Opinion
C/A 0:22-1338-MGL-PJG
12-06-2024
South Carolina State Conference of NAACP; Disability Rights South Carolina; Justice 360, Plaintiffs, v. South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice; Eden Hendrick, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This civil rights matter is back before the court for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 119). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). The motion has been fully briefed and is ready for resolution. (See ECF Nos. 122 & 124.) Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the court concludes that the defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint should be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs are three advocacy groups that seek injunctive relief to redress alleged inadequate care and treatment of the individuals held at the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”). The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' original complaint, challenging the plaintiffs' standing to bring this case. By order dated February 2, 2023, the Honorable Mary Geiger Lewis, United States District Judge, concluded that Plaintiff Justice 360 had organizational standing to raise each cause of action in the original complaint. (Order, ECF No. 68 at 7-8.)
The defendants then moved to dismiss the original complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. By order dated September 14, 2023, Judge Lewis dismissed the plaintiffs' original complaint (and the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction), finding that the complaint's conclusory statements failed to state a claim as to harm for each cause of action. (Order, ECF No. 115 at 2-3.) Because that issue was dispositive, Judge Lewis did not consider the plaintiffs' other objections to the court's Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 99), which provided additional bases upon which the assigned magistrate judge recommended that the original complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on September 28, 2023, from which the court accepts as true the following allegations. Plaintiff South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP (“NAACP”)-a state conference branch of the national NAACP civil rights organization-is a nonprofit, nonpartisan membership organization that, on behalf of its members and other constituents, “advocates for a society in which all individuals have equal rights, all children have access to a free, high quality public education, and all persons are free from disproportionate incarceration and racially motivated practices.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13, ECF No. 117 at 4-5.) Plaintiff Disability Rights South Carolina (“Disability Rights” or “DRSC”) is a South Carolina nonprofit corporation that serves as South Carolina's Protection and Advocacy system, as defined in the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986 (“PAIMI”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801, et seq.; and is thus authorized to “pursue administrative, legal, and other appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of individuals with mental illness who are receiving care or treatment in the State.” (Id. ¶¶ 14-15, ECF No. 117 at 5.) Plaintiff Justice 360 is a South Carolina nonprofit organization whose mission is to “promote fairness, reliability, and transparency in the criminal justice system for children facing lengthy sentences and individuals facing the death penalty in South Carolina”; this organization provides direct representation to juveniles in the custody of DJJ. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17, ECF No. 117 at 6.)
The plaintiffs also filed a third motion for a preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 123.)
The plaintiffs allege various violations of the United States Constitution and certain federal statutes. Specifically, the Amended Complaint asserts four causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the following purported violations of the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) “Failure to Protect Children Entrusted to DJJ Care”; (2) “Prolonged and Punitive Use of Solitary Confinement for Children”; (3) “Failure to Provide Rehabilitative Services”; and (4) “Substandard Conditions of Confinement.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 117 at 65-69.) The remaining causes of action, Counts 5-7, respectively assert violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq.; and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. (Id. at 69-72.) The Amended Complaint alleges a long history of violations at DJJ and focuses on many of the findings by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the South Carolina Legislative Audit Council that resulted in a lawsuit, which was settled in April 2022. The plaintiffs detail specific examples of acts of violence on numerous individuals, both by other juvenile inmates and by DJJ guards. They further allege the improper use of isolation of juveniles; the failure to provide education and mental health treatment; the failure to protect these individuals from harm, overcrowding, understaffing, and inhumane conditions of confinement. In their prayer for relief, the plaintiffs detail pages of mandatory injunctive relief they seek the court to impose. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 117 at 73-79.)
In their motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, the defendants renew their arguments that the plaintiffs lack standing to raise these causes of action. The defendants also argue that the plaintiffs again fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to each cause of action.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Standards
Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) examines whether the complaint fails to state facts upon which jurisdiction can be founded. It is the plaintiff's burden to prove jurisdiction, and the court is to “regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). To resolve a jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider undisputed facts and any jurisdictional facts that it determines. The court may dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any of the following bases: “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Johnson v. United States, 534 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).
On the other hand, a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court “may also consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)).
B. Standing
Standing is one of the core doctrines of justiciability that determines which matters the federal courts can hear and decide. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Although standing is “perhaps the most important” jurisdictional question federal courts face, it is also “one of the [most] amorphous (concepts) in the entire domain of public law.” Justice 360 v. Stirling, 42 F.4th 450, 458 (4th Cir. 2022) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “One element of the case-or-controversy requirement is that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to sue.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); John & Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 78 F.4th 622, 628 (4th Cir. 2023); pet. for cert. filed, No. 23-601 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2023); see also Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 466 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which ensures that a suit is a case or controversy appropriate for the exercise of the courts' judicial powers under the Constitution of the United States.”) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)).
