Opinion
24A-CR-1213
11-06-2024
Aaron Sawyer, IV, Appellant v. State of Indiana, Appellee
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Kristin A. Mulholland Appellate Public Defender Crown Point, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Ellen H. Meilaender Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court The Honorable Samuel L. Cappas, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 45G04-2006-MR-00019
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Kristin A. Mulholland
Appellate Public Defender
Crown Point, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Bradford and Foley, Judges concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bailey, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] Aaron Sawyer, IV, appeals his conviction for Murder, a felony. He presents the sole issue of whether the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense by excluding proffered testimony regarding the social media nickname used by the victim and social media photographs depicting the victim with guns. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On May 31, 2020, Dorell Townsend and his girlfriend, Hannah Brown, were in line to make a purchase at a Clark's gas station in Gary. Terry Horton, who is Sawyer's stepbrother, was waiting behind Townsend and Brown, and Sawyer stood over Horton's shoulder, looking at a cell phone. Townsend and Sawyer were both armed.
[¶3] After Brown had completed her purchase and turned toward the door, she came close to bumping into Horton and said "excuse me," to which Horton replied "you're excused." (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 214.) Townsend interjected "what's up," in a tone that, according to Horton, was neither raised nor angry. (Id.) Brown proceeded through the door into a vestibule; she would later testify that noise from children prevented her from hearing any further exchange of words. Townsend held the door open for a man, woman, and three children who were entering the store; this positioned him with his back toward a candy shelf. Horton and Sawyer would later testify that Townsend made an inquiry or accusation about their "tweaking" - either in the sense of "tweaking" on substances or "tweaking" toward "my girl," which Horton denied. (Id. at 215.) Sawyer would later testify that Townsend made a threat: "I'll blow your all ass down." (Tr. Vol. IV, pg. 155.)
[¶4] Sawyer removed his firearm from his waistband and fired multiple shots at Townsend. Three of the shots struck Townsend, inflicting fatal wounds. Sawyer stepped over the body and proceeded toward the door. He found that it had been automatically locked when the store clerk tripped an emergency button. At Horton's urging, Sawyer shot out the door, and the pair fled. When police officers responded, they found eleven spent shell casings from Sawyer's firearm.
[¶5] On June 11, 2020, the State charged Sawyer with murder. The State subsequently alleged that a use-of-a-firearm sentence enhancement should be imposed. Sawyer was brought to trial before a jury on March 11, 2024. He was convicted as charged and received an aggregate enhanced sentence of sixtyseven years. Sawyer now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] At his trial, Sawyer contended that he had acted in self-defense or in Horton's defense. He and Horton each testified that Townsend's firearm had been visible in the store; however, Townsend had not drawn the weapon. Horton testified that he had not felt concerned or threatened and that Townsend had not interacted with Sawyer, apart from one comment that Horton did not hear, which could have been directed to either Sawyer or Horton. Sawyer testified that Townsend had made a verbal threat to shoot both him and Horton. He also made an offer of proof, stating that, about one month prior to the shooting, he had seen some of Townsend's postings on facebook. Townsend, who used the nickname of Dooda da Shoota, was depicted holding assault rifles.
[¶7] Sawyer now argues that the exclusion of the social media evidence "violated his constitutional right to present evidence" and "the jury should have had the full opportunity to consider all of the circumstances surrounding the confrontation as they appeared to [him]." Appellant's Brief at 8, 13. In general, the admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the decision whether to admit evidence will not be reversed absent a showing of manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion resulting in the denial of a fair trial. Spires v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996). An evidentiary ruling that amounts to constitutional error will be considered prejudicial unless the reviewing court is satisfied that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Zanders v. State, 118 N.E.3d 736, 741 (Ind. 2019).
[¶8] A valid claim of self-defense is a legal justification for an act that is otherwise defined as "criminal." Pinkston v. State, 821 N.E.2d 830, 842 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004), trans. denied. The self-defense statute provides in relevant part:
A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person:
(1) is justified in using deadly force; and
(2) does not have a duty to retreat;
if the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission of a forcible felony. No person, employer, or estate of a person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means necessary.Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c).
[¶9] To prevail on such a claim, the defendant must show that he or she: (1) was in a place where the defendant had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. Pinkston, 821 N.E.2d at 842. "[T]he elements of defense of a third party are the same as those of self-defense." Rondeau v. State, 48 N.E.3d 907, 919 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016). The amount of force that an individual may use to protect himself or herself must be proportionate to the urgency of the situation. Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). When a person uses more force than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances, the right of self-defense is extinguished. Id. The State bears the burden of disproving self-defense. Brown v. State, 738 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind. 2000).
[¶10] Although a defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense, this right is not absolute. James v. State, 96 N.E.3d 615, 618 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018) (citing Roach v. State, 695 N.E.2d 934, 939 (Ind. 1998)). Evidence which legitimately tends to support a theory of self-defense is admissible. See Brand v. State, 766 N.E.2d 772, 780 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002), trans. denied. Such evidence must imply a propensity for violence on the part of the victim. Id. While the victim's threats or violence need not be directed toward the defendant, the latter must have knowledge of these matters at the time of the confrontation between the victim and the defendant. See id. Also, "a defendant must first introduce appreciable evidence of the victim's aggression to substantiate the claim of selfdefense before evidence is admissible to show the reasonableness of the defendant's fear of the victim." Id.
[¶11] A defendant's belief of apparent danger does not require the danger to be actual danger, but the belief must be in good faith. Id. at 781. The question of the existence of such danger, the necessity or apparent necessity, and the amount of force necessary to employ to resist the attack can only be determined from the standpoint of the defendant at the time and under all the then existing circumstances. Id. Focusing on the "standpoint of the defendant" means at least two things: (1) the trier of fact must consider the circumstances only as they appeared to the defendant; and (2) the defendant's own account of the event, although not required to be believed, is critically relevant testimony. Id.
[¶12] Sawyer testified that he "started to shoot" because he was "scared," knew that Townsend "did have a gun on him," and Sawyer "took those words serious." (Tr. Vol. IV, pgs. 155-56.) He estimated that he fired five shots in Townsend's direction. Sawyer also sought to introduce evidence that Townsend had previous access to firearms and used a social media nickname suggesting his willingness to shoot.
[¶13] Brown, Horton, and Sawyer each testified that Townsend was armed on the day in question; thus, the excluded evidence of access to firearms was cumulative. Assuming that the nickname "Dooda da Shoota" implies a propensity for violence and thus had some relevance, in the circumstances of this case, the exclusion of the nickname was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was presented with evidence that, on the day in question, Townsend did not attempt to use his firearm; indeed, he was shot while holding a door open for store patrons. There is no evidence that Townsend ever acted as an aggressor in a physical sense. And Sawyer fired his weapon numerous times. The firing of multiple shots undercuts a claim of self-defense once a purported aggressor is disabled. Gammons v. State, 148 N.E.3d 301, 305 (Ind. 2020). Knowing that the victim used a comical - or perhaps threatening -social media nickname would assuredly have no significant impact upon the jury's verdict; that is, the State disproved Sawyer's claim of self-defense.
Conclusion
[¶14] The exclusion of social media evidence pertaining to the victim did not deprive Sawyer of his right to present a defense.
[¶15] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Foley, J., concur.