Opinion
Case No. 1:01-CV-321
July 26, 2002
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
On October 5, 2001, pro se plaintiff Dora Saylor ("Saylor") filed a complaint against her former employer, Ossian Health Care, Inc. ("Ossian"). Saylor's Complaint alleges that Ossian violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) and (c) when Ossian discharged Saylor in January 2001. On April 29, 2002, Ossian filed a motion for summary judgment. Saylor responded on July 3, 2002, and Ossian replied in support of its pending motion on July 19, 2002. For the following reasons, Ossian's motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Ossian hired Saylor as a Certified Nurse's Assistant ("CNA") on October 23, 2000. At the time she was hired, Saylor was sixty (60) years old. In addition, Saylor was required to complete a physical examination prior to her hire which indicated that she had a "mild bilateral hearing loss." However, Saylor's hearing loss was corrected by the use of hearing aids and, as a result, the examining physician indicated that her hearing was "normal." Indeed, Saylor states that her hearing problem did not cause her any problems at work. At her deposition, she stated that she could hear better than the other employees because of her hearing aids.
At the time of her initial employment with Ossian, Saylor was provided a written job description and an Employee Handbook. The written job description indicated that Saylor had an obligation to follow the instructions of her supervisors. Moreover, the Employee Handbook stated that termination could result if Saylor, among other things, refused to perform work assignments; threatened, coerced, or interfered with employees, customers, or visitors; left her assigned job/work area without notifying her supervisor; or engaged in negligent or careless acts that adversely affect the quality or quantity of work or safety.
Saylor had several complaints regarding her work performance. On December 5, 2000, the Director of Nursing, Jan Springer ("Springer"), gave Saylor a verbal warning for not completing her assigned tasks properly. Saylor alleges that during this verbal warning conference, Springer informed her that there had been a complaint about her hearing. However, the Employee Conference Record from this event indicates that the problems were job performance — not hearing — related.
Saylor states in her response to the motion for summary judgment that the complaint about her hearing took place in November 2001. However, in her deposition, she says it was in late November or early December. Ossian indicates the date was actually December 5, 2001, which does not contradict Saylor's deposition testimony, so the Court adopts that date.
On December 15, 2000, Greg Boyle, an Ossian Nurse, gave Saylor another verbal warning for defective and improper work. On December 18, 2000, a patient complained about how Saylor had treated her and Saylor received another verbal warning.
On January 21, 2001, Kim Ogilvie ("Ogilvie") was the Charge Nurse supervising Saylor. Ogilvie requested that Saylor be transferred from the north hall to the south hall to work. Saylor was difficult when Ogilvie requested that Saylor work in the south hall. Subsequently, Ogilvie found Saylor in the north hall and Saylor acknowledged that she had turned off a feeding tube there. Ogilvie states that the feeding tube should not have been turned off because it began beeping to indicate that it should be on.
On January 22, 2001, William Spitler ("Spitler"), an Ossian Charge Nurse told Saylor to go on dinner break, but Saylor refused. As a result, Spitler filed a written complaint for insubordination regarding Saylor. That same evening, Ogilvie was advised that Saylor was in the west hall, though she was still assigned to the south hall. Saylor had turned on the light in a patient's room and put down the side rails on the bed. Ogilvie states that lights were not to be turned on at night in order to keep from disturbing the residents. Side rails were always to be in place.
Saylor met with Ogilvie in the nurse's station and Ogilvie requested an explanation of why Saylor had been in the west hall, why she had turned on the lights, and why she had left the side rails on the resident's bed down. Saylor denied having done anything improper and argued with Ogilvie. Saylor acknowledges that the confrontation escalated and Ogilvie directed Saylor to leave the facility at that time. Saylor felt that she should complete her charts before she left, so rather than leave immediately, she began charting. Saylor claims that Ogilvie pulled her away from her charting and pushed her down the hall to the coat room.
Saylor indicates that she then clocked out and proceeded to the coat room, but decided to return because she was concerned about her hall being left unattended; thought Ogilvie was not in a rational mental state; and wanted to ask Spitler, another Charge Nurse, if she should really leave because Saylor believed she could not leave until she had permission from the Director of Nursing. Saylor went to the nurses' station, where she was not authorized to be, to speak with Spitler. Simultaneously, Ogilvie appeared at the nurse's station.
Ogilvie again told Saylor to leave. Saylor again refused and was sufficiently belligerant that Spitler stepped between the two women. Ogilvie called Springer, the Director of Nursing, who asked to speak to Saylor and also told Saylor to leave. Ogilvie also called the police and Officer Stephanie Tucker of the Wells County Police Department arrived. Saylor told Tucker that Ogilvie had battered and harassed her. Officer Tucker found no evidence of a physical confrontation and escorted Saylor off the premises.
