Opinion
23-CV-6442 (LTS)
01-02-2024
WILLIAM SCALES, Plaintiff, v. DESIGN NORTEX; THE BRANDED PROFESSIONALS, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendants Design Nortex and The Branded Professionals violated his rights.By order dated July 27, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
Plaintiff names both Design Nortex and The Branded Professionals as defendants, but throughout the complaint, he only refers to a singular defendant.
Plaintiff submitted the complaint and IFP application without signatures. By order dated September 22, 2023, the Court directed Plaintiff to submit signed copies of the signature pages of the complaint and IFP application. (ECF 3.) Plaintiff submitted the signed documents on October 22 and October 23, 2023. (ECF 4, 5.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings his claims using the court's general complaint form. He invokes both the court's federal question jurisdiction and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. In the space on the form where he is asked which of his federal constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated, Plaintiff writes,
The defendant has deliberately sabotaged my company preventing the hiring of new web developer company in order to complete hired services in order to officially launch. The defendant's actions has left the corporation(s) business layouts vulnerable.(ECF 1, at 2.)Plaintiff further provides the following in his statement of claim,
The defendant is being sued for breach of contract and negligence. The defendant's actions has prevented the official launch of corporation(s), which has resulted in damages in many forms. The defendant's actions has resulted in loss of revenue, depleted company investments, missed business opportunities, and has left the company's business layouts vulnerable. The damages are estimated in the amounts of millions of dollar, possibly accumulating in the billions of dollars. The defendant's actions effects multiple companies, preventing the flagship company(s) from launching. Additionally, the defendant refuses to provide a refund, preventing the hiring of a new web developer company in order to complete the company's website and mobile application.(Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the motion. All other grammar, spelling, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.
Plaintiff states that “[m]oney damages are pending, but the defendant is being sued for the amount of millions of dollars.” (Id. at 6.)
DISCUSSION
A. Claims on behalf of other entities
The complaint is unclear as to whether Plaintiff is asserting claims on behalf of himself or on behalf of his business, which he refers to as a corporation. (See ECF 1, at 5.) To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims on behalf of a corporation or other artificial entity, the Court must dismiss those claims. The statute governing appearances in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, “allow[s] two types of representation: ‘that by an attorney admitted to the practice of law by a governmental regulatory body, and that by a person representing himself.'” Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991)). A nonlawyer cannot bring suit on behalf of another entity. See United States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2008); Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998). While “some courts allow sole proprietorships to proceed pro se [because] a sole proprietorship has no legal existence apart from its owner,” Lattanzio, 481 F.3d at 140 (citation omitted), courts generally do not allow corporations, partnerships, associations, and other artificial entities to appear in court without an attorney, Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1993).
Plaintiff does not allege that he is an attorney, and he does not state that his business is a sole proprietorship. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims on behalf of entities (other than any that are his sole proprietorships), the Court dismisses those claims without prejudice. In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to allege facts showing that he is asserting claims on his own behalf and not on behalf of another entity.
B. Subject matter jurisdiction
Plaintiff must also amend his complaint to allege facts showing that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider this action. The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, subject matter jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is presented or, when asserting claims under state law under a federal district court's diversity jurisdiction, when the plaintiff and the defendants are citizens of different States and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.'” United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative....”).
To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff's claims must arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A civil action arises under federal question jurisdiction if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Mere invocation of federal question jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal question jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Loc. 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that this Court can consider his claims under its federal question jurisdiction. He states that he is asserting claims of breach of contract and negligence, which are usually brought under state law, not federal law, and his allegations do not suggest any viable federal cause of action.
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims under state law, his complaint does not show that the Court has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of this action. To establish diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, a plaintiff must first allege that he and the defendants are citizens of different States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998) (“A case falls within the federal district court's ‘original' diversity ‘jurisdiction' only if diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete, i.e., only if there is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same State.”). For diversity purposes, an individual is a citizen of the State where he or she is domiciled, which is defined as the place where the individual “has his true fixed home . . . and to which, whenever he [or she] is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, for diversity purposes, a corporation is a citizen “of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” § 1332(c)(1); see also The Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010) (a corporation's principal place of business is its “nerve center,” usually its main headquarters).
Moreover, for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, the plaintiff must also allege to a “reasonable probability” that his claims are in excess of the sum or value of $75,000, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See § 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The sum claimed by the plaintiff will control if it is made in good faith. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). It is the Court's duty, however, to dismiss an action where it is “convinced to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover an amount in excess of the [minimum statutory jurisdictional amount.]” Tongkook Am., Inc. v. Shipton Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 784 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Deutsch v. Hewes St. Realty Corp., 359 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1966) (alteration in original, internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff asserts that he is a citizen of the State of New York, and that Defendant Design Nortex is incorporated in the State of California, and that it has its principal place of business in that state. Thus, it appears that Defendant Design Nortex is a citizen of California. He provides a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania address for Defendant The Branded Professionals, but he does not allege whether and where that defendant is incorporated and, if it is a corporation, where its principal place of business is located. Accordingly, it is unclear what the state citizenship of Defendant The Branded Professionals, and thus, whether the parties are diverse for the purpose of this action.
Plaintiff does not indicate how Defendant The Branding Professionals is constituted; he does not state whether it is a corporation, a limited liability company, or is constituted in some other form. If it is a limited liability company, Plaintiff must allege the state citizenship of each of its members.
In addition, Plaintiff seeks damages in the “millions of dollars” (id. at 6), but it is unclear from his complaint how, to a reasonable probability, his claims satisfy the jurisdictional amount for a diversity action - an amount in excess of the sum or value $75,000.
For all of the reasons set forth above, it appears that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this action. In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint alleging facts showing that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider this action; to the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims under state law, under the court's diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, he must allege facts showing that the parties are diverse and that his claims in this action satisfy the jurisdictional amount for a diversity action, amount in excess of the sum or value of $75,000.
C. Request for pro bono counsel
Plaintiff has filed a motion for the Court to request pro bono counsel. (ECF 4.) The factors to be considered in ruling on an indigent litigant's request for counsel include the merits of the case, Plaintiff's efforts to obtain a lawyer, and Plaintiff's ability to gather the facts and present the case if unassisted by counsel. See Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1989); Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60-62 (2d Cir. 1986). Of these, the merits are “[t]he factor which command[s] the most attention.” Cooper, 877 F.2d at 172. Because it is too early in the proceedings for the Court to assess the merits of the action, Plaintiff's motion for counsel is denied without prejudice to renewal at a later date.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid state law claim, on his own behalf, under the court's diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to provide more facts about his claims. In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, he must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that he wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who injured Plaintiff; how Plaintiff was injured; when and where Plaintiff was injured; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-6442 (LTS). An amended complaint form is attached to this order. No summonses will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the Court will dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
The Court denies Plaintiff's motion for the Court to request pro bono counsel without prejudice to renewal at a later date. (ECF 4.) As summonses have not been issued, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. (ECF 5.)
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.