Opinion
No. 99 C 3682.
January 31, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case is before the court on the petition of Luis Saucedo for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the following reasons, we deny the petition for habeas corpus.
BACKGROUND
On August 25, 1994, petitioner Luis "Babyface" Saucedo, with his fellow gang members, Jaime "J.R." Ruiz and Gabriel "Crazy T" Terrazas, assaulted David Martinez in an alley near 26th Street in Chicago. Martinez was shot three times. At the crime scene, the police recovered Ruiz' baseball hat bearing gang insignia and three shells from a .380 caliber automatic handgun. After a short investigation, the police questioned Ruiz, Terrazas, Sergio Diaz, and Oscar Duarte.
Martinez died several days later. The medical examiner recovered a .380 caliber bullet from Martinez' body. The police arrested Terrazas and Ruiz on first-degree murder charges. With Terrazas' assistance, the police located and arrested petitioner on first-degree murder charges. Terrazas later agreed with the prosecution to testify against petitioner in return for a reduced charge of aggravated battery.
Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder after approximately 32 minutes of deliberations. The trial court denied petitioner's post-trial motion. At the sentencing hearing, Martinez' family testified about his educational background and potential for community leadership. Several police officers testified about other incidents involving petitioner for which he was not charged. The dean of petitioner's school testified about his disruptive behavior. After hearing arguments in aggravation and mitigation, the court sentenced petitioner to 50 years imprisonment. The court found that petitioner showed some likelihood of rehabilitation, but other evidence warranted a lengthy sentence.
Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the Illinois Appellate Court, First Judicial District, raising three issues: 1) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; 2) he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel when counsel failed to object to the prosecution's leading questions on redirect examination; and 3) excessive sentence. On November 6, 1997, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Petitioner filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court in which he raised the same issues presented to the Appellate Court. On June 3, 1998, the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
On May 28, 1999, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (1996). The petition raised the following two issues: 1) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on second degree murder; and 2) ineffective assistance of counsel. On July 1, 1999, the trial court dismissed the petition for post-conviction as untimely. Additionally, the trial court held that the first issue raised by petitioner was barred by the doctrine of waiver, because it should have been raised on direct appeal. The court also found the petitioner's second issue to be frivolous and patently without merit, as it was unsupported by any facts or evidence.
Petitioner then appealed the dismissal of his post-conviction petition to the Illinois Appellate Court, First Judicial District. On May 17, 2000, the Appellate Court found "no issues of arguable merit" in petitioner's post-conviction petition and affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal. On June 2, 1999, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. On June 30, 1999, we dismissed the petition without prejudice and gave petitioner leave to reinstate his petition at the conclusion of the post-conviction proceedings pending in state court.
Petitioner did not file a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court regarding his post-conviction petition, thereby concluding the proceedings in state court. Petitioner then filed a motion to reinstate his habeas petition in this Court, which we granted on October 5, 1999.
On October 25, 1999, petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. In it, he raises five grounds for relief: 1) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; 2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to the leading questions of the prosecutor during redirect examination; 3) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failure to ask for a jury instruction on second degree murder and failure to raise the issue on appeal; 4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to file a post-trial sentencing motion; and 5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to hold the state to its speedy trial term.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) governs the consideration of any claim adjudicated by a state court on its merits. See Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 868-71 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under section 2254(d)(1), habeas relief may be awarded only if the state court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1). Under subsection (d)(2), habeas relief is possible only if the state court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented" in the state court. The "unreasonable application" exception of section 2254(d)(1) applies to mixed questions of law and fact, and thus where the state court offers "a responsible, thoughtful answer" after "frill opportunity to litigate" the question, a federal court on habeas review must accept that answer as "adequate to support the judgment." Lindh, 96 F.3d at 871.
A federal court cannot address the merits of constitutional claims brought in a petition for habeas corpus relief, however, unless the state courts have had a full and fair opportunity to review them. See United States ex rel, Simmons v. Gramley, 915 F.2d 1128, 1131-32 (7th Cir. 1990). As the Seventh Circuit explained in Henderson v. Thieret, 859 F.2d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1988):
Before considering a petition for habeas corpus on its merits, a district court must make two inquiries — whether the petitioner exhausted all available remedies and whether the petitioner raised all his claims during the course of the state proceedings. If the answer is "no," the petition is barred either for failure to exhaust state remedies or for procedural default. Id.
