Opinion
Case No. 02-10215-BC.
June 16, 2003.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The petitioner, Israel Sarmiento, a federal inmate presently incarcerated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons at its correctional facility in Milan, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The habeas petition attacks the decision of a federal disciplinary hearing officer (DHO).
I.
This matter arose from an incident on November 6, 2001, when someone on the second floor of building two (2-2) of the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota pulled the fire alarm. Staff had previously applied an anti-theft detection powder on the fire alarm due to a rash of fire alarm activations on 2-2 from October 21 — 25, 2001. The invisible power turns a bluish purple color when it comes in contact with skin and water is applied to the affected area.
An investigation followed the November 6 incident. Operations Lieutenant S. L. Jacobson reported that:
Inside the pull station there were two definite fingerprint markings where the [theft detection] powder had been lifted up. Staff checked every inmate's hands on 2-2 and also sprayed the[m] with tap water and had them rub their hands together. No inmate had any indication of ink stains on their hands other than inmate Israel Sarmiento.
Inmate Sarmiento was observed with horizontal stains across the tips of his pointer finger and middle finger of his right hand. The horizontal markings formed a straight line when he cupped his fingers as if pulling a fire alarm. There were also pinpoint stains on his right palms, staining under the fingernail of the pointer finger, and also on the top of the left hand above the small finger knuckle. All of the stains appeared to be bluish purple in color. Officer Bob Haling initially identified inmate Sarmiento with markings on his hands during the bed book count. Both Mr. Peterson and I checked the inmate's hands and observed the stains. Mr. Peterson then poured water over inmate Sarmiento's hands and had him rub them together. The stains did not disappear or smear. I then escorted inmate Sarmiento to the bathroom and had him wash hi[s] hands (no soap) and vigorously rubbed his hands together. The stains did not wash away or smear.
. . . .
Inmate Sarmiento stated the stains on his hands were pen ink from a broken pen he had been writing with earlier in the day. I asked him to produce the pen for me from his cell. He stated he had broke the pen at his work site. He also said he was sleeping when the fire alarm was activated.
Officer Haling had very similar staining to his hands which were bluish purple in color. He received these stains when he reset the fire alarm station which had been activated. It was our group consensus that the staining on the hands of Sarmiento were very similar to the markings on Officer Haling's hands. It was also our consensus that they were most likely caused by activating the fire alarm pull station.
Return to Order to Show Cause, Exhibit 6, S. L. Jacobson's memorandum.
Lt. Jacobson's investigation led to the petitioner being charged with misconduct. On November 20, 2001, the DHO held a hearing on the charge. The petitioner's defense was that he was lying in bed when the fire alarm rang and that he accidentally got ink on his hands when he broke a pen at his job site. The DHO found the petitioner guilty of tampering with a security device. As a result, the petitioner forfeited twenty-seven days of good conduct time. He also was sanctioned with thirty days of disciplinary segregation and one hundred eighty days loss of commissary (suspended pending one hundred eighty days of clear conduct).
The petitioner appealed the DHO's decision, but the Regional Director of the Bureau of Prisons denied his administrative appeal. On May 13, 2002, the Administrator of National Inmate Appeals denied relief after determining that the evidence supported the DHO's decision and that appropriate sanctions were imposed.
The petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition on October 8, 2002. His ground for relief is that he is actually innocent and that there was insufficient evidence produced at the disciplinary hearing to support the DHO's findings. The petitioner asserts that he got ink on his hands when he attempted to fix an ink pen at work. The respondent urges the Court in a responsive pleading filed through counsel to deny the petition.
II.
The Due Process Clause requires that a disciplinary sanction which deprives a prisoner of good-time credits be supported by evidence. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). However, the Supreme Court has held that
the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time credits. This standard is met if there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985) (citations and internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Williams v. Bass, 63 F.3d 483, 486 (6th Cir. 1995).
In this case, the DHO noted in her hearing report that, on the day of the incident, the petitioner was the only inmate in building two with ink on his hands. The DHO further noted that no other inmates would have had access to the fire alarm because all the inmates were in their housing units when the alarm was activated. The DHO relied on the following additional facts when reaching a decision: (1) a horizontal stain on the petitioner's fingers was consistent with pulling the fire alarm; (2) the officer who re-set the alarm had bluish purple ink on his hands, which matched the color of the ink stains on the petitioner's hand; and (3) the petitioner's work supervisor stated that he observed the petitioner break a pen but that he did not notice any ink stains on the petitioner's hands at the time. The DHO concluded that "the greater weight of the evidence supports the finding that [the petitioner] did commit the prohibited act of `tampering with a security device.'" Return to Order to Show Cause, Exhibit 6, Discipline Hearing Officer's Report, at 3.
The petitioner, however, contends that the DHO did not consider the possibility that he (the petitioner) did not commit the charged offense. The petitioner further contends that his defense is corroborated by the fact that the officer who re-set the alarm was able to wash the ink from his hands, whereas the petitioner was not able to eliminate the stain by washing his hands.
The record indicates that the DHO did consider the petitioner's defense, including the petitioner's own statement and his witnesses' statements about the incident. The mere fact that the officer was able to wash away a similar bluish purple stain does not prove that the petitioner's stain came from a source other than the fire alarm. It may be that the officer used soap or a chemical to remove the stain from his hands, whereas the petitioner was instructed to use just water on his hands. In any event, the DHO chose to believe correctional staff rather than the petitioner, which is a judgment traditionally left to a fact finder, especially when there was corroborating physical evidence which supported the theory of the petitioner's guilt. Moreover, as the Supreme Court explained in Hill, "[t]he Federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board. Instead, due process in this context requires only that there be some evidence to support the findings made in the disciplinary hearing." Hill, 472 U.S. at 457.
III.
The record here is not so devoid of evidence that the DHO's finding was without support or otherwise arbitrary. The Hill standard has been met. Therefore, the petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Opinion and Order entered on this date,It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.