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observing that "legal competency is not required to represent oneself at trial" and that "the only material issue is whether [the defendant] was competent to make the decision to represent himself" (citing Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 83, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989))
Summary of this case from Broadaway v. StateOpinion
NO. 03-15-00273-CR
07-08-2016
Christopher Tremane Saunders, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 27TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 68919, HONORABLE JOE CARROLL, JUDGE PRESIDINGMEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Christopher Tremane Saunders was charged with the offense of injury to a child. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(a). Saunders pleaded not guilty and the case proceeded to trial, where Saunders represented himself during the guilt-innocence phase. The jury convicted Saunders of the offense and assessed punishment at six years' incarceration.
On appeal, Saunders contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing "to insure that his waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made" and that, as a result, he was denied his right to counsel. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. We will affirm his conviction.
BACKGROUND
After his arrest, Saunders filed a pre-trial motion to discharge his court-appointed counsel and to represent himself in the proceedings. Following a hearing at which the trial court questioned Saunders regarding his desire to proceed pro se, the trial court granted Saunders's motion and allowed Saunders to represent himself. However, the trial court appointed standby counsel to assist Saunders.
At trial, Saunders proceeded to represent himself during the guilt-innocence phase. During the punishment phase, Saunders informed the trial court that he no longer wished to represent himself and that he instead wanted his standby counsel to represent him for the remainder of the proceedings. The trial court granted the request.
In his sole issue on appeal, Saunders asserts that the trial court failed "to insure that his waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made," which "constitutes an abuse of discretion that mandates reversal and new trial." Saunders claims that his waiver of counsel was ineffective because he lacked accurate knowledge of the law relating to several matters and that the judge should have asked him additional questions during his hearing to demonstrate whether he actually understood the processes involved in serving as his own counsel.
DISCUSSION
A defendant in a criminal prosecution is entitled to be represented by counsel in adversarial judicial proceedings. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.051(a). A defendant also has a Sixth Amendment right to make his own legal defense when the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily elects to do so. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). However, the right to self-representation "does not attach unless it has been clearly and unequivocally asserted" by the defendant. Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d 353, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Once the defendant has clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation, the trial judge must inform the defendant about the "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'" Id. (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835).
Judges must take an active role in evaluating the defendant's waiver of counsel, Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), and "the record must contain proper admonishments concerning pro se representation and any necessary inquiries of the defendant so that the trial court may make an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself." Goffney v. State, 843 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The trial judge must inform the defendant that technical rules of evidence and procedure exist, and that he will not be granted special treatment because he is representing himself. Johnson v. State, 760 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). However, the trial court need not follow a "formulaic questioning" or a particular "script" while evaluating the defendant's waiver of counsel. Blankenship, 673 S.W.2d at 583.
Neither "technical legal training" nor "ability to conduct an adequate defense" are required for a defendant's self-representation at trial. Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 83, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). While the defendant's choice to represent himself "must be knowingly and intelligently made, it need not be wise." Id. The defendant must be permitted to make the informed decision to "conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment." Id. (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834). In fact, the question of whether the defendant "is competent to represent himself is immaterial; the appropriate question is whether he is competent to choose the endeavor." Id. At the hearing on Saunders's motion to proceed pro se, the following exchange occurred between the trial court judge and Saunders:
THE COURT: You have asked the Court that you be allowed to represent yourself; is that correct?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand that acting as your own counsel you will need to evaluate the trial record and determine what the issues are and present them to the Court?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And that you would be doing that representing yourself on appeal-
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -in the event you were convicted. Do you understand that you will need to do your own legal research?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand that you will need to understand the rules for the preservation of error and the admission or non-admission of evidence?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand how to preserve error in a trial of a case?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand that if you represent yourself you will not be given any special consideration and you will be treated just as any other attorney representing another defendant?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Have you ever represented yourself before in a criminal action?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
. . . .
THE COURT: Have you ever studied law?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: When?
SAUNDERS: For 13 years and some college. Regular libraries, law libraries.
THE COURT: All right. Did you go to college?
SAUNDERS: Yes.
THE COURT: Did you graduate from college?
SAUNDERS: No, I got withdrew [sic]. I missed a couple of days so I had to re-enroll, but I continued to study though.
THE COURT: Do you intend to have a jury trial?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand the rules about voir dire of a jury?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand that after a jury was impaneled or tried the case that a Court's Charge would be prepared?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Are you familiar with the rules with regard to how a Court's Charge is prepared and what would be contained in the Court's Charge?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Are you familiar with the rule of evidence?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Are you familiar with the rules of criminal procedure?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: In the event you are convicted, do you understand that there are appellate rules of procedure that you will have to follow?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand that if you represent yourself you will be on your own and will receive no advice or guidance or help from the Court?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand that the appellate court will not create arguments for you in the event you are convicted and you are appealing the case?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand that if you represent yourself you will not be allowed to claim in the future that you had ineffective assistance of counsel in representing you either in the trial or on appeal?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand that it is really not a wise decision that you should make to represent yourself?
SAUNDERS: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You don't understand that?
SAUNDERS: It's wise on my part, maybe not on other people's, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Meaning what?
SAUNDERS: In some cases, yes. Yes, Your Honor, but not in this case, no.
THE COURT: All right. Is your election to not have an attorney a freely and intelligently and voluntarily made decision on your part?
SAUNDERS: Yes, Your Honor.
This exchange reveals that Saunders clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation. See Williams, 252 S.W.3d at 356. In addition, the trial judge took an active role in assessing Saunders's waiver of counsel, see Blankenship, 673 S.W.2d at 583, and informed Saunders of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Williams, 252 S.W.3d at 356. For example, the trial judge questioned Saunders about his prior legal and educational experience and advised him that "[self-representation] is really not a wise decision." Finally, the trial judge made Saunders aware that technical rules of evidence and procedure exist and explained that Saunders would not be granted special treatment as a pro se defendant. See Johnson, 760 S.W.2d at 279. Therefore, the record affirmatively demonstrates that Saunders knew what "he [was] doing and his choice [was] made with eyes open." See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
On appeal, Saunders argues that his waiver of counsel was not knowingly and intelligently made because he had an incorrect understanding of various legal matters, as evidenced in his various statements both before and during trial. However, legal competency is not required to represent oneself at trial; the only material issue is whether Saunders was competent to make the decision to represent himself.See Scarbrough, 777 S.W.2d at 92. Based on the record before us, we conclude that Saunders's assertion of self-representation was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Because Saunders effectively invoked his right to represent himself, we cannot conclude he was denied his right to be represented by counsel. We overrule Saunders's sole issue on appeal.
In his appellate brief, Saunders cites Faretta for the proposition that a trial court judge is obligated to inquire into a defendant's knowledge of the rules of evidence and procedure. In Faretta, the trial court judge asked the defendant questions such as "How many exceptions are there to the hearsay rule?" as well as "What are the grounds for challenging a juror for cause?" Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 808 n.3 (1975). However, Saunders fails to note that in Faretta, the U.S. Supreme Court did not hold that such questions were necessary. The Court stated:
We need make no assessment of how well or poorly Faretta had mastered the intricacies of the hearsay rule and the California code provisions that govern challenges of potential jurors on voir dire. For his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment of conviction is affirmed.
/s/_________
Scott K. Field, Justice Before Justices Puryear, Goodwin, and Field Affirmed Filed: July 8, 2016 Do Not Publish
Id. at 836. This type of detailed questioning by the trial court, the Supreme Court determined, actually deprived the defendant in Faretta of "his constitutional right to conduct his own defense." Id. Therefore, Saunders is incorrect in his assertion that Faretta supports his appeal in this manner.