Later that day, Springer initiated a meeting between herself, Saylor, and Steve Lanham ("Lanham"), the Administrator of Ossian Health Care. Lanham and Springer asked Saylor about the events of the past two evenings. Lanham and Springer determined that Saylor's version of the events did not match up with that of Ogilvie, Spitler, Officer Tucker, or Cathleen Harding, another Ossian employee who had witnessed the relevant events. As a result, Lanham and Springer discharged Saylor for insubordination.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
"Summary judgment is proper only if `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1031 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). While the moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a [genuine issue of] material fact, there is nothing in Rule 56 that requires a moving party to negate an essential element of an opponent's claim for which the opponent will bear the ultimate burden at trial." Bank of Illinois v. Allied Signal Safety Restraint Sys., 75 F.3d 1162, 1168 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 3178 (1986)). Rather, the standard for granting summary judgment requires the district court to grant summary judgment if the record before us "could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." McClendon v. Indiana Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).
The burden is therefore on the non-movant to set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). "In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, courts must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that party." Debs v. Northeastern Illinois Univ., 153 F.3d 390, 394 (7th Cir. 1998). Substantive law determines which facts are "material"; that is, those facts which might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See McGinn v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 102 F.3d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1996). Consequently, a dispute over irrelevant or unnecessary facts does not preclude summary judgment. See Hardin v. S.C. Johnson Sons, Inc., 167 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 1999).
The non-moving party may not rest on the allegations of the pleadings in opposing a motion for summary judgment. See Crim v. Bd. of Educ. of Cairo Sch. Dist. No. 1, 147 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 1998). Rather, the non-moving party must produce some evidence sufficient to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. "Futhermore, a `party needs more than a scintilla of evidence . . . to defeat summary judgment.'" Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 361 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Senner v. Northcentral Technical College, 113 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 1997)). Thus, a summary judgment determination is essentially an inquiry as to whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.
DISCUSSION
I. Disability Discrimination Claim
Saylor first contends that Ossian discriminated against her on the basis of her disability. A plaintiff can raise an inference of employment discrimination either by putting in enough evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, to raise a genuine issue whether employer has a discriminatory motivation in carrying out the challenged employment action or by using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Kariotis v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 1997). Here, Saylor has produced no direct or circumstantial evidence that her termination was the result of disability discrimination. Therefore, Saylor must proceed according to the now familiar McDonnell Douglas framework.
Using that method, a plaintiff must show a prima facie case of discrimination. If she is successful in doing so, the burden shifts to the employer to show a legitimate non-discriminatory purpose for the challenged employment action. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's proffered purpose is pretextual. See Simpson v. Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc., 196 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1999).
To make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is qualified for the position she desires; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding the adverse action indicate that it is more likely than not that his disability was the reason for it. See Lawson v. CSX Transportation Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 922 (7th Cir. 2001). In this case, it does not appear that Saylor can make out a prima facie case.
First, the Court is not satisfied that Saylor is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The ADA defines "disability" as (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) having a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. See E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 233 F.3d 432, 438 (7th Cir. 2000). In this case, Saylor testified at her deposition that her hearing was normal when corrected with hearing aids and never caused her any problems. Indeed, Saylor testified that she could hear better than other Ossian employees. Therefore, Saylor has failed to show that her hearing loss substantially limits one or more major life activities. Moreover, Saylor has failed to submit any evidence that she had a record of such an impairment: Nowhere in the record does Saylor even allege that her hearing loss has ever substantially limited her abilities. Nor has Saylor shown that Ossian regarded her as being disabled. In fact, her physical examination on file at Ossian indicated that her hearing was "normal." Accordingly, the Court is not satisfied that Saylor is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
In addition, Saylor has failed to produce evidence that her discharge was more likely than not caused by her disability. In fact, the only evidence Saylor has proffered is that when she received a verbal warning in early December, 2001, Springer told her there had been a complaint about her ability to hear. Quite simply, the Court does not believe that one isolated incident more than a month prior to Saylor being terminated is sufficient to raise an inference that Saylor's discharge was more likely than not a result of her disability. As a result, Saylor has failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination and Ossian's motion for summary judgment on that claim will be granted.
II. Age Discrimination Claim
Saylor also claims that Ossian unlawfully discharged her on the basis of her age. As in the disability context, a plaintiff can proceed on an age discrimination claim under the ADEA in either of two ways: The plaintiff can offer direct or circumstantial evidence of age discrimination or can utilize the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Kariotis v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 1997). Under the ADEA, to make out a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show (1) she was a member of the protected class; (2) she was meeting her employer's legitimate performance expectations; (3) she suffered adverse employment action; and (4) the employer treated similarly situated persons not in the protected class more favorably. See Simpson v. Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc., 196 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1999). Saylor has not offered any direct or circumstantial evidence of age discrimination. As a result, she must proceed according to the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
Simpson discusses the McDonnell-Douglas test with respect to claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. . . . However, because the substantive provisions of the ADEA "were derived in haec verba from Title VII," Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584-85 (1978), it is appropriate for this Court to rely on opinions discussing Title VII provisions in this case.
Again, it appears that Saylor cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination. Saylor has offered no evidence that Ossian treated similarly situated persons not in the protected class more favorably. That is, Saylor has not produced the names of any individuals younger than her who were not discharged when they committed similar acts of insubordination. Indeed, Saylor has not produced any evidence whatsoever that her age was a factor in the decision to terminate her. As a result, the Court finds that Saylor has not made out a prima facie case of age discrimination. Ossian's motion for summary judgment on the age discrimination claim will also be granted.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Ossian's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the Defendant.