Opinion
Civil Action No. 03cv184 (RBW)
March 19, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This lawsuit is the second filed in this Court by the pro se plaintiff. In this lawsuit, plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully terminated from his employment by defendants in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Defendants have filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, both motions must be denied at this time.
Plaintiff had another matter pending before this Court,Savage v. Scales, et al., 02cv1993. In that case, plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and D.C. Code § 11-921(3)(A)(vii), et seq., for the alleged "wrongful attachment and garnishment of his wage earnings and [the] denial of his rights to statutory due process. . . ." Complaint filed in action 02cv1993 at 1. The Court issued an opinion dismissing plaintiff's claims on March 16, 2004.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff Tony Edward Savage is a former employee of the District of Columbia ("D.C.") Department of Corrections. He worked at the D.C. Jail Records Office as a Legal Instruments Examiner. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed March 24, 2003 ("Compl.") ¶ 1. Plaintiff's employment was terminated on January 31, 2003, due to alleged malfeasance in violation of District Personnel Manual ("DMP") Chapter 16. Id. ¶ 44. The circumstances leading to his termination involved the preparation of an erroneous release order for Donald Shield, an inmate in the D.C. Jail. Id. ¶ 47. Plaintiff states that because inmate Shields had a Metropolitan Transit Police Fugitive Unit detainer from the Prince George's Sheriff's Office, he told his supervisor, Ms. Virginia Bowie, that he could not prepare a release order for inmate Shields. Id. ¶ 31. However, plaintiff alleges that Ms. Bowie informed plaintiff that "it [was] the Department of Correction's custom and practice not to honor Metro Transit Police Fugitive Unit detainer[s] that have not been processed through D.C. [Metropolitan Police Department] and further detainment of Shields [would be] illegal. . . ." Id. Plaintiff states that Bowie told him to indicate that there was no detainer status on Shields' release documents. Id. Plaintiff thereafter prepared a release order for inmate Shields "indicating no detainer status as instructed[,]" however, he "did not remove the detainer status from the Jail Corrections Community System (JACCS). . . ." Id. ¶¶ 32-33.
Plaintiff's request for an emergency temporary restraining order was denied by Judge Sullivan on February 4, 2003.
"On June 13, 2002, Benjamin Ellis, the Supervisory Legal Instruments Examiner, informed Bowie that [i]nmate Shields had been unlawfully released because in his Record was a copy of [a] Metro Transit Fugitive Unit detainer lodged for Prince George's County Police." Id. ¶ 35. Bowie allegedly claimed that the release was not unlawful because the Department of Corrections did not honor such detainers, however, Ellis stated that this custom "had been rescinded by [a] Memorandum of Understanding dated June 4, 1991." Id. ¶ 37. Thereafter, in July 2002, the Department of Corrections' Office of Internal Affairs conducted an investigation into inmate Shields' release.Id. ¶ 40. Around that same time, plaintiff alleges that Bowie told him that the Acting Chief of Records, Valerie Emerson, relayed a message to Bowie stating that Melvin Brown told Emerson to tell Bowie to deny that there had been a detainer in Shields' record, to state that such a detainer was not listed on the JACCS print-out, and to deny that plaintiff had discussed the detainer issue with her. Id. ¶ 41. As a result of this purported disclosure, on September 30, 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia alleging that defendant "Washington had abrogated his statutory duty and obligation pursuant to D.C. Code Title 24, section 425, through having failed to . . . provide comprehensive policy and procedures for the Legal Instruments Examiners to perform their official duties consistent with the D.C. Office of Personnel job classification. . . ." Id. ¶ 42.
Although plaintiff states in his complaint filed in this case that he filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, in his affidavit submitted in this case, plaintiff characterizes what he submitted to the Superior Court as a "letter" to Chief Judge Rufus King. Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement Motion for Summary Judgment by Affidavit, Affidavit of Tony Edward Savage dated February 21, 2003 ("Savage Aff.") ¶¶ 20-21.
