Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:03-cv-03473-LDD.
October 29, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER MEMORDANDUM
Presently before this Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants on April 15, 2004 (Doc. No. 11) and the Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff on May 13, 2004 (Docs. No. 14, 15).
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff is currently employed as a flexible clerk by the United States Postal Service in Emmaus, Pennsylvania. Def.'s Mot. S.J. at 2, Sarko Dep. Tr. at 8-9. On May 24, 2001, Plaintiff was placed on off-duty status without pay in connection with an incident that occurred at the Perkiomenville post office on May 17, 2001. Pl.'s Compl. at 1-2, Def.'s Mot. S.J. at 2. Plaintiff, who was working at the Perkiomenville post office on a temporary basis, Def.'s Mot. S.J. at 2, Sarko Dep. Tr. at 10, was accused of improper sexual conduct occurring on that date by a female rural carrier, Carla Mokluk, who was also assigned to the Perkiomenville post office. Def.'s Mot. S.J. at 2, Sarko Dep. Tr. at 13, 15. As a result of Ms. Mokluk's accusation, made on May 21, 2001, Plaintiff was placed on off-duty status without pay, Def.'s Mot. S.J. at 2, Laughlin Dep. Tr. at 29, and subsequently terminated from the Postal Service several months later. Def.'s Mot. S.J. at 6, Laughlin Dep. Tr. at 42. More than a year later, Plaintiff was returned to his status as a clerk at the Emmaus post office and awarded back pay after arbitration of a union grievance found a procedural flaw with the manner in which Plaintiff's termination had been handled. Def.'s Mot. S.J. at 2; see United States Postal Serv. and Am. Postal Workers Union, ALF-CIO, Case Nos. C98C-4C-D01264275 and C98C-4C-D01264277 (Nov. 14, 2004) (Loeb, Arb.).
Subsequent to these events, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. No. 1) against the Postmaster General on June 4, 2003, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") and violation of Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Title VII"). Defendant then moved for Summary Judgment on April 15, 2004 (Doc. No. 15). In his Motion, Defendant argues that his reason for terminating Plaintiff was not discriminatory animus, but the Postal Service's legitimate belief that Plaintiff engaged in improper sexual conduct. Def.'s Mot. S.J. at 11. Moreover, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action because he was reinstated and received back pay. Id. at 16. In his response (Docs. No. 14, 15), Plaintiff submits that his termination without any progressive discipline is evidence that Defendant's stated motive was pretextual, Pl.'s Mem. in Opp. at 16, and that he did suffer an adverse employment action, despite his reinstatement with back pay, because of the harm to his reputation among his co-workers. Pl.'s Mem. in Opp. at 15, 16.
II. Standard of Review
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 568 (3d Cir. 1986). Only facts that may affect the outcome of a case are "material."Anderson, 477 U.S. 248. All reasonable inferences from the record are drawn in favor of the non-movant. See id. at 256.
Although the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the non-movant must then establish the existence of each element on which it bears the burden of proof. See J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1531 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 921 (1991). A plaintiff cannot avert summary judgment with speculation or by resting on the allegations in his pleadings, but rather must present competent evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999); Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989); Woods v. Bentsen, 889 F. Supp. 179, 184 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
III. Analysis
The same general standards and analyses are applicable to Plaintiff's Title VII and ADEA claims. Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003) (citingMcDonnell Douglas Corp. V. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973);Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Under the framework for claims of employment discrimination, the burden of proof shifts as follows: (1) Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) Defendant then must offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision; and (3) Plaintiff may then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant's stated reason is a mere pretext for illegal discrimination. Sarullo, 352 F.3d at 797; Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
A. Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing (1) that he was a member of a protected class; (2) that he was qualified for the job he held; (3) that he was subject to an adverse employment action despite being qualified; and (4) that the circumstances of Plaintiff's rejection or replacement create an inference of discrimination. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n. 6 (1981); Sarullo, 352 F.3d at 797 n. 6. The prima facie test is a flexible one, tailored to fit the context in which it is applied. Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int'l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996).
For purposes of a prima facie ADEA case, the fourth element contemplates an age difference of at least five years. See Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 722, 735 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
The first two elements of Plaintiff's prima facie case are not disputed. He is a man and more than forty years old. Pl.'s Compl. at 1-2. He is therefore a member of a protected class under Title VII (his gender) and the ADEA (his age), and his qualifications are not in dispute. However, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not suffered an adverse employment action because he was reinstated with back pay following arbitration.
