Opinion
NO. 2016-CA-000053-MR
02-17-2017
RONALD SATTENBERG, M.D. APPELLANT v. UNIVERSITY RADIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATES, P.S.C. APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: William D. Nefzger M. Catherine Halloran Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, URA: Clay M. Stevens Kristen H. Fowler Louisville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BRIAN C. EDWARDS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 12-CI-003326 OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: KRAMER, CHIEF JUDGE; D. LAMBERT AND NICKELL, JUDGES. KRAMER, CHIEF JUDGE: On August 12, 2011, Dr. Ronald Sattenberg was walking through an office located in the University of Louisville Hospital's department of radiology when he tripped over some cords lying on the floor and injured himself. He then filed suit in Jefferson Circuit Court against several parties, including appellee University Radiological Associates, P.S.C. (URA), alleging negligence and premises liability. Thereafter, URA sought to dismiss Sattenberg's claims against it by asserting immunity to suit based upon the exclusive remedy provision of the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Act, KRS 342 et seq. Its motion for summary judgment was granted, and this appeal followed. We now reverse.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Summary judgment serves to terminate litigation where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03. Summary judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible that the nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). Summary judgment "is proper only where the movant shows that the adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances." Id. at 479 (citing Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985)).
On appeal, we must consider whether the circuit court correctly determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. App. 1996). Because summary judgment involves only questions of law and not the resolution of disputed material facts, an appellate court does not defer to the circuit court's decision. Goldsmith v. Allied Building Components, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1992). Likewise, we review the circuit court's interpretations of law de novo. Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Bell Cty. Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Ky. 2007).
As noted, the circuit court summarily dismissed Sattenberg's claims against URA on the basis of the exclusive remedy provision. URA argues the circuit court's judgment was correct because undisputed evidence demonstrated, as the circuit court pointed out in its order, that Sattenberg was employed by URA when he injured himself and that URA had a policy of worker's compensation insurance in force at the time.
The circuit court's understanding of the exclusive remedy provision, however, was incomplete. As explained in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Slusher, 325 S.W.3d 318, 323 (Ky. 2010),
The exclusive remedy provision of the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Act, which is contained in KRS 342.690, provides as follows:
If an employer secures payment of compensation as required by this chapter, the liability of such employer under this chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death. . . . The exemption from liability given an
employer by this section shall also extend to such employer's carrier and to all employees, officers or directors of such employer or carrier. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
"Essentially, the exclusive remedy provision grants immunity for liability arising from common law and statutory claims, meaning such claims cannot be pursued in the courts of this Commonwealth." Kentucky Employers Mut. Ins. v. Coleman, 236 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Ky. 2007). The effect of this statute is that "KRS 342.690(1) and its predecessor statute shield a covered employer and its insurer from any other liability to a covered employee for damages arising out of a work-related injury." Id. (quoting Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Reker, 100 S.W.3d 756, 760 (Ky.2003)). "[T]he exemption from liability granted to an employer by KRS 342.690(1) is also extended to all employees of the employer." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sherman & Fletcher, 705 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Ky. 1986).
As emphasized above, only injuries incurred by employees which arise out of the course and scope of their employment are compensable by workers' compensation benefits to the exclusion of other remedies. KRS 342.0011(1); KRS 342.690(1). Conversely, injuries incurred by employees which do not arise out of the course and scope of their employment are not compensable by workers' compensation benefits to the exclusion of other remedies. Thus, it is not enough that an employer-employee relationship existed between URA and Sattenberg and that URA indisputably had secured worker's compensation insurance at the time of Sattenberg's injuries. For the exclusive remedy provision to have properly applied, Sattenberg's injuries must also have been related to his work for URA. This principle was illustrated in Wymer v. JH Props., Inc., 50 S.W.3d 195 (Ky. 2001). There, an employee of Jewish Hospital sustained a work-related injury; she later sustained a separate and distinct injury while undergoing physical therapy at a Jewish Hospital facility; and, because she had not sustained her latter injury in the course and scope of her employment with Jewish Hospital, the exclusive remedy provision did not preclude her from asserting a malpractice action. Id. at 197.
Because the exclusive remedy provision is an affirmative defense that URA had the burden of proving and because URA prevailed at the summary judgment phase, we may only affirm the circuit court if the undisputed evidence of record demonstrates that Sattenberg sustained his injuries in the course and scope of his employment with URA.
See Gordon v. NKC Hosps., Inc., 887 S.W.2d 360, 363 (Ky. 1994).
With that said, URA's brief largely devotes itself to the following two points: (1) Sattenberg is receiving an indeterminate amount of voluntary Workers' Compensation benefits due to his alleged injury from one of his other employers, the University of Louisville ("U of L"); and (2) U of L was a defendant below, and the circuit court granted U of L an interlocutory summary judgment on the basis of the exclusive remedy provision.
Both of these points are actually irrelevant. The circuit court could ultimately vacate its summary judgment in favor of U of L and make a determination that U of L is not entitled to exclusive remedy immunity; as noted, the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of U of L remains, to date, interlocutory. Moreover, nothing of record demonstrates Sattenberg was performing work for and was subject to the joint control of both U of L and URA when he sustained his injuries. Absent such evidence, even if U of L were entitled to exclusive remedy immunity, it would be of no benefit to URA. See Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 68 (2008) (explaining joint employment and joint liability of employers in the context of Workers' Compensation).
Upon review, there is no evidence on this subject—only an unresolved question. Indeed, URA's reluctance to state anything definitive about this issue is underscored by the fact that, in a worker's compensation action Sattenberg filed contemporaneously with this matter (based upon exactly the same injuries), URA has defended by arguing Sattenberg did not sustain his injuries in the course and scope of his employment with URA. We therefore REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
URA's position in the workers' compensation proceedings does not, as Sattenberg advocates, rise to the level of judicial estoppel. As far as the record demonstrates, those separate workers' compensation proceedings remain unresolved. Thus, because this proceeding and the workers' compensation proceeding are both ongoing, it cannot be said that, by arguing in the workers' compensation proceedings that Sattenberg's injuries are not work-related, URA is asserting a later position clearly inconsistent with an earlier one; or that URA succeeded in persuading a court or any other tribunal to accept a particular position; or that, as of yet, URA has derived some unfair advantage. See Hisle v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, 258 S.W.3d 422, 434-35 (Ky. App. 2008) (discussing judicial estoppel factors).
In light of our holding, it is unnecessary to address the remaining points raised in Sattenberg's brief. Those issues regard the length of time he was allotted for discovery regarding the course and scope of his employment with URA; and whether the circuit court abused its discretion in making URA's summary judgment final and appealable. --------
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: William D. Nefzger
M. Catherine Halloran
Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, URA: Clay M. Stevens
Kristen H. Fowler
Louisville, Kentucky