To satisfy the constitutional standing requirement, a plaintiff must provide evidence to support the conclusion that: (1) “the plaintiff . . . suffered an injury in fact-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “there [is] a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) “it [is]likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, 413 F.3d 451, 458 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); see also David v. Alphin, 704 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sprint Commc'ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273, 74 (2008)). The party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements, and at the motion to dismiss stage, “general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice” to show standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
CGM, LLC v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 664 F.3d 46, 52 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating constitutional standing is generally considered under Rule 12(b)(1) because it is jurisdictional, unless statutory standing is at issue, which would be properly considered under Rule 12(b)(6)).
Precedent instructs that to show an injury in fact as required by the first prong of the Article III standing analysis, “plaintiffs must demonstrate that their claim rests upon ‘a distinct and palpable injury' to a legally protected interest.” Lane v. Holder, 703 F.3d 668, 672 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 501). The alleged injury must “affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1. Generally, to show the requisite injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that the government action it challenges affects him or her directly, and that the harm essentially causes an absolute deprivation of the legally protected interest. See Lane, 703 F.3d at 672-73. To show the second element-traceability-a plaintiff must show that the alleged injury to him or her is “fairly traceable” to the challenged law. Id. at 672. “[W]hen a plaintiff is not the direct subject of government action, but rather when the asserted injury arises from the government's regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, satisfying standing requirements will be substantially more difficult.” Id. at 673 (cleaned up) (discussing traceability). For redressability, the plaintiff must establish “a non-speculative likelihood that the [alleged] injury would be redressed by a favorable decision.” Justice 360, 42 F.4th at 459 (alteration in original).
“For a legal dispute to qualify as a genuine case or controversy, at least one plaintiff must have standing to sue.” Dep't of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2565 (2019). “The standing requirement applies to each claim that a plaintiff seeks to press.” Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 370 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)); see also Kenny v. Wilson, 885 F.3d 280, 287 (4th Cir. 2018) (“At least one plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim and form of requested relief.”).
Where the plaintiff is an organization, it can satisfy the standing requirements of Article III through either organizational standing or associational standing. Under organizational standing, the organizational plaintiff has standing to redress injuries directly inflicted on the organization, whereas under associational standing, the organizational plaintiff has standing to sue as a representative for one of its members to seek redress for the member's injury. White Tail Park, 413 F.3d at 458; see also S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 182 (4th Cir. 2013). The United States Supreme Court recently suggested that “associational standing” is known as “representational standing or organizational standing.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 199 (2023). However, to maintain consistency and avoid confusion with the organizational standing versus associational standing distinction already employed in this case, the court will maintain the nomenclature traditionally used by this court and courts within this circuit. See, e.g., People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Tri-State Zoological Park of W. Md., Inc., 843 Fed.Appx. 493, 495 (4th Cir. 2021) (stating that an organization “can assert standing in its own right to seek judicial relief for injury to itself . . . referred to as organizational standing[.]”); White Tail Park, 413 F.3d at 459 n.3 (“We have generally labeled an organization's standing to bring a claim on behalf of its members ‘associational standing.' ”); Defs. of Wildlife v. Boyles, 608 F.Supp.3d 336, 342 (D.S.C. 2022); Moss v. Spartanburg Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 676 F.Supp.2d 452, 457 (D.S.C. 2009). Thus, as used here, “organizational standing” refers to an organization's assertion of standing based on injuries suffered by the organization itself and “associational standing” refers to standing based on harm suffered by a member that the organization represents.
1. Organizational Standing
Plaintiffs NAACP, Justice 360, and Disability Rights all argue that they have organizational standing, and as previously noted, Judge Lewis has already determined that Justice 360 has organizational standing. “An organizational plaintiff may establish standing to bring suit on its own behalf when it seeks redress for an injury suffered by the organization itself.” White Tail Park, 413 F.3d at 458 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 511 (explaining that an organizational plaintiff may have standing to sue on its own behalf “to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy”)); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). In determining whether a party has standing, the court is not to consider the merits, but rather “whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring [the] suit.” White Tail Park, 413 F.3d at 460 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997)). A plaintiff must demonstrate that it has a sufficiently “personal stake” in the lawsuit to justify invoking federal jurisdiction. White Tail Park, 413 F.3d at 461 (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)). When determining whether an organization has standing, courts must conduct the same analysis it would for an individual plaintiff. Lane, 703 F.3d at 674.