To avoid procedural default, a federal habeas petitioner must show that he raised the claims contained in his habeas corpus petition during the state proceedings and that he afforded the highest state court an opportunity to address these claims. Cawley v. DeTella, 71 F.3d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 1995). In Illinois, a habeas petitioner is required to raise all arguments before the Illinois Supreme Court, even though the Court has discretionary control over its docket. O'Sullivan v. Boerekel, 526 U.S. 838, 843 (1999). A federal court's review of a habeas claim is barred if the State in which the petitioner was convicted treats the failure to appeal as a procedural default barring further review. Id.
II. Procedural Default
In this case, petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for: a) failure to seek a jury instruction on second degree murder and failure to raise the issue on appeal (Claim 3); b) failure to file a post-trial sentencing motion (Claim 4); and c) failure to hold the state to its speedy trial term (Claim 5) must be dismissed under the doctrine of procedural default. A petitioner's failure to properly present his claims in the state court proceedings and further failure to establish cause for that default and prejudice from the constitutional infirmities alleged therein bars consideration of those claims in a subsequent action for habeas corpus. See Nutall v. Greer, 764 F.2d 462, 465 (7th Cir. 1985).
A number of procedural default arguments apply to petitioner's claims. Petitioner's claims regarding the failure to file a post-trial sentencing motion and the failure to hold the state to its speedy trial term (Claims 4 and 5) were never raised in any state court proceeding and cannot be raised for the first time in a federal habeas corpus petition. See Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir. 1995). These claims were never raised on direct appeal, in a petition for leave to appeal, or in petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. Moreover, petitioner has failed to show that there was adequate cause for his failure to raise these claims in the state court proceedings and that he has suffered actual prejudice from the alleged Federal law violation. Thus, Claims 4 and 5 are inappropriate for habeas relief.
Petitioner raised Claim 3 in his petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, Claim 3 alleges ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failure to ask for a jury instruction on second degree murder and failure to raise that issue on direct appeal. In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner raised these issues for the first time. Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed by the trial court and that decision was affirmed by the Appellate Court. Petitioner did not file a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court regarding his post-conviction petition. Therefore, petitioner never afforded the highest state court an opportunity to address this claim and that procedural default bars federal review of the claim. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999); White v. Godinez, 192 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 1999).
Finally, Claim 3, as it relates to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, is procedurally defaulted and barred from consideration by this Court because the claims were rejected on adequate and independent state law grounds by the highest state court to review it. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). As stated in Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989), the state court must have actually relied on a state procedural rule as an independent basis for its decision. To determine whether a state court independently and adequately relied on state procedural law, the federal court looks to the highest court that has supplied an explanation. Prihoda v. McCaughtry, 910 F.2d 1379, 1383 (7th Cir. 1990). As a matter of comity, the federal court generally will be bound by a state's finding of procedural default under its own laws.White v. Peters, 990 F.2d 338, 340 (7th Cir. 1994).
In the instant case, petitioner presented the claim regarding the second degree murder instruction for the first time in his petition for post-conviction relief. The circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely under the time limitations in the Post-Conviction Hearing Act ( 725 ILCS 5/122-1, et seq.). Alternatively, the circuit court noted that the claim was frivolous and patently without merit as petitioner failed to provide any support, by means of alleged facts or evidence at trial, for his claim that he would have been entitled to a second degree murder instruction. A claim that is frivolous and patently without merit fails to meet the requirements for post-conviction relief pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/122-1. In this case, the last court to issue a written order on these claims rested its decision on state procedural grounds sufficient to justify its decision. Therefore, federal habeas relief is not available to petitioner on this claim.
Because petitioner has procedurally defaulted these claims this court can reach the merits of these claims only if petitioner can demonstrate: 1) adequate cause to excuse his failure to raise the claims in state court; and 2)actual prejudice resulting from the defaults. Farrell v. Lane, 939 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1991). Petitioner fails to make any attempt to establish cause and prejudice in his petition. Nor does he establish a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" that would permit him to sidestep the cause and prejudice requirement. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). Therefore, petitioner's claims are barred on federal habeas review.
