The court concluded that no binding stipulations existed, and stated that the parties were free to conduct disclosure and file a note of issue when the matter was ready for trial. Thus, although the order appears not to have expressly vacated the order on appeal determining the value of the properties, it implicitly does so ( see generally Banker v Banker, 56 AD3d 1105, 1107; Savino v "ABC Corp.", 44 AD3d 1026, 1027; Matter of Jefferson County Dept. of Social Servs. v Mark L.O., 12 AD3d 1037, 1037-1038, lv denied 4 NY3d 794). Moreover, of course, the order on appeal depends entirely on the existence and validity of the stipulations.
To prevail on his motion to vacate his default, the defendant John Aronis was required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Savino v "ABC Corp.", 44 AD3d 1026; SS Constantine Helen's Romanian Orthodox Church of Am. v Z. Zindel, Inc., 44 AD3d 744; White v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 41 AD3d 709, 710). The determination as to what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed if the record supports such determination ( see Hodges v Sidial, 48 AD3d 633, 634; White v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 41 AD3d at 710).
The defendants also demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense ( see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Button Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 142; Carnazza v Shoprite of Staten Is., 12 AD3d 393, 394; Becker v University Physicians of Brooklyn, 307 AD2d 243, 244; see generally Powell v Pasqualino, 40 AD3d 725). Thus, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 5015 to vacate the judgment entered against them upon their default in appearing at trial ( see Savino v "ABC Corp.", 44 AD3d 1026; Ray Realty Fulton, Inc. v Lee, 7 AD3d 772). The defendants' remaining contentions are not properly before this Court.
It is well established that relief pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) and CPLR 3012(d) (leave to serve a late answer) are available only upon a showing of a reasonable excuse for the default in answering and a meritorious defense to the claims (see Eugene DiLorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 501 NYS2d 8 [1986]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Gutierrez, 102 AD3d 825, 958 NYS2d 472 [2d Dept 2013]). The determination of that which constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (see Hodges v Sidial, 48 AD3d 633, 852 NYS2d 340 [2d Dept 2008]; Savino v "ABCCorp.", 44 AD3d 1026, 845 NYS2d 789 [2d Dept 2007]; Juseinoski v Board of Educ. of the City ofN.Y., 15 AD3d 353, 790 NYS2d 162 [2d Dept 2005]). Since a successful motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) and CPLR 3012(d) results in a vacatur of the default and an opportunity to answer and defend on the merits (see David v Barnes, 130 AD2d 703, 515 NYS2d 817 [2d Dept 1987]), the moving papers should include a demand for leave to serve and file a proposed, verified answer and a copy of such answer (see Gershman v Ahmad, 131 AD3d 1104, 16 NYS3d 836 [2d Dept 2015]; citing Bekker vFleischman, 35 AD3d 334, 825 NYS2d 270 [2d Dept 2006]).
Furthermore, the determination as to what constitutes a reasonable excuse is "left to the sound discretion of the court" Savino v. ABC Corp. 44 A.D.3d 1026 (2d Dept. 2007).
The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse is left to the sound discretion of the court [internal citations omitted]." Savino v "ABC Corporation" , 44 AD3d 1026, 1026 (2d Dept 2007); JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.v Bruno , 57 AD3d 362 (1st Dept 2008); Stillman v Cityof New York , 39 AD3d 301 (1st Dept 2007).
While the determination of that which constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (see Hodges v Sidial, 48 AD3d 663, 852 NYS2d 340 [2d Dept 2008]; Savino v ABC Corp., 44 AD3d 1026, 845 NYS2d 789 [2d Dept 2007]; Juesinoski v Board of Educ. of the City of NY, 15 AD3d 353, 790 NYS2d 162 [2d Dept 2005]), a disposition on the merits is favored (see Gerdes v Canales, 74 AD3d 1017, 903 NYS2d 499 [2d Dept 2010]). In the exercise of its discretion, the court may accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse (see CPLR 2005; Campbell-Jarvis v Alves, 68 AD3d 701, 889 NYS2d 257 [2009]).
The determination of that which constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the trial court ( seeHodges vSidial, 48 AD3d 663, 852 NYS2d 340 [2d Dept 2008]; Savino v ABC Corp., 44 AD3d 1026, 845NYS2d 789 [2d Dept 2007]; Juesinoski v Board of Educ. ofthe City of NY , 15 AD3d 353, 790 NYS2d 162 [2d Dept 2005]; Gambardella vOrtov Lighting, Inc., 278 AD2d 494, 717 NYS2d 923 [2d Dept 2000]). Since a successful motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) and CPLR 3012(d) results in a vacatur of the default and an opportunity to answer and defend on the merits seeDavid v Barnes, 130 AD2d 703, 515 NYS2d 817 [2d Dept 1987]), the moving papers should include a demand for leave to serve and file a proposed, verified answer and a copy of such answer ( seeBekker vFleischman, 35 AD3d 334, 825 NYS2d 270 (2d Dept 2006)).
CPLR ยง 5015(a)(1).Savino v. "ABC Corp.", 44 AD3d 1026, [2d Dep't, 2007]. Reasonable Excuse
This court concludes in the affirmative. Savino v. "ABC Corp.", 44 AD3d 1026, [2d Dept 2007].