Opinion
No. CV-06-4005975
November 21, 2006.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS
The defendant, the Psychiatric Security Review Board ("PSRB"), has moved to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff, Roy Sastrom, on the grounds that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Facts
The complaint alleges the following facts. The plaintiff is an acquittee who is confined at Connecticut Valley Hospital in Middletown, Connecticut, a facility of the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services. The plaintiff is committed to the jurisdiction of the PSRB. He seeks a declaratory judgment determining that the PSRB lacks authority or jurisdiction over the plaintiff due to the fact that the PSRB positions of psychiatrist and psychologist are currently vacant. The plaintiff further requests that the judgment include a declaration that any decision of the PSRB made without the participation of a member of the PSRB who is a psychologist or psychiatrist be void ab inition and that the declaratory judgment be retroactive.
The PSRB is a state "agency" as that term is defined in the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA) and by Connecticut General Statutes §§ 4-166(1) and 17a-581. In connection with the Motion to Dismiss the defendant has submitted the affidavit of Ellen Weber, the Executive Director of the PSRB. That affidavit provides in pertinent part:
4. Roy Sastrom is an acquittee who was ordered committed to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board for a maximum term of forty (40) years, by order of the Tolland Superior Court on July 11, 1994, after he was acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect of charges of four counts of Harassment in the First Degree. Four counts of Threatening and four counts of Attempted Larceny in the First degree.
5. Neither Roy Sastrom nor his attorney have petitioned the Psychiatric Security Review Board for a declaratory ruling on the issues present in the above captioned matter . . .
Discussion of the Law and Ruling
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 210-11, 897 A.2d 71 (2006). "Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003).
The PSRB has moved to dismiss the plaintiff's request for a declaratory judgment on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. In support of the motion to dismiss, the PSRB argues that based on Connecticut General Statutes §§ 4-166 et seq. and 17a-581, it is a state agency, subject to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), and, therefore, the plaintiff must first seek a declaratory ruling from the PSRB according to General Statutes § 4-175(a) in order to acquire a declaratory judgment. Since the plaintiff did not request a declaratory ruling from the PSRB's decision or its inaction, which the plaintiff concedes, the PSRB asserts that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction because an adequate administrative remedy exists.
General Statutes § 4-175 provides in relevant part: "(a) If a provision of the general statutes, a regulation or a final decision, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff and if an agency (1) does not take an action required by subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (e) of section 4-176, within sixty days of the filing of a petition for a declaratory ruling, (2) decides not to issue a declaratory ruling under subdivision (4) or (5) of subsection (e) of said section 4-176, or (3) is deemed to have decided not to issue a declaratory ruling under subsection (I) of said section 4-176, the petitioner may seek in the Superior Court a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the regulation in question or the applicability of the provision of the general statutes, the regulation or the final decision in question to specified circumstances. The agency shall be made a party to the action."
The plaintiff counters that although exhaustion is a threshold issue, two exceptions are applicable: (1) the PSRB has exceeded its statutory authority, and (2) exhaustion would be futile. With respect to the first exception, the plaintiff argues that "the PSRB has no expertise on the issue of the construction of its enabling statute." As to the second exception, the plaintiff argues bias, in that the action before the PSRB "could not result in a favorable decision and invariably would result in further judicial proceedings" as "the only conceivable ruling the PSRB could give would be yes, it has authority." The plaintiff's final argument asserts that, because § 4-175(a) fails to address declaratory judgment requests, Connecticut General Statutes § 52-29 and Practice Book § 17-55 are applicable and thus, "the superior court in CT Page 21456 any action or proceeding may declare rights or other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." (Emphasis in original.)
"[B]ecause the exhaustion [of administrative remedies] doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, [the court] must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the [plaintiff's] claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neiman v. Yale University, 270 Conn. 244, 251, 851 A.2d 1165 (2004). "Under our exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administrative proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum . . . In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 616, 872 A.2d 408 (2005). "It is a settled principle of administrative law that, if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter . . . Exhaustion is required even in cases where the agency's jurisdiction over the proposed activity has been challenged . . . This requirement reflects the legislative intent that such issues be handled in the first instance by local administrative officials in order to provide aggrieved persons with full and adequate administrative relief, and to give the reviewing court the benefit of the local board's judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) River Bend Associates, Inc. v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 262 Conn. 84, 103, 809 A.2d 492 (2002).
"A claim that an administrative agency has acted beyond its statutory authority or jurisdiction properly may be the subject of an administrative appeal . . . Where there is in place a mechanism for adequate judicial review . . . [i]t is [the] general rule that an administrative agency may and must determine whether it has jurisdiction in a particular situation. When a particular statute authorizes an administrative agency to act in a particular situation it necessarily confers upon such agency authority to determine whether the situation is such as to authorize the agency to act — that is, to determine the coverage of the statute — and this question need not, and in fact cannot, be initially decided by a court . . . This general rule is in accord with [the court's] frequently stated observation that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal is designed to test." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Greater Bridgeport Transit District v. Local Union 1336, 211 Conn. 436, CT Page 21457 439, 559 A.2d 1113 (1989).
