As to the fourth element, the Colony contends that Valdez has failed to establish the fourth element of her hostile work environment claim, as her First Amended Complaint only includes an "isolated contention" that an alleged supervisor gave her more residents to bathe than younger workers, and an isolated incident does not amount to "severe or pervasive" harassment. See Uppal v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 482 Fed. Appx. 394, 397 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that "single incident of harassing conduct cannot support a hostile work environment claim") (citing Miller, 277 F.3d at 1276); Satchel v. School Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., 251 Fed. Appx. 626, 630 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff did not present evidence to show that harassment was severe and pervasive where harassment "consisted of specific, isolated incidents which occurred over a period of years at different schools"). In her response, Valdez maintains that "the frequent degrading comments coupled with [the Colony's] employees['] hostile conduct cumulatively created a hostile work environment," such as Valdez being referred to as "old b*tch" and "Spanish b*tch" on "a regular basis."
” Id. As the Supreme Court has stated “teasing, offhand comments and isolated incidents do not constitute discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Satchel v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., 251 Fed.Appx. 626, 630 (11th Cir.2007) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998)). The alleged harassment in this case was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a racially hostile work environment.
As relevant here, Wertheim's “belief that he was disabled [must be] objectively reasonable.” ABEL, 161 F.3d at 1328.See also Satchel v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., 251 Fed.Appx. 626, 629 (11th Cir. 2007); Roberts, 135 Fed.Appx. at 357; Luna v. Walgreen Co., 575 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Bowen v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., No. 19-62664-CIV-CANNON/Hunt, 2021 WL 2583495, at *12 (S.D. Fla. June 2, 2021); Carroll v. Neumann, 204 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2002). So what belief is reasonable?
'Unfair treatment, absent discrimination based on sex, or national origin, is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.'"). And see Satchel v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County. 251 Fed.Appx. 626, 628 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of Title VII retaliation claim based om filing of a union grievance reasoning that a union grievance is not a protected activity where it failed to allege in the grievance anything related to race or otherwise indicate the School Board was engaged in unlawful employment practices). Thus, McNeal cannot show she engaged in statutorily protected expression; she cannot satisfy the elements of her prima facie case.
There is no question that Lt. Mitchell engaged in protected activity when he filed his two EEOC Charges. See, e.g., Satchel v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cty., 251 Fed. App'x 626, 628 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[A]n EEOC complaint constitutes protected activity."). The parties do, however, dispute whether the other actions Lt. Mitchell named qualify as protected activities.
Moreover, Rubach's tailgating of McLaughlin occurred only seven to eight times and ceased in 2013. See McLaughlin Dep. at 62-63, 113-14, 169-70; see also Alexander v. Opelika City Schs., 352 F. App'x 390, 393 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that harassment was not frequent when a plaintiff "testified that he was called 'boy' constantly, but could only recall eight specific instances over the course of two years where he was called 'boy'"); see also Satchel v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., 251 F. App'x 626, 630 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that conduct was not severe or pervasive when "[t]he harassment [the employee] complained of consisted of specific, isolated incidents which occurred over a period of years at different schools"). Although McLaughlin's allegation regarding the forklift incident and the tailgating could be physically threatening, McLaughlin's description of the tailgating incidents indicates that they actually were nothing more than Rubach driving "real, real close."
are bereft of any relationship with opposition to an unlawful employment practice engaged in by the Baldwin County Board of Education or to the making of a charge under Title VII's retaliation provision. See, e.g., Satchel v. School Bd. Of Hillsborough County, 251 Fed.Appx. 626, 628 (11th Cir.2007) (“The activities cited in Satchel's complaint, including filing a union grievance, filing an informal complaint of harassment by a co-worker, and writing letters to the editor of local newspapers, do not constitute the type of protected activity contemplated by Title VII because Satchel failed to allege that the complaints included in those documents had any relationship to race or otherwise indicate that the School Board was engaged in unlawful employment practices.”), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1315, 128 S.Ct. 1875, 170 L.Ed.2d 752 (2008).
Because the conduct to which Plaintiff was subjected was not based on race, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving the third element of a prima facie case of race discrimination. See Satchel v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., 251 F. App'x 626, 630 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie race discrimination case when "the behavior she observed and experienced did not consist of any racially derogatory statements or acts" and the plaintiff merely evinced a belief that one of her coworkers was racist and that the school system she worked for was affected by institutional racism). Plaintiff also has not shown that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive. While the alleged acetate can and seat incidents were physically threatening (though not race-related), many of the alleged incidents were benign, such as the alleged comment about training and HR's alleged actions. While Plaintiff subjectively perceived all of the incidents that he experienced to be hostile, such a perception was not objectively reasonable.
In order to establish a prima facie case of ADA retaliation, a plaintiff must show: "(1) that [s]he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that [s]he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action." Satchel v. School Board of Hillsborough County, 251 Fed. Appx. 626, 629 (11th Cir. 2007). Once a prima facie case has been established, the employer has the opportunity to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action.
Debra A. SATCHEL, petitioner, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF HILLSBORO COUNTY.Case below, 251 Fed.Appx. 626. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.