In contrast, the word "obdurate" is defined as "unyielding or stubborn." In re Padezanin, 937 A.2d 475, 484 (Pa. Super Ct. 2007); Scalia v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 878 A.2d 114, 116 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005); Hargy, 2012 WL 11866877, at *19. Lastly, the word "vexatious" is defined as "without reasonable or probable cause or excuse; harassing; annoying."
Since trial courts are granted wide latitude in deciding whether to award attorney's fees pursuant to § 2503, we review an award of such fees for an abuse of discretion. See Thunberg v. Strause, 682 A.2d 295, 299 (Pa. 1996); Scalia v. Erie Ins. Exch., 878 A.2d 114, 116 (Pa.Super. 2005). "An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record
Lucchino, supra … [(citation omitted]); Berg, supra…; Miller, supra…; Allen, supra…. Scalia v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 878 A.2d 114, 116-17 (Pa. Super. 2005). "[I]t is the burden of the party seeking counsel fees to prove the existence of one of the statutory conditions."
Instead, the trial court awarded attorney's fees to Ladrosky pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 2503(7) which permits the award of attorney's fees as a sanction if it is shown that a party's conduct during the pendency of a matter was dilatory, obdurate, vexatious or done in bad faith. See Scalia v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 878 A.2d 114, 116 (Pa. Super. 2005). "The trial court has great latitude and discretion with respect to an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to statute."
An appellate court's scope of review in cases involving counsel fees is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Thunberg v. Strause, 545 Pa. 607, 682 A.2d 295 (1996); Scalia v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 878 A.2d 114 (Pa. Super. 2005). Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1023.1(c) provides that:
Similar to attorney's fees, expenses related to the litigation are recoverable only when provided for by statute, or when clearly agreed to by the parties. Absent a statutory or contractual basis, a plaintiff cannot seek attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. Tippett v. Ameriprise Ins. Co., 2015 WL 1345442, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2015) (citing Scalia v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 878 A.2d 114, 116-17 (Pa.2005); Lucchino v. Commonwealth, 570 Pa. 277, 809 A.2d 264, 282 (Pa.2002)). Looking again to Section 5 of the Agreement, it is evident that the parties intended to allow Talen to recover costs associated with this litigation.
The Insurers move to strike the Tippetts' claim for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses in Count I. Absent a statutory or contractual basis, a plaintiff cannot seek attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. See Scalia v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 878 A.2d 114, 116-17 (Pa. 2005); Lucchino v. Commonwealth, 809 A.2d 264, 282 (Pa. 2002). Because the Tippetts do not plead a statutory basis for a fee and expenses award under Count I, nor does the insurance policy provide for such an award, the claim for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses will be stricken from Count I.
Id. "The trial court has great latitude and discretion with respect to an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to a statute." Scalia v. Erie Ins. Exch., 878 A.2d 114, 116 (Pa.Super. 2005). We review the court's decision over an award of attorneys' fees for an abuse of discretion.
If there is support in the record for the trial court's findings of fact that the conduct of the party was obdurate, vexatious or in bad faith, we will not disturb the trial court's decision. In re Padezanin , 937 A.2d 475, 483–484 (Pa. Super. 2007), quoting Scalia v. Erie Ins. Exchange , 878 A.2d 114, 116 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). In his opening issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in finding that Appellant waived his claim asserting that the court failed to explain with specificity the factual basis for its conclusion that Appellant's conduct warranted sanctions.
We suggest that Appellant only filed this appeal from an unappealable order for purposes of delay; ergo, the trial court may fashion any remedy or sanction that it deems necessary, including ordering Appellant to pay Appellees' costs and counsel fees for this appeal pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7) ("The following participants shall be entitled to a reasonable counsel fee as part of the taxable costs of the matter: . . . Any participant who is awarded counsel fees as a sanction against another participant for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct during the pendency of a matter."). See also In re Barnes Foundation, 74 A.3d 129, 135 (Pa. Super. 2013); Scalia v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 878 A.2d 114, 116 (Pa. Super. 2005). Appeal quashed.