On October 4, 2002, Brown issued a memorandum to plaintiff stating that plaintiff was being placed on administrative leave with pay effective at 4:00 p.m. that same day. Id. ¶ 43. On October 23, 2002, Brown submitted a 15 day advance notice of a proposal to remove plaintiff as a Legal Instruments Examiner "pursuant to District of Columbia Personnel Manual (DMP) chapter 16 charge of negligence for a cause of Malfeasance. . . ." Id. ¶ 44. This notice stated that because plaintiff had the duty "to have followed up on the detainer status before affixing his initials indicating no detainer status . . . [,]" and had failed to do so, he was being terminated.Id. ¶ 45. On December 20, 2002, Delores Thomas, a Department of Corrections official and a designated hearing officer, responded to plaintiffs allegations that there were "mitigating circumstances for the release of [i]nmate Shields. . . ." Id. ¶ 46. Specifically, plaintiff stated that the prior removal of telephones from the Legal Instruments Examiners' desks, which they used to contact courts and law enforcement agencies, precluded plaintiff "from following up on the detainer status. . . ." Moreover, plaintiff contends, because there was no "comprehensive policy and procedures manual. . . ." plaintiff, and other Legal Instruments Examiners, were unaware of the June 4, 1991, Memorandum of Understanding which rescinded the Department of Corrections' former policy not to honor Metro Transit Fugitive Unit detainers. Id. Despite these arguments, Thomas recommended that plaintiff be terminated because he had a duty, pursuant to his job description, to check the detainer status of detainees before he initialed the release document. Id. ¶ 47. Plaintiff was terminated effective January 31, 2003. Id. 48.
Plaintiff states in his complaint that his termination was effective January 31, 2002, however this date precedes the dates of the events pertinent to this case. In addition, in his affidavit, plaintiff states that the effective date of his termination was January 31, 2003. Savage Aff. ¶ 25.
Plaintiff argues that the defendants' "application of [the] DMP chapter 16 charge" as the basis for plaintiff's termination "is unconstitutional and also `time barred' pursuant to [the] DMP chapter 16 `statute of limitations requiring charges to be brought within 45 days of the alleged offense.'" Id. ¶ 50. Plaintiff also argues that his termination was "in retaliation for [p]laintiff having filed a whistleblower complaint against [defendant] Washington." Id. ¶ 51. Plaintiff points to several other individuals who were charged with negligence but who were not terminated and argues that he was disparately treated. Id. ¶ 55. Furthermore, plaintiff argues that defendant Washington had "a statutory obligation and duty pursuant to D.C. Code Title 24, section 425, to develop, train and implement a comprehensive policy and procedures manual for the agency's employees to perform their official duties. . . ." Id. ¶ 58.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Defendants have filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). This rule provides:
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Plaintiff contends that because defendants "have denied every single allegation in [the] complaint [by filing an answer,] judgment on the pleading is not ripe because in essence judgment on the pleading after an answer is tantamount to a motion for summary judgment." Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleading[s] ("Pl.'s Opp'n") ¶ 3, at 2. However, it is precisely because the defendants have already filed an answer in this case that a motion for judgment on the pleadings is proper at this juncture. See Pro-Football. Inc. v. Harjo, No. Civ.A. 99-1385, 2000 WL 1923326, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2000) (Stating that "[t]echnically, a 12(b)(6) motion is untimely if filed after the movant has answered the complaint[,]" and construing the defendants' motion as a Rule 12(c) motion "because the [defendants] answered the complaint before filing th[e] motion. . . .");Summers v. Howard Univ., 127 F. Supp.2d 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2000) (same). The standard for review of defendants' Rule 12(c) motion "is essentially the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Longwood Village Restaurant, Ltd. v. Ashcroft, 157 F. Supp.2d 61, 66-67 (D.D.C. 2001) (citingHaynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (other citation omitted)). As with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may not consider pleadings "`outside the scope of the complaint.'"Gasser v. Ramsey, 125 F. Supp.2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2000) (quotingTerry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). The Court may grant the motion "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be provided consistent with the allegations." Longwood Village Restaurant, Ltd., 157 F. Supp.2d at 66 (citing Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). The Court must "View the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Peters v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d 1483, (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Jablonski v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 1988) (other citation omitted)).