The defendants ask the court to revisit Judge Lewis's finding that Justice 360 has organizational standing in this case, arguing that the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint wipes the slate clean. However, as noted by the defendants' themselves, the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint largely mirrors the original, except for fifteen pages of new allegations from pages 50 to 64 of the Amended Complaint. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, ECF No 119 at 3-4.) In those fifteen pages, the plaintiffs have added allegations about the harm purportedly suffered by the plaintiff organizations and the juveniles they claim to represent who are incarcerated at DJJ.
The court concludes that the new allegations do not undercut the district judge's previous finding that Justice 360 has organizational standing. As previously found by Judge Lewis, Justice 360's organizational standing is supported by the plaintiffs' allegations that Justice 360 cannot engage in its regular advocacy activities because of the trauma faced by the juveniles it represents as a result of each of the alleged violations, and Justice 360 must expend extra resources in the form of increased staff hours and training. (Order, ECF No. 68 at 6.) Not only do those allegations remain in the Amended Complaint, but the plaintiffs bolstered those allegations this time around with greater detail. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 231-291, ECF No. 117 at 50-57.) Thus, there is no need for the court to revisit the issue of Justice 360's organizational standing or the other plaintiffs' organizational standing. See, e.g., Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 216-17 (4th Cir. 2017) (describing cases where “each party for whom standing was at issue requested identical relief[, therefore] . . . once the Court decided that a single party had standing, it made no difference to the resolution of either case whether any other party had standing.”).
2. Associational Standing
Plaintiff Disability Rights also contends it has associational standing based on juvenile constituents it serves who are incarcerated at DJJ. In a previous Report and Recommendation, the court found that Disability Rights failed to allege in original complaint that it had a constituent in DJJ who had standing to raise the claims in the original complaint. (Report & Recommendation, ECF No. 45 at 18-19.) However, the plaintiffs now allege in the Amended Complaint that Disability Rights has identifiable juvenile constituents who are incarcerated at DJJ. Based on these new allegations, the court now concludes that Disability Rights has associational standing.
Justice 360 has no members and does not assert associational standing here. And while NAACP previously argued it had associational standing, it does not appear to do so based on the Amended Complaint. (Pls.' Resp., ECF No. 122 at 17.)
To have associational standing, an organization must show that: (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue as individuals; (2) the interests at stake are germane to the group's purpose; and (3) neither the claim made nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the suit. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); accord S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n, 713 F.3d at 184; White Tail Park, 413 F.3d at 458.
The threshold question here is whether Disability Rights has members and thus can meet the first prong of the test in Hunt. As previously explained, Disability Rights is a South Carolina nonprofit corporation that serves as South Carolina's Protection and Advocacy system, as defined in the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986 (“PAIMI”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801, et seq. Thus, it is authorized to “pursue administrative, legal, and other appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of individuals with mental illness who are receiving care or treatment in the State.” (Id. ¶¶ 14-15, ECF No. 117 at 5.) However, it is not a membership organization in the traditional sense that the organization is comprised of voluntary members. Instead, Disability Rights serves constituents for whom the organization seeks to represent in this action.
An organization that does not have members may have associational standing to bring claims on behalf of its constituents if the constituents “possess all of the indicia of membership in an organization.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344. For instance, in Hunt, the Supreme Court found that a state-created commission charged with promoting and protecting the State of Washington's apple industry and composed of apples growers and dealers elected from different parts of the state had sufficient indicia of membership to invoke associational standing to challenge another state's advertising law. The Court concluded that the apple growers and dealers possessed the indicia of membership in an organization because they elected the members of the commission, they alone could serve on the commission, they financed its activities, and the commission was the means by which they expressed their collective views and protected their collective interests. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344-45. The Court also noted that the commission's purpose was the protection and promotion of the state's apple industry and the commission served a “specialized segment” of the state's economic community that was the “primary beneficiary of its activities,” including litigation and advocacy. Id. at 344. Finally, the Court found that because the commission was funded by assessments on the industry's businesses, the interests of the commission and its constituents were closely tied. Id. at 345.
So too here, Disability Rights's constituents have sufficient indicia of membership to invoke associational standing. By statute, Disability Rights was created to serve the interests of the mentally ill population in South Carolina, including juveniles with mental illnesses who are incarcerated at DJJ. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 292-95, ECF No. 117 at 57-58.) Disability Rights is statutorily tasked with pursuing legal remedies and advocating on behalf of its constituents. In other words, Disability Rights's constituents are a specialized community that is the primary beneficiary of the organization's activities, and statutorily, their interests are closely tied. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344-45. Also, Disability Rights's Board of Directors includes significant representation of individuals with mental illness and its activities are guided by an advisory council “comprised primarily of individuals who have received or are receiving mental health services.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 297, ECF No. 117 at 58.) Therefore, Disability Rights serves as a means for its constituents to collectively express their views and protect their interests. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344-45.