"It is futile to seek a remedy only when such action could not result in a favorable decision and invariably would result in further judicial proceedings . . . [The Supreme Court has] held that utilizing administrative remedies is not futile for purposes of the futility exception even when the decision maker has indicated that it will rule against the grievant." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nieman v. Yale, supra, at 259. There is a presumption "that administrative board members acting in an adjudicative capacity are not biased." Simko v. Ervin, 234 Conn. 498, 508, 661 A.2d 1018 (1995). "To overcome the presumption, the plaintiff . . . must demonstrate actual bias, rather than mere potential bias . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) OG Industries, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 232 Conn. 419, 429, 655 A.2d 1121 (1995).
The plaintiff concedes, citing Young v. Chase, 18 Conn.App. 85, 91, 557 A.2d 134, cert. denied, 211 Conn. 807, 559 A.2d 1141 (1989), that when a statutory right of appeal from an administrative decision exists, a party may not bypass that procedure. The plaintiff claims exception from the standard procedure, however, arguing that the PSRB has exceeded its statutory authority when it acted without a psychologist and psychiatrist as required by § 17a-581, thus, entitling the plaintiff to a declaratory judgment ruling from the court.
Connecticut statutes and case law favor an administrative agency's authoritative ability to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter at issue. Greater Bridgeport Transit v. Local Union 1336, supra, at 438, addressed "whether an administrative agency has exclusive initial power to determine its own jurisdiction in a particular case." Relying on General Statutes § 4-183(g) (now § 4-183(j)), the Court held: "[w]here there is in place a mechanism for adequate judicial review . . . [i]t is [the] general rule that an administrative agency may and must determine whether it has jurisdiction in a particular situation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 439. The Court held therein that pursuant to the general rule, the board union, not the Superior Court had the authority to determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over the issue presented before it. The Court found that an adequate administrative remedy existed and that the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id., 439-40.
General Statutes § 4-183 provides in relevant part: "(j) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. If the court finds such prejudice, it shall sustain the appeal and, if appropriate, may render a judgment under subsection (k) of this section or remand the case for further proceedings. For purposes of this section, a remand is a final judgment."
In the present case, according to the enabling statute, § 17a-581, the PSRB "shall be an autonomous body within the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services for administrative purposes only." "Administrative purposes only" is defined in General Statutes § 4-38f to include the ability to "[e]xercise any quasi-judicial, rule-making or regulatory authority, licensing and policy-making functions which it may have independent of such department and without approval or control of the department."
"No violation of constitutional rights occurs if an administrative agency is vested with exclusive initial power to determine whether it has jurisdiction in a particular case, so long as there is a provision for adequate judicial review. Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a tribunal having general subject matter jurisdiction of a case possesses authority to determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy via appeal from its holding that it has jurisdiction. If a statute authorizes an administrative agency to act in a particular situation, it necessarily confers upon the agency authority to determine whether the situation is one in which the agency is authorized to determine the coverage of the statute — a question that cannot be initially decided by a court . . ." 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law § 284 (2006).
Based on the foregoing, the PSRB has the ability to determine its own jurisdiction and can entertain the plaintiff's request for a declaratory hearing. As a result, the general rule in § 4-183(g) is applicable. The plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies, therefore, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
As to the plaintiff's second argument, futility is a court-recognized exception to the exhaustion doctrine, The plaintiff makes two arguments: (1) it is futile to ask the PSRB whether it has "the authority . . . to act in the first instance, on account of its failure to conform with the requirements of its enabling statute," and (2) the PSRB may be biased.
Courts have recognized such exceptions "only infrequently and only for narrowly defined purposes . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neiman v. Yale, supra, at 258-59. "An administrative remedy is futile or inadequate if the agency is without the authority to grant the requested relief." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mendillo v. PSRB of Education, 246 Conn. 456, 467, 717 A.2d 1177 (1998). "It is futile to seek a remedy only when such action could not result in a favorable decision and invariably would result in further judicial proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simko v. Ervin, supra, at 507.
As discussed previously, the plaintiff's argument that the PSRB does not have the authority to act is contrary to the enabling statute which provides the PSRB with its authority. In support of this argument, the plaintiff cites Simko, in which the plaintiffs therein argued that the futility doctrine applied because "the defendant was the town attorney and allegedly had engaged in ex parte communications with the board, in the form of a letter asking for clarification of the terms of the variance." Simko v. Ervin, supra, at 507. The Court disagreed with the plaintiffs, holding that futility was not present because "the plaintiffs' mere suspicion of bias on the part of members of the board, without more, is not sufficient to excuse them, on grounds of futility, from the exhaustion requirement." Id.
In the present case, the plaintiff has neither requested a declaratory hearing from the PSRB nor presented facts as to the PSRB's bias in denying a declaratory hearing. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to overcome the presumption that the PSRB is unbiased. Id., 508. The plaintiff has not met the futility requirements; therefore, the exhaustion doctrine is still applicable and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
The plaintiff's final argument, that "the superior court in any action or proceeding may declare rights or other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed," relies on Bombero v. Planning Zoning Commission, 40 Conn.App. 75, 669 A.26 598 (1996). In Bombero, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of an amended Trumbull subdivision regulation. Id., 76. Unlike Bombero, in the present case, there is an adequate administrative remedy under § 4-175, and the plaintiff does not challenge the constitutionality of the statute. Id., 79-80. Therefore, the plaintiff has failed to provide an adequate reason why the exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable in the present case.
For the foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss is granted.