Summary
In Sawyer v. Platt (N. J. Ch.) 77 A. 1043, Vice Chancellor Learning stated what appears to be the single reported rule on this subject in this state, viz.: "It is not the practice of this court to entertain, at the conclusion of complainant's evidence, a motion on thepart of defendant to dismiss the bill for want of sufficient evidence to support a decree.
Summary of this case from Renner v. RennerOpinion
09-27-1910
SAWYER v. PLATT et al.
Frank S. McKee, Jr., for complainant. Walter H. Bacon and Henry C. Suydam, for defendants.
Action by Elmira F. Sawyer against Lillian Piatt and others. On motion to dismiss bill for want of evidence. Case postponed for hearing as stated.
Frank S. McKee, Jr., for complainant.
Walter H. Bacon and Henry C. Suydam, for defendants.
LEAMING, V. C. (orally). It is not the practice in this court to entertain, at the conclusion of complainant's evidence, a motion on the part of defendant to dismiss the bill for want of sufficient evidence to support a decree. A defendant is here privileged to rest his case upon the evidence offered by complainant, or to introduce evidence in his own behalf, at his election. But defendants in this case occupy an unusual position. They know nothing of the facts touching the claims here urged by complainant, and their counsel now asserts that if a defense is required it will be necessary for him to ask time to search for evidence to disprove the claims of complainants, and that it has been impossible for him to do this in advance because of the necessary inability of the defense to anticipate the evidence which has been adduced in behalf of complainant. He believes that he can, if time is given him for that purpose, throw some light on the facts of the case, but urges that the evidence now before the court is insufficient to sustain the relief sought by the bill, and that, in consequence, he should not be compelled to make a defense. If, under these unusual circumstances,it is entirely certain that the evidence which has been offered by complainant is insufficient to sustain the decree sought, I think it my duty to spare defendants the necessity of further labor; and as I strongly incline to the view that no relief can be granted to complainant in this case under the issues here presented and the evidence offered in behalf of complainant, and as a continuance will be necessary in behalf of defendants if they are to be put on their proofs, I will adopt what seems to me to be a fairer and beneficial course at this time. I will extend to complainant's counsel the time he seeks to urge, through a brief, the sufficiency of his case, and, if I am then convinced that relief may be granted on the evidence already adduced, I will fix a date for defendants to present their proofs. If I am not so convinced, I will advise a decree in behalf of defendants.
In order that counsel may anticipate, in the preparation of the brief which may be submitted, the views which I now entertain, I will briefly define them:
The evidence here discloses circumstances that strongly indicate at this time, to my mind, that Mrs. Sawyer did advance to her husband some or all of these moneys which are now claimed. I will not adjudicate that fact at this time, because subsequent proceedings in the case, if further proceedings are taken, may throw more light on the subject. Witnesses may in the future be produced by the defendants or evidence of some kind may be produced by them which will have the effect of giving a very different appearance to the facts; but at this time, on the evidence now before me, it seems to me that it is altogether probable that Mrs. Sawyer actually advanced this money now claimed, or some part of it, to her husband, and that the proofs already offered may be sufficient to support that finding; but, assuming that to be a fact, two questions arise in my mind, and I have not been able to see my way clear to avoid them in such way that complainant can become entitled to relief in this case.
This suit is brought against the heirs. The only way that I know of in which an heir can be charged with a money judgment for a debt of an ancestor is by the proof that assets have been received by the heir to the amount of the judgment which is pronounced; so the complainant in this case cannot, it seems to me, be entitled to a money judgment against the defendants, because the defendants in this case are shown to have received no assets at all from their father's estate. If, on the other hand, the theory of the case is that the complainant is entitled to a judgment against the estate of her deceased husband as such, so that the judgment will stand as a claim against the estate, then I am unable to see how complainant can avoid the necessity of having before the court an administrator as an active defendant. If a judgment should be pronounced which would, or in any way could, be operative to take away this real estate, or any personal property that may exist, it may be that tomorrow an administrator will be appointed, claims may be filed with such administrator by creditors, and it may tints be ascertained that debts exist for more than the entire amount of the real and personal estate of the deceased, and such debts, so established, would undoubtedly be entitled to assert the right to participate in the distribution of the estate, real and personal, of Mr. Sawyer. Whether such claims would participate as claims prior, concurrent, or subordinate to the claim that Mrs. Sawyer here establishes in this way is clearly now immaterial, for such claims would have the undoubted right to be heard in opposition to any claim upon the part of Mrs. Sawyer. So that, without an administrator here present in this case to represent any creditors which may exist, any adjudication that should be here made of Mrs. Sawyer's claim as a claim against the estate would be entirely futile.
Now, the other aspect which has been suggested is that these particular claims may be regarded as equitable liens on this land, and, therefore, enforceable as such. But, even though that view should be taken, is it not the right of a general creditor to be here represented, at least through a representative of the estate of the deceased, to oppose that claim? But I am unable to discern upon what theory an equitable lien can be successfully urged. I recall a case. Black v. Black, 30 N. J. Eq. 215, I think it was, in which the court suggested that an equitable lien might be enforced in favor of a wife for improvements made by her from her separate estate on her husband's lands under an agreement that she should have certain privileges touching the improvements so made, if the husband wrongfully denied her the privileges agreed upon. But no such elements enter into this case. The evidence in this case is to the effect that the wife, complainant, loaned the money now in question to her husband. I am not familiar with any case which suggests that a loan from a wife to her husband stands on a higher plane than a loan from a stranger. A loan from a stranger would not, become a lien, equitable or otherwise, on the real estate of the debtor by reason of the fact that the money so loaned was to assist the debtor to buy certain land or to pay off a certain mortgage. Such a loan by a wife to her husband would seem to be subject to precisely the same rules of law;
These are the views which presently impress me, and on which I will require more light if I am to require defendants to assume the burden of a defense.
I will, therefore, give counsel for complainant time to prepare thoroughly a brief upon the legal aspect of the case. He may give a copy to Mr. Bacon and forward one to me in three or four days, and after the brief has been given to Mr. Bacon he may reply to It,and if counsel for complainant can enlighten me on these features sufficiently to enable me to see that complainant may be entitled to relief, as the case now stands, I will then give to Mr. Bacon time to present his defense.