There is a split of authority as to whether protection and advocacy organizations like Disability Rights have sufficient indicia of membership to invoke associational standing on behalf of their constituents, and the Fourth Circuit has not yet decided this issue. Compare Oregon Advoc. Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding standing), and Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879, 886 (11th Cir. 1999) (same), and State of Connecticut Off, of Prot. & Advoc. for Persons with Disabilities v. Connecticut, 706 F.Supp.2d 266, 284 (D. Conn. 2010) (same), and Advoc. Ctr. for Elderly & Disabled v. Louisiana Dep't of Health & Hosps., 731 F.Supp.2d 583, 591 (E.D. La. 2010) (same, and distinguishing the Fifth Circuit's 1994 decision cited below), with Ass'n for Retarded Citizens of Dallas v. Dallas Cnty. Mental Health & Mental Retardation Ctr. Bd. of Trustees, 19 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1994) (no standing), and Missouri Prot. & Advoc. Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir. 2007) (same). However, other courts in this circuit have found that protection and advocacy organizations like Disability Rights have sufficient indicia of membership to raise civil rights claims on behalf of their constituents. See Wilson v. Thomas, 43 F.Supp.3d 628, 632 (E.D. N.C. 2014); Disability Rts. N.C. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, No. 5:21-CV-361-BO, 2022 WL 2678884, at *2 (E.D. N.C. July 11, 2022). And, for the reasons explained above, the court concludes that Disability Rights's constituents have sufficient indicia of membership to invoke associational standing.
Moreover, the court concludes that Disability Rights has associational standing to raise the claims in the Amended Complaint as a representative of its constituents at DJJ. To reiterate, associational standing requires the organization to show that: (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue as individuals; (2) the interests at stake are germane to the group's purpose; and (3) neither the claim made nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the suit. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
As to the first prong, the plaintiffs identify nine children incarcerated at DJJ who have mental illnesses and thus are constituents of Disability Rights. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 301-13, ECF No. 117 at 59-62.) The plaintiffs, giving specific examples, allege that the nine children have been exposed to a panoply of constitutional and statutory violations arising out of their conditions of confinement, including physical violence, lack of health care, lack of educational services, use of isolation, faulty and broken plumbing, unsanitary living conditions, and lack of recreational time. The plaintiffs also allege that those conditions of confinement exacerbate the children's mental illnesses. For instance, the plaintiffs allege that mentally ill children are more likely to be bullied, assaulted, and victimized than other juvenile inmates, are particularly vulnerable to the psychological toll of the use of isolation, have a greater need for counseling and therapy that is not provided, and are particularly vulnerable to disruptions in educational services. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 314-26, ECF No. 117 at 62-64.) Therefore, the plaintiffs' allegations plausibly show that Disability Rights's constituents would otherwise have standing to sue as individuals because the nine children identified in the Amended Complaint have allegedly suffered an injury in fact from their conditions of confinement that are caused by DJJ and would be redressable by the court.
As to the second and third prongs of the Hunt test, protecting the conditions in which children with mental illness are incarcerated is germane to Disability Rights's statutory authority to “pursue legal, administrative, or other appropriate remedies or approaches to ensure the protection of, and advocacy for, the rights of individuals with disabilities.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 117 at 5.) And, personal participation of Disability Rights's constituents in this lawsuit is not necessary because the plaintiffs seek only prospective injunctive relief. See, e.g., Wilson, 43 F.Supp.3d at 632 (finding that the participation of people with disabilities was unnecessary in a lawsuit by a protection and advocacy group challenging the state's driver's license requirements that sought only declaratory and injunctive relief); Disability Rts. N.C. , 2022 WL 2678884, at *2 (finding participation was unnecessary from people with disabilities in a lawsuit brought by a protection and advocacy group seeking injunctive relief against the state for voting laws that purportedly discriminated against people with disabilities). Therefore, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have now alleged sufficient facts to show that Disability Rights has associational standing to bring the constitutional and statutory claims raised in the Amended Complaint as a representative of its constituents at DJJ.
3. Conclusion
The court has already found that Justice 360 has organizational standing to raise the claims in the Amended Complaint on its own behalf. (Order, ECF No. 68 at 8.) The plaintiffs also provide sufficient allegations in the Amended Complaint to plausibly show that Disability Rights has associational standing to raise those same claims in a representational capacity for its constituents.
