On appeal, the plaintiff argues that Barnett inadequately advised him of the consequences of refusing the requested test because Barnett told him that his license "could" be suspended if he refused to submit to it.In an appeal to the superior court from an ALS decision, the plaintiff has the burden to show that the order was clearly unreasonable or unlawful, and all findings of fact on questions properly before the hearings officer are deemed to be prima facie lawful and reasonable. RSA 263:75, II (2004); see also Saviano v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 151 N.H. 315, 318, 855 A.2d 1278 (2004). The superior court may not set aside or vacate the decision appealed from "unless the court is satisfied, by a clear preponderance of the evidence before it, that such order is unjust or unreasonable."

At its most basic level, the requirement to afford due process forbids the government from denying or thwarting claims of statutory entitlement by a procedure that is fundamentally unfair. Appeal of Eno, 126 N.H. 650, 653, 495 A.2d 1277 (1985) ; see Saviano v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 151 N.H. 315, 320, 855 A.2d 1278 (2004) ("The ultimate standard for judging a due process claim is the notion of fundamental fairness."). "Fundamental fairness requires that government conduct conform to the community's sense of justice, decency and fair play."

“The ultimate standard for judging a due process claim is the notion of fundamental fairness.” Saviano v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 151 N.H. 315, 320, 855 A.2d 1278 (2004). “Fundamental fairness requires that government conduct conform to the community's sense of justice, decency and fair play.”

Id. We review a trial court's interpretation of a statute de novo. Saviano v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 151 N.H. 315, 318-19 (2004). The defendant first argues that the trial court conditionally suspended his third sentence at the time of sentencing, and thus was required to hear his subsequent motion to suspend that sentence irrespective of the time limitations provided in RSA 651:20, I(a). The defendant relies in part upon the language in RSA 651:20, I, that authorizes the trial court to suspend a sentence "at the time of imposition of the sentence."

"The ultimate standard for judging a due process claim is the notion of fundamental fairness." Saviano v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 151 N.H. 315, 320, 855 A.2d 1278 (2004). "Fundamental fairness requires that government conduct conform to the community's sense of justice, decency and fair play."

Nonetheless, the defendant argues that he was never actually arrested for DUI and, therefore, the implied consent statute did not apply. Relying upon our interpretation of the implied consent statute in Saviano v. Director, New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles, 151 N.H. 315, 855 A.2d 1278 (2004), the defendant contends that, in order for the State to invoke the implied consent statute, a driver must "be arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence." The defendant argues that the trial court erroneously ruled that, by reading the first line of the ALS form, the officer arrested him for DUI.

"The ultimate standard for judging a due process claim is the notion of fundamental fairness." Saviano v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 151 N.H. 315, 320, 855 A.2d 1278 (2004). "Fundamental fairness requires that government conduct conform to the community's sense of justice, decency and fair play."

Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Appeal of Tennis, 149 N.H. 91, 93 (2003). Also, while we defer to the trial court's factual findings, provided there is evidence in the record to support them, we review its application of the law to the facts de novo. Saviano v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 151 N.H. 315, 318 (2004). RSA 275:44, I, requires that "Whenever an employer discharges an employee, the employer shall pay the employee's wages in full within 72 hours.

Specifically, he argues that the blood test results should have been excluded because there was no indication of the type of non-alcoholic cleanser used and because the transmittal slip: (1) states the wrong date and time the blood was drawn; (2) does not provide the name and title of the person withdrawing the blood; and (3) does not list the type of non-alcoholic cleanser used to prepare the skin.In an appeal to the superior court from an ALS hearing, the plaintiff bears the burden to show that the order upholding the suspension was clearly unreasonable or unlawful, and all findings of fact on questions properly before the hearings officer are deemed to be prima facie lawful and reasonable. RSA 263:75 (2004); Saviano v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 151 N.H. 315, 318, 855 A.2d 1278 (2004). Resolution of this appeal requires statutory interpretation, which is a question of law that we review de novo. Debonis v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 153 N.H. 603, 605, 903 A.2d 993 (2006).

As to the inadmissible statements, New Hampshire's "implied consent" law, RSA 265:84, states that "[a]ny person who drives a vehicle upon the ways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent to physical tests and examinations for the purpose of determining whether such person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor." RSA 265:84; see also Saviano v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 151 N.H. 315, 319 (2004). We have, accordingly, held that the act of submitting to a breath test "is voluntary because the very act of driving on New Hampshire's public roads implies consent to take the test."