 N.H. 29, 40, 917 A.2d 1221 (2007). Although discovery rules are to be given a broad and liberal interpretation, the trial court has discretion to determine the limits of discovery. Scarborough v. R.T.P. Enterprises, Inc., 120 N.H. 707, 711, 422 A.2d 1304 (1980). A party's request for information must appear relevant and “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”

" 5 Am. Jur. 2d supra § 731. Indeed, it is necessary that "[p]roceedings in the trial court on remand . . . [are] in accordance with both the mandate of the appellate court and the result contemplated in the appellate opinion." Id.; see Scarborough v. R.T.P. Enterprises, Inc., 120 N.H. 707, 709, 422 A.2d 1304 (1980); Frost v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 813 S.W.2d 302, 304-05 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).For that reason, the issue presented is more properly framed as whether our opinion in Abram, read in toto, divested the trial court of authority to re-sentence the defendant on the affirmed charges.

The contempt power is discretionary and the proper inquiry is not whether we would have found the respondent in contempt, but whether the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in refusing to do so. Scarborough v. R.T.P. Enterprises, Inc., 120 N.H. 707, 711-12 (1980); cf. State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard). The record demonstrates that the trial court reviewed the parties' conduct since 1988 and the challenged conduct that resulted in the allegations of contempt, namely, the respondent's failure to pay all child support, before concluding that the respondent should not be held in contempt.

The goal of criminal contempt is simply to punish the defendant "to vindicate the `authority and dignity' of the trial court." Bonser v. Courtney, 481 A.2d 524, 531 (N.H. 1984) (quoting Scarborough v. R.T.P. Enters., 422 A.2d 1304, 1308 (N.H. 1980)). The prison sentence, accordingly, must be definite, Sage, 115 Vt. at 517, 66 A.2d at 14, and "no amount of repentance will remit it."

However, the experience of the federal courts in applying federal handicap discrimination law assists us in interpreting the similar proscription against handicap discrimination contained in our own law. See, e.g., Scarborough v. Arnold, 117 N.H. 803, 807, 379 A.2d 790, 793 (1977), aff'd after remand sub. nom., Scarborough v. R.T.P. Enterprises, Inc., 120 N.H. 707, 422 A.2d 1304 (1980). The version of RSA 354-A:8, I, in effect at the time of the events leading to this appeal provided that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice:

[7, 8] "The purpose of prosecution for criminal contempt is punitive, to vindicate the `authority and dignity' of the trial court." Bonser v. Courtney, 124 N.H. 796, 808, 481 A.2d 524, 531 (1984) (quoting Scarborough v. R.T.P. Enterprises, Inc., 120 N.H. 707, 712, 422 A.2d 1304, 1308 (1980)). From the language of the master's report, it is apparent that the master was vindicating the authority of the court and not the rights of the parties: "The Superior Court does not sit as a `Moot Court' where parties may debate topics of academic interest. It also does not render advisory opinions which may be acted upon at the whim of the parties if they deem it appropriate.

[8, 9] The purpose of prosecution for criminal contempt is punitive, to vindicate the "authority and dignity" of the trial court. Scarborough v. R.T.P. Enterprises, Inc., 120 N.H. 707, 712, 422 A.2d 1304, 1308 (1980). The sentence is determinate, and "no amount of repentance will remit it."

[2, 3] We conclude that the scope of review envisioned under RSA 354-A:10 is analogous to that under RSA 541:13. See Scarborough v. R.T.P. Enterprises, Inc., 120 N.H. 707, 710, 422 A.2d 1304, 1307 (1980); Scarborough v. Arnold, 117 N.H. 803, 809, 379 A.2d 790, 794 (1977). Based on the record before us, we hold that the superior court applied the correct standard of review in this case.