C. Failure to State a Claim
1. Claims Based on Organizational Standing
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted based on organizational standing because the Amended Complaint does not allege that the plaintiff organizations were deprived of their constitutional or statutory rights. The court agrees.
As previously explained, a claim based on organizational standing seeks to vindicate the rights of the organization itself. See White Tail Park, 413 F.3d at 458 (“An organizational plaintiff may establish standing to bring suit on its own behalf when it seeks redress for an injury suffered by the organization itself.”); see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 511 (explaining that an organizational plaintiff may have standing to sue on its own behalf “to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy”).
In a previous Report and Recommendation, the court concluded the organizational plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the constitutional and statutory claims raised in the original complaint. (Report & Recommendation, ECF No. 99 at 1423.) The court provided several reasons for the failure to state a claim, but at the core of each basis was the fact that the organizational plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that their own constitutional or statutory rights were violated. The original complaint plainly claimed that DJJ violated the constitutional and statutory rights of the juveniles. But the plaintiffs' claims of injuries to the organizations were conclusory and the injuries' alleged connection to the constitutional and statutory violations experienced by the juveniles was tenuous. For instance, the court concluded that “the plaintiffs fail to provide any allegations that would connect the constitutional injuries suffered by the juveniles, which are extensively detailed, to the purported harms suffered by the plaintiffs,” and therefore, the organizational plaintiffs failed to meet the pleading standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Iqbal. (Id. at 10.) Also, the court concluded that the organizational plaintiffs did not raise § 1983 claims that fell within the zone of interests protected by that statute-that is, the plaintiffs alleged only that the constitutional rights of the incarcerated juveniles were violated-not the rights of the organizations themselves. (Id. at 14-18.) Relatedly, the court concluded that the organizational plaintiffs failed to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief could be granted because the purported injuries suffered by the organizations were purely derivative of the constitutional violations raised in the original complaint, and consequently, the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that their injuries were proximately caused by those violations. (Id. at 18-19.)
The plaintiffs' Amended Complaint does not change the court's analysis. For each cause of action, the plaintiffs claim in substantially the same language that DJJ is violating “the rights of South Carolina youth,” “the . . . rights of the children in the custody of DJJ,” or “these rights of South Carolina youth.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 340-41, 343, 349, 354, 368, 378-79, ECF No. 117 at 6570, 72.) In other words, the Amended Complaint asserts that the plaintiffs seek to vindicate the rights of the juveniles incarcerated at DJJ, not the rights of the organizations themselves. See White Tail Park, 413 F.3d at 458; see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 511. Plainly then, the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint raises no claims based on organizational standing. Consequently, the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to state an organizational standing claim upon which relief can be granted as explained in the court's prior Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 99.)
2. Claims Based on Associational Standing
a. Section 1983 Claims
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs fail to state claims for constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983 upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that the constitutional rights of the juveniles have been violated. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 119 at 20-22.) The court disagrees.
The Amended Complaint is filed in part pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983, the plaintiffs must allege: (1) that their rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States were violated, and (2) that the alleged violations were committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Where, as here, the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief against state officials pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiffs must allege an ongoing violation of federal law and seek relief properly characterized as prospective. See Biggs v. N. Carolina Dep't of Pub. Safety, 953 F.3d 236, 242 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
The plaintiffs here seek only prospective injunctive relief pursuant to § 1983, which is available only against state officials in their official capacity and not against state agencies. See Biggs, 953 F.3d at 241-42; see also Indus. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Dobson, 68 F.4th 155, 166 (4th Cir. 2023) (requiring the plaintiff to name the official responsible for the government's conformity with federal law and accountable for the purportedly unlawful acts); Doyle v. Hogan, 1 F.4th 249, 255 (4th Cir. 2021) (stating that a state official may only be sued in federal court for prospective injunctive relief if the official is able to enforce the specific law the plaintiff challenges).
Pertinent to the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Due Process Clause guarantees a fair procedure in connection with any deprivation of life, liberty, or property by a state, but it also provides substantive guarantees that protect individuals' liberty against certain government actions, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). The United States Supreme Court has held that such substantive protections apply to those who are involuntarily committed by the State. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (stating that a person involuntarily committed to a state mental institution is not deprived of all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment merely because they were committed under proper procedures).
