A person who lawfully enters premises that are generally open to the public "knowingly . . . remains unlawfully" on the premises when he refuses a lawful request to leave the premises. See Satterwhite v. City of Auburn, 945 So. 2d 1076, 1079 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (holding that the defendant committed the offense of criminal trespass in the third degree in a bookstore when she "refused to leave the . . . store after being asked to leave by [store] management" and city police).
As evidenced by Carter, the crime of heat-of-passion manslaughter requires the specific intent to kill. Thus, because an instruction on a lesser-included offense must be supported by the evidence, Satterwhite v. City of Auburn, 945 So.2d 1076, 1083 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006), Varnado was not entitled to an instruction on heat-of-passion manslaughter unless there was evidence indicating (1) that he had the specific intent to kill Anthony Packer and Sherika Huffman Packer and (2) that he did so under heat of passion caused by provocation recognized by law. § 13A-6-3(a)(2).
Carter v. State, 843 So. 2d 812, 815 (Ala. 2002). Thus, because heat-of-passion manslaughter requires an intentional killing and because an instruction on a lesser-included offense must be supported by the evidence, Satterwhite v. City of Auburn, 945 So. 2d 1076, 1083 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006), Varnado was not entitled to an instruction on heat-of-passion manslaughter unless there was evidence indicating (1) that he intentionally killed Anthony Packer and Sherika Huffman Packer and (2) that he did so under heat of passion caused by provocation recognized by law. § 13A-6-3(a)(2). As the main opinion notes, this Court has recognized that legal provocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter may exist when the defendant witnesses an assault on a family member or close relative.
Traditionally, this Court, when examining a circuit court's decision to impose a certain sentence length under §§ 13A–5–6 or 13A–5–9, Ala.Code 1975, has applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. City of Auburn, 945 So.2d 1076, 1090 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) (“Satterwhite's sentence clearly falls within the statutory range. We have reviewed the record and find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in sentencing Satterwhite to 30 days' imprisonment in the county jail.”); Best v. State, 895 So.2d 1050, 1052 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) ( “It is well settled that, absent an abuse of discretion, this Court will not disturb a sentence on appeal where the sentence imposed by the trial court is within the statutory range.
" Satterwhite v. City of Auburn, 945 So.2d 1076, 1089 (Ala.Crim.App.2006).
Rule 616, Ala. R. Evid., provides that '[a] party may attack the credibility of a witness by presenting evidence that the witness has a bias or prejudice for or against a party or the case or that the witness has an interest in the case.'" Satterwhite v. City of Auburn, 945 So. 2d 1076, 1089 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006). "It cannot be gainsaid that the prosecutor was vigorous and aggressive in his cross-examination of [the expert]; however, we are unable to conclude that the prosecutor's cross-examination amounted to misconduct.