¶ 17 Sawko is another case involving exclusive use of a small piece of the common elements. Sawko v. Dominion Plaza One Condominium Ass'n No. 1–A, 218 Ill.App.3d 521, 161 Ill.Dec. 263, 578 N.E.2d 621 (1991). In Sawko, the condominium association used common funds to buy a nearby parking garage in the interest of all the condominium owners, and thus expanded the common elements, but the board decided to assign specific parking spaces to some of the unit owners, purportedly to accommodate disabled access. Sawko, 218 Ill.App.3d 521, 161 Ill.Dec. 263, 578 N.E.2d 621. The condominium declaration authorized the board, at any meeting called for that purpose, when there was a quorum present, to adopt reasonable rules and regulations covering topics including use of the property's parking space.

Id., 144 Ill.Dec. at 155, 555 N.E.2d at 52. Relying on dicta in Schaumburg, the Appellate Court of Illinois held in Sawko v. Dominion Plaza One Condo. Ass'n, 218 Ill. App.3d 521, 161 Ill.Dec. 263, 578 N.E.2d 621 (1991), that a condominium association's adoption of a parking rule assigning garage spaces improperly diminished an owner's interest in the common elements. The Dominion Plaza board had decided in closed meetings to restrict parking in the West Garage by assigning spaces to unit owners.

The Court must agree with Defendants that the restriction requested constituted an easement, albeit of conditional duration, that would have interfered with other unit owners' proprietary interests in the use of the common area. Falls Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Aveyard, No. 14250, 1994 WL 409626, at *3 (Ohio 2d Dist.Ct.App. July 27, 1994); Sawko v. Dominion Plaza One Condominium Ass'n No. 1-A, 218 Ill. App.3d 521, 529, 161 Ill.Dec. 263, 269, 578 N.E.2d 621, 627 (Ill. 2d Dist.Ct.App. 1991). Although O.R.C. § 5311.04 allows in paragraph (D) for the alteration of a unit owner's percentage of interest in the common areas of a condominium property, the statute does not — strictly construed — appear to permit the conversion of common area property into limited common area property or into the personal property of an individual owner.

Here, plaintiff's ownership interests were diminished because the erection of the balcony extensions amounted to an exclusive use or easement of part of the patio and as a result plaintiff was precluded from using a portion of the common elements to which he previously had access. In Sawko v. Dominion Plaza One Condominium Association No. 1-A (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 521, part of plaintiff condominium unit owner's complaint alleged that a condominium board improperly approved the change of formerly nonexclusive parking spaces in the common elements in a garage to exclusive parking spaces. After determining that the board granted exclusive use to portions of the common elements which were formerly designated as nonexclusive use portions, the court relied on Stuewe and Schaumburg State Bank to conclude that the allocation of the spaces for exclusive use diminished plaintiff's interests in the common elements. (218 Ill. App.3d at 529-30.)

A section 2-615 motion must point out specifically the alleged insufficiency in the pleadings. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2-615(b); Sawko v. Dominion Plaza One Condominium Association No. 1-A (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 521, 525.) The trial court lacks discretion to dismiss a complaint if it states a cause of action.

( Connor v. Merrill Lynch Realty, Inc. (1991), 220 Ill. App.3d 522, 528; Choi, 217 Ill. App.3d at 956.) Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be granted only when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits presented, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the movant's right to judgment is clear as a matter of law. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(c); Logan v. Old Enterprise Farms, Ltd. (1990), 139 Ill.2d 229, 233-34; Sawko v. Dominion Plaza One Condominium Association No. 1-A (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 521, 528.) The trial court must strictly construe all such evidence and draw reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party.