To show an ongoing violation of federal law by the defendants, the plaintiffs raise § 1983 claims based on cases specifically recognizing that the Due Process Clause guarantees to juveniles who are in custody the right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint, and minimally adequate training to protect those interests. See Alexander S. By & Through Bowers v. Boyd, 876 F.Supp. 773, 797-98 (D.S.C. 1995) (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 307); accord J.H. v. Williamson Cty., Tennessee, 951 F.3d 709, 717 (6th Cir. 2020); Vazquez v. Cty. of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1163 (9th Cir. 2020); A.J. by L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1995); but see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977) (reserving the question of whether the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause applies to detained juveniles); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 355 (7th Cir. 1974) (applying the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to claims about conditions of confinement at a juvenile facility). The hallmark of the Due Process Clause's protection is the reasonableness of the State's methods of protecting the juveniles, but the court must show deference to the professional judgment of professionals who administer the facility, and federal intrusions into operation of state institutions should be minimized. Id. at 322-23. Here, the plaintiffs plausibly allege in Counts One through Four of the Amended Complaint that the current and ongoing conditions endured by the juveniles incarcerated at DJJ violate the juveniles' right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As to Count One, the safety guaranteed by the Due Process Clause includes a right to reasonable protection from the aggression of other juveniles and staff. Alexander S., 876 F.Supp. at 797-98 (citing Thomas S. by Brooks v. Flaherty, 699 F.Supp. 1178, 1200 (W.D. N.C. 1988), aff'd, 902 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1990)). In Count One, the plaintiffs claim that the defendants failed to protect the juveniles from violence in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 117 at 65-66.) In great detail, the plaintiffs allege that DJJ facilities are plagued by youth-on-youth violence and staff-on-youth violence. The Amended Complaint includes allegations that staff explicitly or implicitly encourages fights between juveniles, that DJJ officials are aware of the staff's complicity in the violence, and that officials fail to stop the violence. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 95, 98, 101-03, ECF No. 117 at 24-26.) The plaintiffs allege that much of that violence is attributable to DJJ's failure to effectively train its staff, implement security systems such as cameras and locks, and hire enough staff. (Id. ¶¶ 105-13, ECF No. 117 at 26-28.) The plaintiffs further allege constituents of Disability Rights are impacted by this violence, either directly by being assaulted or indirectly through trauma that exacerbates their disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 115, 30305, 307-08, 310-11, 318-20, ECF No. 117 at 28, 59-63.) Therefore, the plaintiffs plausibly allege in Count One that DJJ's failure to protect juveniles from violence is an ongoing violation of the juveniles' right to substantive due process.
As to Count Two, the substantive protection for incarcerated juveniles also includes the freedom from unreasonably restrictive conditions of confinement that are not reasonably related to the legitimate security or safety needs of the institution. Alexander S., 876 F.Supp. at 798. In Count Two, the plaintiffs claim that DJJ's prolonged and punitive use of solitary confinement on juveniles violates the juveniles' Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 117 at 66-67.) The plaintiffs allege that the use of solitary confinement has well-known harms, especially for juveniles, and should not be used solely for disciplinary reasons. (Id. ¶¶ 116-117, ECF No. 117 at 28.) The plaintiffs allege that despite being aware of that harm, DJJ officials “grossly overuse” solitary confinement for multiple reasons, including punishment, protection, and lack of available bed space. (Id. ¶ 119, 126, ECF No. 117 at 29, 31.) The plaintiffs allege that solitary confinement at DJJ, at best, includes 23-hour-per-day isolation in a nine-foot by nine-foot cell with minimal furniture, plumbing, and natural light. (Id. ¶¶ 120-23, ECF No. 117 at 29-30.) The plaintiffs allege that due to understaffing, juveniles who are not formally placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary or security reasons are often subject to “de facto isolation,” which means they are denied access to critical services such as sanitary facilities, outdoor recreation, mental health care, and educational instruction. (Id. ¶¶ 124-25, ECF No. 117 at 30.) The plaintiffs further allege that DJJ knows its use of solitary confinement puts juveniles at serious risk of new and worsening symptoms of mental illness, including self-harming behaviors and suicide, and despite that, regularly places juveniles with mental illness or disabilities in those conditions. (Id. ¶¶ 133-38, ECF No. 117 at 33-34.) Therefore, the plaintiffs plausibly allege in Count Two that DJJ's continued use of solitary confinement is an ongoing violation of the juveniles' right to substantive due process, including constituents of Disability Rights. (Id. ¶¶ 303-06, 308-11, 32122, ECF No. 117 at 59-61, 63.)
