(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Scapin v. State, 204 Ga. App. 725 ( 420 SE2d 385) (1992). Here, the indictment, in pertinent part, charged Patterson with "armed robbery for that [he] . . .did with the intent to commit a theft, take property, to wit: jewelry, cash and motor vehicles of another . . . by use of an offensive weapon, to wit: a handgun.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Scapin v. State, 204 Ga. App. 725 ( 420 SE2d 385) (1992). (a) Carter asserts his trial counsel should have asked for charges on mere presence, mere approval without more, mere association, and grave suspicion because the State's case centered on the theory that Carter was a "party to a crime."
(Citations omitted.) Scapin v. State, 204 Ga. App. 725 ( 420 SE2d 385) (1992). (a) We find no merit in Wade's claim that his counsel failed to learn Georgia law on child molestation and did not know that the Georgia rape shield statute did not apply to child molestation and sexual battery cases based upon trial counsel's testimony to the contrary during the motion for new trial hearing.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Scapin v. State, 204 Ga. App. 725 ( 420 SE2d 385) (1992). The two-prong test for determining the validity of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 ( 104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), asks whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, whether this deficiency prejudiced the defense; that is, whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, but for counsel's deficiency.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Scapin v. State, 204 Ga. App. 725 ( 420 SE2d 385) (1992). "When trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress is the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, the defendant must make a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion."
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Scapin v. State, 204 Ga. App. 725 ( 420 SE2d 385) (1992). Viewed in this light, the record shows that a DeKalb County police officer responded to a dispatch call of a "burglary in progress" at 1046 Main Street Lake Drive around 1:00 p.m.
The above-quoted language should not be used to alter the well-established "clearly erroneous" standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Scapin v. State, 204 Ga. App. 725 ( 420 SE2d 385) (1992) (standard of review). Simply because an inference " could be drawn even where the evidence is disputed or unclear on this question," does not mean that a trial court is required to do so in cases where the evidence is disputed.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Scapin v. State, 204 Ga. App. 725 ( 420 SE2d 385) (1992). The two-prong test for determining the validity of a claim of ineffective[ness] . . . of counsel provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), asks whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, whether this deficiency prejudiced the defense; that is, whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, but for counsel's deficiency.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Scapin v. State, 204 Ga. App. 725 ( 420 SE2d 385) (1992). The two-prong test for determining the validity of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), asks whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, whether this deficiency prejudiced the defense; that is, whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel's deficiency.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Scapin v. State, 204 Ga. App. 725 ( 420 SE2d 385) (1992). Although the Supreme Court in Strickland discussed the performance component prior to the prejudice component, it acknowledged that a court addressing the ineffective assistance issue is not required to approach the inquiry in that order or even to address both components if the defendant has made an insufficient showing on one.