Opinion
01-CV-0592 (JG)
December 10, 2003
CLIFFORD SAUNDERS, Wyoming Correctional Facility, Attica, New York Petitioner Pro se
ELIOT SPITZER, Attorney General of the State of New York, Mona Jha, Assistant Attorney General, New York, Attorney for Respondent
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner Clifford Saunders seeks a writ of habeas corpus. He challenges his 1999 conviction in state court for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied. FACTS The People's evidence at trial established that, on December 4, 1997, at approximately 6:40 p.m., an undercover police officer approached Saunders and told him that he was looking to buy cocaine. Saunders informed the undercover officer that he had cocaine available in ten dollar amounts. After patting down the undercover officer to ensure that he was not a member of the police department, Saunders left him for approximately one minute and entered the Hammil Housing project in the Rockaway Beach section of Queens, New York. When Saunders returned, he handed the undercover officer a ziplock bag containing cocaine, and the undercover officer handed Saunders ten dollars in pre-recorded buy money.
Saunders was arrested approximately three minutes later by one of the undercover officer's fellow officers on the scene. The undercover officer immediately identified Saunders as the seller of the cocaine he had just purchased. The arresting officer observed Saunders throw on the ground a sum of money he had taken from his pocket. The arresting officer picked up the money from the ground next to where Saunders was arrested, and it included the pre-recorded buy money.
Saunders was charged with one count of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. He was found guilty of that charge after a bench trial. On February 17, 1999, he was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four and one-half to nine years.
Saunders appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, Second Department, where he sought reversal based on the People's failure to disclose an amended version of the arresting officer's "on-line booking sheet." Saunders argued that the belated disclosure of the amended version of the document violated his rights under People v, Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286 (1961). On May 1, 2000, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding as follows: "Contrary to his contention on appeal, the defendant received the alleged Rosario material in sufficient time to make meaningful use of it, and was not substantially prejudiced by the delay." People v. Saunders, 707 N.Y.S.2d 879, 879 (2d Dep't 2000) (citations omitted).
Pursuant to Rosario, the state must provide a criminal defendant with the pretrial statements of any witness who will be called to testify on behalf of the prosecution. 9 N.Y.2d at 289-90.
By letter dated May 22, 2000, Saunders sought leave to appeal the Appellate Division's decision to the New York Court of Appeals. He sought review in that court on the same argument he had asserted in the Appellate Division. On August 11, 2000, leave to appeal was denied.People v. Saunders, 95 N.Y.2d 871 (2000).
The instant petition was filed on January 31, 2001. In it, Saunders seeks relief on the same ground he advanced in the state courts, that is, his claim that the belated disclosure of the amended version of the arresting officer's on-line booking sheet deprived him of his right to a fair trial:
DISCUSSION
A. The Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") has narrowed the scope of federal habeas review of state convictions where the state court has adjudicated a petitioner's federal claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under the AEDPA standard, which applies to habeas petitions filed after AEDPA's enactment in 1996, the reviewing court may grant habeas relief only if the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "clearly established Federal law" to mean "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision."Williams v. Taylor U.S. 362, 412 (7000); see also Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2001).
A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts."Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court law if a state court "identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of [a] prisoner's case." Id. "In other words, a federal court may grant relief when a state court has misapplied a `governing legal principle' to `a set of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was announced.'" Wiggins y. Smith, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535 (2003) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175(2003)).
Under the latter standard, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Gilchrist, 260 F.3d at 93 (citingWilliams, 529 U.S. at 411); see also Yarborough v. Gentry, 124 S.Ct. l, 157 L.Ed.2d 1, 7 (2003) (per curiam) ("Where . . . the state court's application of governing federal law is challenged, it must be shown to be not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable."); Wiggins, 123 S.Ct at 2535 (same). Interpreting Williams, the second Circuit has added that although "[s]ome increment of incorrectness beyond error is required . . . the increment need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence." Id. (citing Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2001)).
This standard of review applies whenever the state court has adjusticated the federal claim on the merits, regardless of whether it has alluded to federal law in its decision. As the Second Circuit stated in Sellen v. Kuhlman:
[f]or the purpose of AEDPA deference, a state court "adjudicate[s]" a state prisoner's federal claim on the merits when it (1) disposes of the claim "on the merits," and (2) reduces its disposition to judgement. When a state court does so, a federal habeas court must defer in the manner prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) to the state court's decision on the federal claim — even if the state court does not explicitly refer to either the federal claim or to relevant federal case law.Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 2001).
In addition, a state court's determination of a factual issue is presumed to be correct, and is unreasonable only where the petitioner meets the burden of "rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
B. Saunders's Claim
During the cross-examination of the arresting officer by Saunders's counsel, it was revealed that the arresting officer had made changes to his on-line booking sheet. Specifically, the officer had changed the address where the events occurred. The amended booking sheet was immediately made available to the defendant, and defense counsel cross-examined the arresting officer about his conflicting prior statement regarding the place of arrest.
Respondent contends that Saunders's purported federal claim under the Fourteenth Amendment is really just a state claim underRosario. and thus his claim is not cognizable in this habeas proceeding. With respect to any federal claim, respondent argues that Saunders procedurally defaulted it by failing to apprise the state courts that he was alleging a federal constitutional deprivation. Respondent points out that, except for a citation in a point heading to the Fourteenth Amendment, Saunders's brief to the Appellate Division relied exclusively on New York law.
To the extent that Saunders alleges a Rosario violation, he cannot obtain the writ. Putting aside the fact that a Rosario claim does not present a federal question reviewable by a habeas court, see Morrison v. McClellan, 903 F. Supp. 428, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Any error under Rosario at trial would be a violation of state law, and. thus, not subject to review under a petition for a writ of habeas corpus"), defense counsel received the Rosario material in sufficient time to use it at trial to cross-examine the arresting officer.
To the extent that Saunders alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial under the United States Constitution, he is also unsuccessful. I need not resolve the procedural issue raised by the respondent because Saunders's claim is so conspicuously lacking in merit. The evidence at trial against Saunders was overwhelming. He was identified by the undercover officer to whom he made a hand-to-hand sale of cocaine. He was arrested by another officer shortly after he was observed discarding the pre-recorded buy money. The precise address of the transaction simply was not germane at the trial. In any event, as I pointed out earlier, the arresting officer was in fact cross-examined with regard to his inconsistent statements about the location of the events at issue.
In light of the foregoing, it cannot reasonably be said that the state courts's rejection of Saunders's claim, on the merits, constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the petition is denied. Because Saunders has failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of his constitutional rights, a certificate of appealability shall not issue.
So Ordered.
Brooklyn, New York