As to Count Three, the substantive protections of the Fourteenth Amendment create an affirmative duty on the State to provide “adequate mental health care” to detained juveniles. See Doe 4 by & through Lopez v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm'n, 985 F.3d 327, 340 (4th Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm'n v. John Doe 5, 142 S.Ct. 583 (2021). The plaintiffs claim that DJJ's failure to provide rehabilitative services, including recreational and outdoor time, access to mental health services, and trauma-informed care, violates the Fourteenth Amendment. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 117 at 67-68.) The plaintiffs allege that DJJ fails to provide basic mental health care to juveniles. Specifically, they allege juveniles lack “regular access to medication or counseling,” and despite being barred from doing so under state law, DJJ houses dozens or hundreds of children with severe mental or developmental disabilities without ever transferring them to psychiatric residential treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 166-73, ECF No. 117 at 39-40.) The plaintiffs allege that every juvenile should meet with a licensed mental health professional for forty minutes twice per week, but in practice, the juveniles receive only one visit per month. The plaintiffs also allege that DJJ staff often ignore or override the mental health professionals' recommendations for the juveniles' mental health needs. (Id. ¶¶ 228-30, ECF No. 117 at 49-50.) The plaintiffs further allege that although “trauma-informed care” is the accepted standard of professional care in juvenile detention, DJJ fails to provide such care, and the rampant violence in DJJ impedes the juveniles' rehabilitation. (Id. ¶¶ 157-65, ECF No. 117 at 37-39.) Therefore, the plaintiffs plausibly allege in Count Three that DJJ's failure to provide even basic mental care or treatment or to adhere to standards of professional care is an ongoing violation of the juveniles' right to substantive due process, including, necessarily, constituents of Disability Rights. (Id. ¶¶ 302, 305, 307-08, 311, 323-25, ECF No. 117 at 59-61, 63.)
The court notes that the proper standard to judge such claims is unsettled, and the parties do not provide substantive argument on this issue in their briefing on the motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Doe 4 by & through Lopez, 985 F.3d at 342 (discussing whether to apply the “deliberate indifference” standard or “accepted professional judgment” standard to claims of inadequate mental health care at a detention center for migrant children). Regardless, for the reasons stated herein, the court concludes that the plaintiffs state a plausible claim under either standard.
As to Count Four, the substantive protections of the Fourteenth Amendment create an affirmative duty on the State to provide for juveniles' safety and general well-being, including food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety. See Doe 4 by & through Lopez, 985 F.3d at 339-40. The plaintiffs claim DJJ houses juveniles in such “substandard” conditions with respect to sanitation, nutrition, hygiene, exercise, and education that DJJ violates the juveniles' Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 117 at 68-69.) The plaintiffs allege that the juveniles in DJJ face “squalid conditions,” including rooms overrun with odors, trash, standing water, and biting pests; walls and showers covered in mold and graffiti; and toilets that do not work and are filled with human waste for weeks at a time. (Id. ¶¶ 174-77, ECF No. 117 at 40-41.) The plaintiffs also allege that juveniles are regularly denied access to water or basic hygiene- unable to shower, brush their teeth, or wash their sheets; juveniles go hungry due to lack of adequate meals or unsanitary service of meals that includes food that is infested with bugs, rancid, or contaminated; juveniles are made to sleep on floors due to overcrowding-often on thin mattresses, covered in thin blankets, and exposed to pests that interfere with their sleep; and juveniles are denied access to regular, adequate physical activity. (Id. ¶¶ 180-85, ECF No. 117 at 42-43.) Therefore, the plaintiffs plausibly allege in Count Three that DJJ's failure to provide for the juvenile's basic well-being is an ongoing violation of the juveniles' right to substantive due process, including constituents of Disability Rights. (Id. ¶¶ 303, 305-11, 328-29, ECF No. 117 at 59-64.)
b. ADA, Rehabilitation Act, & IDEA Claims
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and IDEA because they fail to allege that their constituents have a disability as defined by the statutes. As to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the defendants also argue that the plaintiffs fail to allege facts that could meet the causation elements of the claims. Further, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs fail to allege facts showing that DJJ is violating the IDEA by not providing individualized education plans. The court agrees.
Claims pursuant to Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act can be analyzed together because they are substantially the same, differing only on the third element. To state a claim, the plaintiffs must plausibly allege that (1) they have a disability; (2) they are otherwise qualified to receive the benefits of a public service, program, or activity; and (3) they were denied the benefits of such service, program, or activity, or otherwise discriminated against, on the basis of their disabilities. Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 739, 750 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494, 503 (4th Cir. 2016)). Generally, under the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiffs must plausibly allege that they were excluded “solely by reason of” their disability, whereas the ADA requires only that the disability was “a motivating cause” of the exclusion. Wicomico Nursing Home, 910 F.3d at 750 (quoting Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2012)). The IDEA, on the other hand, requires that all children with disabilities, as defined by 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3), receive a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). The FAPE must provide the children with meaningful access to the educational process in the least restrictive and appropriate environment, with the child participating, to the extent possible, in the same activities as non-disabled children. MM ex rel. DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cty., 303 F.3d 523, 526 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A)).
