Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 12-0517
01-02-2014
In the Matter of: JULIE ANN SAVITTIERI, Petitioner/Appellee, v. PRENTICE WILLIAMS, Respondent/Appellant.
Julie Savittieri, Mesa Petitioner/Appellee In Propria Persona Prentice Williams, Tempe Respondent/Appellant In Propria Persona
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT
AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FN2011-002869
The Honorable Janice K. Crawford, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Julie Savittieri, Mesa
Petitioner/Appellee In Propria Persona
Prentice Williams, Tempe
Respondent/Appellant In Propria Persona
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Chief Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined.
DOWNIE, Judge:
¶1 Prentice Williams appeals from the annulment of his marriage to Carolyn Mohn ("Carolyn"). The marriage was annulled because the superior court found that Carolyn lacked the mental capacity to enter into the marriage. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In August of 2007, Carolyn's physician signed a statement stating that Carolyn was disabled due to dementia and could not manage her financial affairs. Carolyn continued to live in her own home with the assistance of a home healthcare provider. In May 2009, her physician opined that Carolyn "would be considered incompetent to make decisions in her own best interest" and "that the children should seek a . . . guardianship to protect her assets so no one takes advantage of her situation." In addition to her home healthcare provider, Carolyn received assistance from Williams, who lived with her.
¶3 In January 2011, Williams met with Carolyn's long-time minister, Pastor Summers, and asked him to marry the couple. Pastor Summers testified that he declined because he believed Carolyn was suffering from dementia and could not make such a decision and that marrying Williams would put Carolyn in a position where she would be taken advantage of.
¶4 On March 3, 2011, Carolyn's daughter, Julie Savittieri, and Williams took Carolyn to Tempe St. Luke's Hospital, where Carolyn was diagnosed with dementia. A short time later, Savittieri sought appointment as Carolyn's guardian and conservator. In April 2011, a probate court investigator interviewed Carolyn, concluded she was incapacitated, and recommended a full guardianship. The next day, Williams married Carolyn. Two days later, Savittieri was appointed
Carolyn's temporary guardian and moved Carolyn to a residential care facility. Savittieri was later appointed Carolyn's permanent guardian.
¶5 Savittieri initiated this litigation to annul the marriage, or in the alternative, to dissolve it. After Carolyn's death, the superior court held a trial on the issue of annulment and annulled the marriage based on its determination that Carolyn lacked the mental capacity to enter into marriage on the date of the marriage and never regained mental capacity sufficient to ratify the marriage before she died. The superior court denied Williams's post-trial motions. We have jurisdiction over Williams's timely appeal pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") Section 12-2101(A)(1) and (5)(a).
DISCUSSION
¶6 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior court's findings. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 346, ¶ 5, 972 P.2d 676, 679 (App. 1998) (citation omitted).
¶7 Williams argues the court erred because Carolyn was not unhappy in the marriage, and the marriage was not irretrievably broken. These issues are only relevant, though, to the alternative petition for dissolution, which was rendered moot by Carolyn's death. See Van Emmerik v. Colosi, 193 Ariz. 398, 399, ¶ 7, 972 P.2d 1034, 1035 (App. 1998) (dissolution action abates with death of spouse).
¶8 Williams also argues the court admitted irrelevant testimony from Carolyn's home healthcare provider, Katherine Garfield, over his objection. According to Williams, Garfield was unqualified to testify about Carolyn's condition because she was not a full time companion.
¶9 We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence unless a clear abuse of discretion appears and prejudice results. Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, 185 Ariz. 493, 506, 917 P.2d 222, 235 (1996) (citation omitted). It is an appellant's duty to ensure that the appellate court receives a complete record. See ARCAP 11(b); Rancho Pescado, Inc. v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 174, 189, 680 P.2d 1235, 1250 (App. 1984) (citation omitted). If the appellant fails to provide a complete transcript, we will assume that the evidence supported the superior court's findings. Renner v. Kehl, 150 Ariz. 94, 97 n.1, 722 P.2d 262, 265 n.1 (1985) ("Without a record we must presume that . . . there was substantial evidence in the complete record to support the findings of the trial court.").
¶10 Williams has provided us with only select portions of the hearing transcript, and the portion of the transcript attached in support of this argument does not reflect that he objected to Garfield's testimony. To the contrary, it shows that Williams was the individual eliciting testimony from Garfield regarding her understanding of Carolyn's condition. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony.
¶11 Next, Williams argues the court erred in admitting testimony from Pastor Summers regarding Carolyn's medical condition and state of mind because he is not a medical doctor. Williams claims he asked the court to exclude the testimony, but the court never ruled on his request. He also contends the court erred by giving significant weight to Pastor Summers' testimony.
¶12 The portion of the trial transcript Williams offers shows that he objected to Pastor Summers' testimony that Carolyn suffered from dementia after Williams himself asked the pastor questions regarding Carolyn's state of mind and medical condition, and that the court informed Williams he could not object to answers to questions he had asked. In response to Williams' questions, Pastor Summers admitted he was not a medical doctor, but concluded Carolyn suffered from dementia based on his experience and training. We defer to a trial court's assessment of witness credibility and the weight afforded specific testimony. Pima County Juv. Action No. S-139, 27 Ariz. App. 424, 427, 555 P.2d 892, 895 (1976).
¶13 Next, Williams argues the court displayed prejudice by referring to Carolyn as "Mrs. Mohn," rather than "Mrs. Williams," and failed to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and determine the admissibility of each witness's testimony and accord it appropriate weight. To support his contention, Williams includes a portion of the transcript in which the court questioned Williams. The transcript excerpt does not support the claimed error. Moreover, the transcript excerpts Williams filed do not reveal any bias or prejudice by the superior court. On the contrary, they demonstrate that the court gave Williams every opportunity to explain anything he believed was relevant.
¶14 Williams's final argument is difficult to discern. He appears to argue that Savittieri was not properly appointed Carolyn's guardian and/or did not have the right to move her to a care facility. Such issues are not properly before us. This is not an appeal from the guardianship order or actions Savittieri took as Carolyn's guardian.
¶15 The superior court, after holding an evidentiary hearing, made extensive factual findings and concluded Carolyn lacked the capacity to enter into the marriage. We will not set aside these findings unless clearly erroneous, and we give due weight to the superior court's opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses. See City of Prescott v. Town of Chino Valley, 166 Ariz. 480, 485-86, 803 P.2d 891, 896-97 (1990). We find nothing in this record to indicate that the court's determination was erroneous. To the contrary, evidence in the record amply supports the annulment order.
CONCLUSION
¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order annulling the marriage between Williams and Carolyn.