Sarracino v. Superior Court

99 Citing cases

  1. Nierenberg v. Superior Court

    59 Cal.App.3d 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 18 times
    In Nierenberg v. Superior Court (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 611, 620, 130 Cal.Rptr. 847, the appellate court held that in the absence of a stipulation, a court commissioner does not have the authority to conduct a contempt proceeding, even if the parties stipulated to the commissioner conducting the underlying trial.

    Second, "cause" as used in section 21, article VI is defined as "the proceeding before the court." ( Sarracino v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 1, 10 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 21, 529 P.2d 53].) Thus the proceeding before the court in which the stipulation was entered into was the criminal prosecution of defendant Harris.

  2. In re Sara D.

    87 Cal.App.4th 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 151 times
    Holding it permissible to appoint a guardian ad litem on ex parte basis but noting that ex parte applications require notice the day before the hearing, and citing to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1203 (former rule 379) requiring notice to be given no later than 10:00 a.m. the day before the hearing

    Appellant, citing Sarracino v. Superior Court, argues that the correct standard is to be found in Probate Code section 1801, while respondent, citing In re Christina B., argues the correct standard is found in Penal Code section 1367.Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 12. Probate Code section 1801 states, in relevant part:

  3. Reisman v. Shahverdian

    153 Cal.App.3d 1074 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 48 times
    Finding it appropriate to dismiss appeal from judgment confirming arbitration award where notice of entry of judgment was mailed on March 31, 1981, and notice of appeal was not filed until August 14, 1981

    (10) A party who has notice of a proceeding but fails to appear or otherwise take part loses the status of party litigant. ( Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 6-8 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 21, 529 P.2d 53].) The parties who do appear and take part may thus stipulate to the appointment of a temporary judge without the consent of the absent, nonlitigating parties. ( Id., at p. 10.)

  4. Lint v. Chisholm

    121 Cal.App.3d 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 41 times
    In Lint v. Chisholm (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 615 (Chisholm), a self-represented attorney failed to notify the court clerk of a change of address, did not receive notice of trial, and consequently failed to appear at trial.

    " In Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 21, 529 P.2d 53], the Supreme Court cited Benson favorably — holding, where a petitioner defaults by failing to appear at a hearing the "stipulation of the parties litigant" required by article VI, section 21 of the California Constitution may be entered into by the other party alone. "Accordingly, petitioner was not a party litigant, and the stipulations executed by the applicants . . . were sufficient to empower the commissioner to act as a temporary judge."

  5. Powers v. City of Richmond

    10 Cal.4th 85 (Cal. 1995)   Cited 154 times
    Discussing state constitutional right of review

    They rely on the rule that the "adoption of constitutional language similar to that in a former constitutional provision is presumed to incorporate authoritative judicial construction of the former language." ( Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 8 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 21, 529 P.2d 53].) (5) To assess the strength of this argument, we will review the historical antecedents of article VI, section 11, to determine whether, in 1966, the term "appellate jurisdiction" had an "authoritative judicial construction" that embraced a right to a direct appeal. 1849 Constitution

  6. In re Marriage of Skelley

    18 Cal.3d 365 (Cal. 1976)   Cited 250 times
    Finding an order reducing temporary spousal support and denying attorney fees constitutes an appealable collateral order

    (1) When a court renders an interlocutory order collateral to the main issue, dispositive of the rights of the parties in relation to the collateral matter, and directing payment of money or performance of an act, direct appeal may be taken. ( Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 9 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 21, 529 P.2d 53], and cases cited therein; see also Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33 Cal.2d 116, 119 [ 199 P.2d 668] and cases cited therein; Lukens, The Collateral Order Doctrinein California (1963) 15 Hastings L.J. 105; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, §§ 38, 39, pp. 4052-4053.) This constitutes a necessary exception to the one final judgment rule.

  7. In re Edgar M.

    14 Cal.3d 727 (Cal. 1975)   Cited 83 times
    Dealing with former § 558, the statutory predecessor to § 252

    (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 22; Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corp. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 351, 361-362 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 353, 515 P.2d 297].) Although full judicial powers can be conferred on an otherwise qualified referee by "stipulation of the parties litigant" (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21; Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 5-6 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 21, 529 P.2d 53]), there is here not only an absence of any such stipulation but an affirmative objection by the minor to the hearing of the case by any referee of the juvenile court. At the outset of the proceedings minor's counsel filed an affidavit, purportedly pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, asserting that Edgar M. could not have a fair hearing before the presiding judge of the juvenile court "or before any referee appointed under his authority."

  8. People v. Fedalizo

    246 Cal.App.4th 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 69 times
    Holding the defendant had no right to be present at an uncontested hearing regarding Proposition 47 eligibility

    (See Tsakos Shipping & Trading, S.A. v. Juniper Garden Town Homes, Ltd. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 74, 95, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 585 [“[A] presumption exists that an attorney who appears on behalf of a party has authority to do so. This presumption may be overcome only by a strong showing that the attorney had no authority”]; accord, Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 13, 118 Cal.Rptr. 21, 529 P.2d 53 [“An attorney's authority to represent his purported client is presumed in the absence of a strong factual showing to the contrary”]; In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 78, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 914 [“in the absence of evidence affirmatively showing the attorney's lack of authorization, a notice of appeal signed by the client's attorney should raise no question about its validity”]; People v. American Bankers Ins. Co. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 742, 745, 236 Cal.Rptr. 501 [“An oral statement by counsel that he is appearing on the defendant's behalf and is ready to proceed with the hearing or trial will suffice absent proof that the attorney did not have authority to proceed on the defendant's behalf”].)

  9. Powell v. Powell

    No. A129916 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2012)

    ) In addition, an order requiring one party to pay another party's attorney fees during a family law proceeding is immediately appealable as a final judgment on a collateral matter. (Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 9 ["The provision of the order in the dissolution proceeding requiring petitioner to pay his wife's attorney's fees was 'in effect a final judgment against a party in a collateral proceeding growing out of the action' "] (Sarracino); In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 [order reducing temporary support and denying attorney fees and costs is appealable] (Skelley); In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1311 [order awarding attorney fees for future work was immediately appealable] (Tharp); see Smith v. Krueger (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 752, 756 [order denying attorney fees is appealable as a final determination on a collateral matter].) If a matter is immediately appealable, but no appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal the matter is waived.

  10. Regency Health Services, Inc. v. Superior Court

    64 Cal.App.4th 1496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 30 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding real party in interest, an incompetent nursing home resident, was required to bear the costs of the petition on writ of mandate rather than the guardian ad litem who court noted was "not the real party in interest and no judgment can be entered either for or against" the guardian individually

    (Cf. Code Civ. Proc., § 367; Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 13 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 21, 529 P.2d 53] ["A guardian ad litem who appears for an incompetent person in an action or proceeding does not thereby become a party to that action or proceeding any more than the incompetent person's attorney of record is a party."].) This "strictly literal" construction — construing the term "party" to exclude a guardian — leaves no one available to respond to interrogatories.