In a previous Report and Recommendation, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under these statutes because the plaintiffs failed to identify a juvenile they represent who is housed at DJJ, identify a disability for the juveniles that is covered by the statutes, or plausibly allege that the juveniles have been denied benefits under the statutes because of their disabilities. (Report & Recommdation, ECF No. 99 at 19-23.) In the Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs identify nine children detained at DJJ who the plaintiffs allege “each have qualifying disabilities that allow them to be DRSC constituents” and that “DRSC's incarcerated juvenile constituents are qualified individuals with disabilities as defined by the ADA.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 302, 360, ECF No. 117 at 59, 69.) For some of the nine children, the plaintiffs also list a specific condition or an unspecified mental illness:
• “Child 7 has PTSD and ADHD.”
• “Despite having Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder (DMDD) and ADHD, Child 9 has not been allowed to see his counselor and has been denied care or attention because of his disability.”
• “Child 10 has mental illness, qualifies for services from DRSC, and has received mental health services since the age of 7.”(Id. ¶¶ 305, 307, 308, ECF No. 117 at 60-61.) The plaintiffs do not state whether these conditions are the disabilities that they rely upon to trigger protections under the disability statutes, and in their response to the defendants' motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs argue they need not identify those disabilities. (Pls.' Resp., ECF No. 122 at 33.)
Consequently, the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to correct the deficiencies identified by the court's previous Report and Recommendation as to the plaintiffs' ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and IDEA claims. Most notably, the plaintiffs must do more than merely allege that some juveniles housed in DJJ have disabilities as defined by the statutes. See, e.g., Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 739, 750 (4th Cir. 2018) (stating a complaint failed to plead the necessary and basic elements of an ADA claim because the complaint pled only that the claim was brought on behalf of “qualified individuals with a disability”). Even assuming the few disorders specifically named in the Amended Complaint for Child 7 and Child 9 meet the standard for disabilities under the statutes, the plaintiffs provide no specific allegations that those juveniles are being denied services, programs, or activities, or that their disabilities are motivating or sole causes of purported discrimination to show a violation of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating Rule 8 requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). As to the IDEA, the plaintiffs fail to allege specific facts showing that their constituents are being denied meaningful access to a FAPE. Nor may the plaintiffs skirt these requirements by arguing, as they do again here, that they are raising a disparate impact claim, without providing facts to show how DJJ's policies are disparately impacting disabled juveniles. See, e.g., Payan v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 11 F.4th 729, 738 (9th Cir. 2021); B.C. v. Mount Vernon Sch. Dist., 837 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2016). Therefore, the plaintiffs fail to state an ADA, Rehabilitation Act, or IDEA claim upon which relief can be granted.
c. DOJ Agreement
The defendants argue that this case is subject to dismissal because it is a “collateral attack” on the April 2022 settlement between DJJ and DOJ. The court disagrees.
Generally, settlements are not subject to collateral attack. Duell v. Heidenrich, 39 F.3d 1176 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313 (1995) (“We have made clear that ‘it is for the court of first instance to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based on its decision are to be respected.' ”) (quoting Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314 (1967)); Pratt v. Ventas, Inc., 365 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2004) (“A ‘collateral attack' is a tactic whereby a party seeks to circumvent an earlier ruling of one court by filing a subsequent action in another court.”).
However, the plaintiffs' lawsuit does not challenge the April 2022 judgment. The April 2022 judgment is a settlement agreement between DOJ and DJJ arising out of a pattern and practice investigation under 34 U.S.C. § 12601, whereas here, the plaintiffs' claims are brought on behalf of juveniles incarcerated at DJJ pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking prospective relief since the agreement was entered. Though these cases may have overlapping facts and legal issues, the parties and causes of action are different. And though the defendants argue that the relief sought by the plaintiffs has already been resolved as part of the April 2022 judgment, that argument is more appropriately addressed in the context of mootness, if at all. The defendants fail to put forth any argument that the April 2022 judgment is a final adjudication of the rights of the plaintiffs in this case, nor do they explain how the adjudication of the claims in this case would interfere with the April 2022 judgment. As the plaintiffs were not a party to the April 2022 agreement and seek separate relief under different causes of action, the lawsuit should not be dismissed as an impermissible “collateral attack.”
RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, the defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint should be denied as to the plaintiffs' associational standing claims brought pursuant to § 1983 and granted as to the plaintiffs' associational claims brought pursuant to the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and IDEA. The motion to dismiss should be granted as to the plaintiffs' organizational claims.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).