Ironically, although arguing that defendants' motion is premature, plaintiff has himself moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. "When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in [Rule 56], an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but . . . by affidavits or otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The Court must grant the motion for summary judgment "forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
B. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based on Plaintiff's Failure to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies
Defendants argue that this case is not properly before the Court at this time because plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act ("CMPA"), D.C. Code § 1-601.1, et seq., which is applicable to his claims as a District of Columbia employee. Plaintiff argues that exhaustion is not required in a case involving a § 1983 claim. Pl.'s Opp'n ¶ 4, at 10. Plaintiff is correct.
It is true, as the defendants note, that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held that the "CMPA . . . provide[s] District employees with their exclusive remedies for claims arising out of employer conduct in handling personnel ratings, employee grievances, and adverse actions."District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 635 (D.C. 1991). However, the local Court of Appeals has, in accordance with Supreme Court precedent, also held that exhaustion of administrative remedies pursuant to the CMPA is not a prerequisite to filing a complaint premised on § 1983 violations. See Roache v. District of Columbia, 654 A.2d 1283, 1284 (D.C. 1995) ("[W]e agree that the trial judge erred in dismissing [the plaintiff's] federal claims pursuant to §§ 1981 and 1983. The Supreme Court has held that `exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983.'") (quoting Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982)): see also Crockett v. District of Columbia, 293 F. Supp.2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. 2003) (rejecting defendants' argument that the plaintiff, a former District of Columbia police officer, had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the CMPA and holding that "since the administrative forum . . . could not have provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate his federal claims [because the Office of Employee Appeals is not authorized to grant compensatory or punitive damages, plaintiff] was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing [his] federal action.").
Accordingly, because plaintiff was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his § 1983 claim, the Court will deny the defendants' motion to dismiss on this basis.
C. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
As indicated, plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defs.' Opp'n") asserts that plaintiff's "motion for summary judgment" merely reiterates the arguments plaintiff made in his opposition to defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and that the motion "does not comport even remotely with the requirements of Rule 56 . . . and should summarily be denied." While the Court does not condone the defendants' failure to provide any substantive arguments in support of denying the motion, the Court concludes that there remain serious issues of material fact concerning the events surrounding his termination, and therefore, plaintiff's motion is premature. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (summary judgment proper only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. . . ."). Furthermore, the Court cannot conclude that plaintiff "is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law[,]"id., and it may benefit from the presentation of substantive arguments from the defendants and plaintiff's reply to those arguments. Accordingly, the Court will deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment without prejudice at this time and will convene an initial scheduling conference for the purpose of issuing a scheduling order for the conducting of discovery, if appropriate, as well as the submission of materials pertinent to plaintiffs summary judgment motion. SO ORDERED.
The Court will deny plaintiff's Motion to Stay Rule 16 Order for Appointment of Counsel from Pro Bono Panel as moot at this time since plaintiff sought a stay pending the Court's determination of the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court will schedule an initial scheduling conference in this matter, as one has not previously been held, at which time the plaintiff can address whether he intends to obtain counsel to represent him in this matter. Plaintiff also has filed an "Emergency Motion for an Order Directing Defendants to Comply with District of Columbia Office Personnel Position Description Certification for the Legal Instrument Examiners and an Order Granting Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment by Submission of Union Arbitration Transcript Proceedings and Award Findings." Defendants have not replied to this motion. The Court will address this motion at the scheduling conference and defendants may present their position on the motion at that time.
An Order consistent with the Court's ruling accompanies this Order.
ORDER
In accordance with the Court's rulings as expressed in the Memorandum Opinion that accompanies this Order, it is herebyORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Stay Rule 16 Order for Appointment of Counsel from Pro Bono Panel [#14] is denied as moot. It is further
ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [#15] is denied. It is further
ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Supplement Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleading[s] [#23] is granted. It is further
ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [#24] is denied without prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Supplement Motion for Summary Judgment by Affidavit [#26] is granted.
SO ORDERED. on this 19th day of March, 2004.
An Order consistent with the Court's ruling accompanies this Order.