Therefore, consent of all the unit owners was required to enact the amendment. Id. at 500; see also Makeever v. Lyle, 125 Ariz. 384, 609 P.2d 1084, 1089 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1980) (converting general common elements to exclusive use of one owner constitutes taking of other owners' property without authority); Preston v. Bass, 13 Ark. App. 94, 680 S.W.2d 115, 116 (1984) (Board approval of carport in common area created limited common element requiring 100% vote of unit owners); Penney v. Association of Apt. Owners, 70 Haw. 469, 776 P.2d 393, 395 (1989) (change from general to limited common element altered unit owners' percentage interests); Carney v. Donley, 261 Ill. App.3d 1002, 199 Ill.Dec. 219, 224, 633 N.E.2d 1015, 1020 (1994) (board did not have authority to approve balcony extensions into common area); Sawko v. Dominion Plaza One Condo. Ass'n, 218 Ill. App.3d 521, 161 Ill.Dec. 263, 269, 578 N.E.2d 621, 627 (1991) (assigning parking spaces to some units diminished other owners' interests in common elements); Stuewe v. Lauletta, 93 Ill. App.3d 1029, 49 Ill.Dec. 494, 496, 418 N.E.2d 138, 140 (1981) (developer's grant of parking space to one unit gave exclusive easement and diminished other owners' interests in common elements); Strauss v. Oyster River Condominium Trust, 417 Mass. 442, 631 N.E.2d 979, 981 (1994) (additions built in common area changed percentage interests of unit owners); Grimes v. Moreland, 41 Ohio Misc. 69, 322 N.E.2d 699, 702 (1974) ("placing fences and [air conditioner] compressors on condominium common areas constitutes a taking of property and an ouster of co-tenants from common areas"); cf. Alpert v. Le'Lisa Condominium, 107 Md. App. 239, 247, 667 A.2d 947 (1995) (parking spaces assigned to 20 of 32 unit owners did not become limited common elements because they would not be conveyed with the unit); Juno by the Sea, supra, 397 So.2d 297, 303 (assigning parking spaces to 50

Our courts have long held that converting common elements for a single condominium owner's exclusive use is improper. See Picerno v. 1400 Museum Park Condominium Ass'n, 2011 Ill.App. (1st) 103505, ¶ 14 (holding that it is well-settled that other owners' interests are diminished when one unit owner is given exclusive use of an area); Carney v. Donley, 261 Ill.App.3d 1002, 1009-10 (1994) (holding that the erection of balcony extensions amounted to an exclusive use that diminished other unit owners' ownership interest in the common elements); Sawko v. Dominion Plaza One Condominium Ass'n No. 1-A, 218 Ill.App.3d 521, 529-30 (1991) (holding that the board of directors diminished a unit owner's interest in the common elements by allowing non-exclusive parking spaces to be used exclusively by certain individuals); Stuewe v. Lauletta, 93 Ill.App.3d 1029, 1031 (1981) (holding that, barring approval by all unit owners, a developer's grant to one owner of a lease with a covenant for a parking space that had been part of the common elements was improper)

Our courts have long held that converting common elements for a single condominium owner's exclusive use is improper. See Picerno v. 1400Museum Park Condominium Ass'n, 2011 Ill.App. (1st) 103505, ¶ 14 (holding that it is well-settled that other owners' interests are diminished when one unit owner is given exclusive use of an area); Carney v. Donley, 261 Ill.App.3d 1002, 1009-10 (1994) (holding that the erection of balcony extensions amounted to an exclusive use that diminished other unit owners' ownership interest in the common elements); Sawko v. Dominion Plaza One Condominium Ass 'n No. 1-A, 218 Ill.App.3d 521, 529-30 (1991) (holding that the board of directors diminished a unit owner's interest in the common elements by allowing non-exclusive parking spaces to be used exclusively by certain individuals); Stuewe v. Lauletta, 93 Ill.App.3d 1029, 1031 (1981) (holding that, barring approval by all unit owners, a developer's grant to one owner of a lease with a covenant for a parking space that had been part of the common elements was improper). Majewska's arguments are contrary to both our precedents and common sense.

We note that where the legislature enacts a statute establishing a means to enforce existing rights, there is no presumption that the statutory means is intended either as an exclusive remedy or to abolish other actions at common law or equity; the legislature usually must express or manifest the intent to give the statute such a preemptive effect. Sawko v. Dominion Plaza One Condominium Ass'n No. 1-A, 218 Ill. App. 3d 521, 526, 578 N.E.2d 621, 624-25 (1991). Nothing in the Act or its legislative history indicates that it is intended to be the sole remedy under the circumstances here. Cf. Cunningham v. Brown, 22 Ill. 2d 23, 28-30, 174 N.E.2d 153, 156-57 (1961) (the Liquor Control Act provided the sole remedy against tavern owners and operators for injuries resulting as a consequence of intoxication; the Act was not intended to complement a common law remedy because no common law remedy in that area existed).