III. Merits of the Claims Presented
Petitioner properly preserved for federal habeas review his claims that: 1) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and 2) that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel because trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's leading questions on redirect examination. These claims were raised on appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, and again in a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. The last state court to address the claims on the merits was the Illinois Appellate Court, First Judicial District. Petitioner's burden before this Court, then, is to demonstrate that the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court was an unreasonable application of, or contrary to, established United States Supreme Court precedent.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim
Petitioner asserts that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder. We find that petitioner has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that the state court determination was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court." Lindh, 96 F.3d at 986-69.
The claim raised here was presented to the Illinois Appellate Court, which addressed it at some length in its decision. The Appellate Court cited to the Illinois case of People v. Collins, 106 Ill.2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985), which we believe is the appropriate authority. InCollins, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the reasoning set forth inJackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Jackson sets forth the standard for review for a claim of insufficient evidence. In reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence, the critical inquiry is "whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. This inquiry does not require the court to ask whether it believes the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt."Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19. The Appellate Court acknowledged and applied the standard set forth in Jackson and, after reviewing the evidence, it determined that "[v]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find a reasonable jury could have found Saucedo guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
Petitioner cites no authority in support of his contention that the Appellate Court erred in determining that he was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, petitioner merely states that the testimony of a "co-defender" against him was not credible. Co-defendant Terrazas testified that petitioner, Terrazas and Ruiz chased Martinez down an alley and began to beat him. Petitioner then warned Terrazas and Ruiz to "watch out, to move out of the way" before taking the gun from his waist and shooting Martinez two times. Terrazas testified that he asked petitioner if he had killed Martinez, petitioner replied, "I don't know. I just shot him twice." The Appellate Court analyzed the testimony of the co-defendant, Terrazas, and determined that the jury chose to believe the testimony, which was corroborated in several respects by Diaz and Vasquez. The Appellate Court concluded that a reasonable jury could have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because this question presents a mixed question of law and fact, petitioner must show that the state court's determination was an "unreasonable application of clearly established federal law" as established by the United States Supreme Court. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 870. Petitioner has not met his burden here. The order of the Illinois Appellate Court, First Judicial District, contains a statement of the applicable law. Using the appropriate standard, the Illinois Appellate Court determined that the trier of fact appropriately determined that a reasonable trier of fact could fairly conclude the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the evidence most strongly in the People's favor. The Illinois Appellate Court correctly applied the law ofJackson v. Virginia, and determined that the trial court ruled correctly. Thus, petitioner's habeas claim is without merit and is denied.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claim
Petitioner next claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to the prosecutor's leading questions during redirect examination. Because this claim was properly presented to the Illinois Appellate Court, we will address it on its merits. We find that petitioner has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that the state court rendered a decision that was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court." See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 868-69.
The standard for reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).Strickland sets forth a two prong analysis for determining ineffectiveness of counsel: 1) a showing that counsel's performance was deficient; and 2) a showing that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 678.
In order to prevail on his claim of ineffectiveness under the first prong of Strickland, petitioner must show that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. In reviewing challenged conduct, "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id.
To satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. This Court "need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Id. Rather, "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which . . . will often be so, that course should be followed." Id.
In this case, petitioner has not met his burden to demonstrate that he was denied effective assistance of counsel regarding his counsel's failure to object to every leading question. The Illinois Appellate Court's decision regarding this matter reflects ample consideration and appropriate application of the Strickland standard. The Appellate Court noted that "[w]hen defense counsel fails to object to leading questions which could have been rephrased by the prosecution, the defendant cannot make a substantial showing of prejudice to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland." The Court then went on to analyze trial counsel's performance, noting that he had, indeed, objected to several leading questions, and some of those objections were sustained. Therefore, the Appellate Court concluded that there was not unreasonable performance by trial counsel, nor did petitioner suffer prejudice.
Likewise, petitioner's attempt to make an ineffectiveness argument in this Court is unsuccessful. He fails to point to any United States Supreme Court law that supports his position, nor does he demonstrate that the Illinois Appellate Court failed to properly assess trial counsel's conduct pursuant to Strickland. Petitioner merely states that he disagrees with the state court's determination. That is not enough to sustain his burden under § 2254(d). Therefore, petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus brought by petitioner Luis Saucedo. This is a final and appealable order.