There are instances where the Superior Court finds facts de novo, such as when the court reviews a tax assessment. See, e.g., Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 61, ¶ 3, 708 A.2d 281, 282. Because review in these types of cases is governed by special statutory provisions, they are generally not subject to Rule 80B. See M.R. Civ. P. 80B(a).

[¶15] Applying close scrutiny here, we conclude that a dismissal with prejudice was, in the circumstances presented here, too "drastic" a sanction, for two reasons. Baker's Table, 2000 ME 7, ¶ 16, 743 A.2d 237; see Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 61, ¶¶ 6-7, 708 A.2d 281 (concluding that a dismissal as a sanction for a discovery violation was "overly harsh" where the plaintiff, though "not blameless," had a good faith and legally justifiable basis for believing that the proceedings had been stayed). First, after PMO-SJC-7 was rescinded and court proceedings returned to an in-person format, the Judicial Branch website continued to direct parties to Form CV-218 even though it no longer reflected current court practices.

The record does not establish, however, whether Unifund was engaging in dilatory tactics or whether it or its attorney had previously engaged in dilatory tactics in prior cases. See Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 61, ¶¶ 1, 6-7, 708 A.2d 281, 281, 283 (vacating the court's sanction of dismissal as "overly harsh" in response to the plaintiff's failure to comply with a discovery order because, even though the plaintiff was "not blameless," his failure to comply with the order was based on his good faith belief that all Superior Court proceedings were stayed by a bankruptcy filing). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand to the District Court for further proceedings, including consideration of what sanction to impose on Unifund considering its degree of fault and the extent to which the court may determine that its actions did or did not prejudice other parties or the efficient administration of justice.

[¶ 7] We "review the imposition of sanctions for discovery violations for an abuse of discretion, but will more closely scrutinize sanctions such as dismissal or default." Harris v. Soley, 2000 ME 150, ¶ 9, 756 A.2d 499, 504 (citing Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 61, ¶ 6, 708 A.2d 281, 283). The narrower discretion of the trial court in imposing a sanction of dismissal "reflects the constitutional implications in dismissing an action without affording a party the opportunity to be heard on the merits of his case."

We generally apply a higher level of scrutiny only in those instances where the sanction imposed resulted in dismissal of a claim or cause of action. See Soley, 2000 ME 150, ¶ 9, 756 A.2d at 504; Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 61, ¶ 6, 708 A.2d 281, 283. Rule 37 provides, in pertinent part:(a)(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded . . . the discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer . . . in accordance with the request. . . . . (a)(4) Award of Expenses of Motion.If the motion is granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion . . . to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

[¶ 9] We review the imposition of sanctions for discovery violations for an abuse of discretion, but will more closely scrutinize sanctions such as dismissal or default. See Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 61, ¶ 6, 708 A.2d 281, 283. Nevertheless, "[a]lthough we recognize the constitutional implications of dismissal and give greater scrutiny to the decision to dismiss than we would give to a lesser sanction, we will not lightly overrule the trial court's decision." Orlandella v. O'Brien, 637 A.2d 105, 106 (Me. 1994) (citing Fallon v. Casco-Northern Corp., 462 A.2d 53, 56 (Me. 1983); Reeves v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 421 A.2d 47, 50 (Me. 1980)); see also Pelletier v. Pathiraja, 519 A.2d 187, 190 (Me. 1986).

Several months later, he filed for bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court. Because the case was stayed by such filing, we vacated a Superior Court judgment dismissing Saucier's complaint. See Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 61, ¶ 7, 708 A.2d 281, 283. On remand and following discovery, the court granted the Assessor's motion for a summary judgment.

A dismissal with prejudice is considered a severe penalty if imposed as a sanction before a party has been heard on the merits, and the Law Court has expressed that this form of sanction should only be used in narrow circumstances. Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 61, ¶ 6, 708 A.2d 281; Fallon v. Casco-Northern Corp., 462 A.2d 53, 56 (Me. 1983). If the defendants are seeking disposal of the case after the plaintiff has been fully heard, the correct terminology for a motion to dismiss complaint at completion of plaintiff's case is motion for judgment as matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 50(d); Smith v. Welch, 645 A.2d 1130,1131 n.l (Me. 1994).

'Although the trial court's discretion to choose an appropriate sanction is broad, when a court imposes a 'drastic' sanction such as dismissal or default we will closely scrutinize the court's decision.'" 2000 ME 7, ¶ 16, 743 A.2d 237, 243 (quoting Saucier v. State Tax Assessor , 1998 ME 61, ¶ 6, 708 A.2d 281). " '[T]he ultimate sanction should be imposed only for the most serious instances of noncompliance with pretrial procedures.

A dismissal with prejudice is considered a severe penalty if imposed as a sanction before a party has been heard on the merits, and the Law Court has expressed that this form of sanction should only be used in narrow circumstances. Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 61, ¶ 6, 708 A.2d 281; Fallon v. Casco-Northern Corp., 462 A.2d 53, 56 (Me. 1983). If the defendants are seeking disposal of the case after the plaintiff has been fully heard, the correct terminology for a motion to dismiss complaint at completion of plaintiff's case is motion for judgment as matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 50(d); Smith v. Welch, 645 A.2d 1130, 1131 n.1 (Me. 1994).