E.g., Williams, 529 S.E.2d at 39-40; Keiger v. Citgo Coastal Petroleum, Inc., 482 S.E.2d 792, 794 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); see also, e.g., First Nat. Bank, 2007 WL 3232116, at *2 (interpreting and applying South Carolina law in disposing of claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an at-will employment relationship); Johnson v. Dillard's, Inc., C/A No. 3:03-3445-MBS, 2007 WL 2792232, at *17 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2007); Hindman v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 947 F. Supp. 215, 226 (D.S.C. 1996) (same), aff'd, 133 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1997); Witt v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 860 F. Supp. 295, 306 (D.S.C. 1994) (same); Grooms v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 861 F. Supp. 497, 506 (D.S.C. 1991) (same), aff'd, 993 F.2d 1537 (4th Cir.) (per curiam) (unpublished), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 996 (1993). According to the court in Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (D.S.C. 1985): In the context of [at-will employment] it would be incongruous to say that an inference may be drawn that the employer impliedly agreed to a provision which would be destructive of his right of termination.

See supra p. 300-301 (conflict of laws discussion). At the hearing before this court, Witt agreed that there is no covenant of good faith in an at-will employment relationship under South Carolina law. See, e.g., Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1363-64 (D.S.C. 1985) (Judge Hawkins held that there is no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in at-will employment). An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is antithetical to the whole notion of at-will employment.

A contract for permanent employment of indefinite duration, which is unsupported by any other consideration than the respective obligations to perform services and pay wages, is terminable at the will of either party. Satterfield v. LockheedMissiles and Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985) (citing various South Carolina cases). Employment at will results from agreements which have "no additional expression of duration."

It is the court's responsibility to first determine as a matter of law whether or not the conduct in question was outrageous before submitting that question to the jury. Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1365, 1369 (D.S.C. 1985) (citing Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 283 S.C. 155, 321 S.E.2d 602, 609-10 (Ct.App. 1984), quashed in part, 287 S.C. 190, 336 S.E.2d 472 (1985)). In Satterfield, a wrongful termination suit, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

The court must "first determine as a matter of law whether or not the conduct in question was outrageous before submitting that question to the jury." Barber v. Whirlpool Corp., 34 F.3d 1268, 1276 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1365, 1369 (D.S.C. 1985)). Defendant argues that its conduct was not intentional and reiterates its contention that Plaintiff has not produced evidence to show that RAC employee Tolliver knew Richardson prior to his meeting with Taylor.

The commercial contract covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however, is not implied in employment at-will. Grooms v. Mobay Chemical Corp., 861 F. Supp. 497 (D.S.C. 1991) (policy manual which was not written in mandatory terms and contained vague and unspecific language did not constitute an enforceable contract which would limit employer's right to discharge an at-will employee), aff'd, 993 F.2d 1537 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 996 (1993); Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985). As discussed above, Johnson fails to show that the Policy Manual constitutes a contract between the parties, and thus she cannot show that Dillard's breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

His breach of contract claim and, the action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails accordingly.See Satterfield v. Lockheed, 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1363-64 (S.C. 1985) (recognizing the inherent contradiction of at-will employment and an action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing).D. DENIAL OF DISABILITY BENEFITS

See Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213, 214 (1985). While South Carolina recognizes exceptions to the doctrine, see Small v. Springs Indus., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1987), none of those exceptions apply here. Under South Carolina law, there is simply no claim for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment context, see Grooms v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 861 F. Supp. 497, 506 (D.S.C. 1991), aff'd, 993 F.2d 1537 (4th Cir.) (per curiam) (unpublished), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 996, 114 S.Ct. 561, 126 L.Ed.2d 461 (1993); Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1361-63 (D.S.C. 1985), nor could there be without violating the employment-at-will doctrine, an exception that this court declines to create and institute. Here, Hindman was an at-will employee, who was employed for an indefinite duration, which constitutes employment at will, see id. at 1361, and there is no evidence that Hindman's employment status was other than at-will.

This Court agrees. In Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (D.S.C. 1985) the court stated: [P]laintiff's employment was at will, a relationship in which the law accords the employer an unfettered right to terminate the employment at any time.

Harrison, 264 F. Supp. at 92 (emphasis added) (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts, Right of Privacy § 112 at 835 (3d ed. 1963)).E.g., Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 418 (8th Cir. 1978) ("Except in cases of physical intrusion, it has been held that the tort must be founded upon publicity, in the sense of communication to the public in general or to a large number of persons, as distinguished from one individual or a few."); Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1370 (D.S.C. 1985) ("The disclosure of private facts must be a public disclosure, and not a private one; there must be, in other words, publicity."); Beard v. Akzona, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 128, 133 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) ("`Publicity' . . . means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge."); Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Kan. 1985) ("it is not an invasion of the right of privacy . . . to communicate a [private fact] to a single person or even to a small group of persons."). The form of invasion of the right of privacy covered in this Section depends upon publicity given to the private life of the individual.