The Supreme Court has held that "[a] tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). As of the filing of this action, Plaintiff's removal had been reversed as a result of the grievance process and he has been reinstated by an arbitration award with back pay and benefits. Def.'s Mot. S.J. at 17; United States Postal Serv. and Am. Postal Workers Union, ALF-CIO, Case Nos. C98C-4C-D01264275 and C98C-4C-D01264277 (Nov. 14, 2004) (Loeb, Arb.); USPS Back Pay Decision/Settlement Worksheet for Sarko, Edward J. Plaintiff contends, without citing any relevant authority, that despite his reinstatement with back pay and benefits, his earlier termination continues to constitute an adverse employment decision and that Plaintiff's mental anguish is sufficient to maintain a claim of adverse employment action because he has not been "made whole." Pl.'s Mem. at 14-16.
Subsequent to his reinstatement, however, Plaintiff can no longer lay claim to an adverse employment action. Notably, one of the ways Title VII and the ADEA compensate successful Plaintiffs is by awarding reinstatement with back pay. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Moreover, there is no evidence that the terms and conditions of Plaintiff's employment have been altered — Plaintiff did not lose salary, benefits, or seniority rights, nor was he reinstated to a different position, demoted in title, or scheduled to work a different shift or fewer hours. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination. See Weston v. Commonwealth, 251 F.3d 420, 431 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that written reprimands did not constitute tangible, adverse employment action where other terms and conditions of employment were not altered).
Further, even if, as Plaintiff contends, reinstatement did not "undo" his termination or if perceived damage to his reputation was sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action, Pl.'s Mem. in Opp. at 15-16, Plaintiff still fails to establish prong four of the prima facie case with respect to his age discrimination claim: that his employer's actions raise an inference of discrimination under the ADEA. Sarko's evidence of age discrimination consists solely of his assertion that he was replaced by younger person after he was terminated and before he was reinstated. In Sarullo v. United Service Postal Service the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff could not establish an inference of age or race discrimination where he was terminated because of a drug arrest and there was no evidence in the record that his supervisors were aware of his age or race. 352 F.3d 789, 791 798-99 (3d Cir. 2003). The Third Circuit stated inSarullo that in order for the plaintiff to satisfy the fourth prong of the prima facie case "he must establish some causal nexus between his membership in a protected class and [his termination]." 352 F.3d at 798. Likewise, in the instant case Plaintiff Sarko's termination was the proximate result of the sexual harassment complaint made by Ms. Mokluk. There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff's supervisors were aware, let alone motivated by, his age. Moreover, Plaintiff has offered no evidence to counter Defendant's assertion that no individual employee filled Plaintiff's position with the Emmaus post office. Def.'s Mot. S.J. at 15; Laughlin Dep. Tr. at 33. Mr. Sarko has failed to demonstrate the necessary causal connection with regard to his suit under the ADEA. For this reason, Plaintiff's claim under the ADEA is DISMISSED.
B. Defendant's Non-Discriminatory Reason
Finally, even if Plaintiff's could make out a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII, it still would not survive summary judgment as Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant's non-discriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff was pretextual.
After a Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, "`[t]he burden of production (but not the burden of persuasion) shifts to the defendant, who must then offer evidence that is sufficient, if believed, to support a finding that the defendant had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [adverse employment decision].'" Showalter, 190 F.3d at 235 (quoting Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3rd Cir. 1997);see also Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 278 (3rd. Cir. 1998). Sarko does not dispute that Mr. Laughlin was the appropriate person to terminate Plaintiff. Mr. Laughlin, after conducting a full and fair investigation, concluded that terminating Plaintiff was in the best interest of the Postal Service because he could not expose other female employees of the Postal Service to an individual whom Mr. Laughlin believed had engaged in improper sexual conduct. Def.'s Mot. S.J. at 12; Laughlin Dep. Tr. at 30. Inherent in this decision is the amply supported credibility determination made by Mr. Laughlin that Ms. Mokluk was telling the truth. See Def.'s Mot. S.J. at 11-12. As Plaintiff himself stated, "[i]n essence, a credibility determination was the reason for Sarko's termination. . . ." Pl.'s Mem. in Opp. at 15. Nothing in the record raises doubts about the propriety of the means Mr. Laughlin used to make his determination, nor is there any evidence of an underlying, discriminatory motivation.
To survive summary judgment Plaintiff would still have to submit evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action. Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). Pretext is not demonstrated by showing simply that the employer was mistaken. Sempier v. Johnson Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 731 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992),cert. denied, 510 U.S. 826 (1993)). Instead, the Court examines the record for "evidence of inconsistencies or anomalies that could support an inference that the employer did not act for its stated reasons." Id. (citing Josey v. John R. Hollinsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1993)).
In the instant case, the only evidence Plaintiff presents to establish pretext is (1) the fact that progressive discipline was not utilized, Pl.'s Mem. in Opp. at 16-18, and (2) that Defendant believed Ms. Mokluk over Plaintiff. Sarko Dep. Tr. at 72. Neither of these reasons is sufficient for a factfinder to reasonably conclude that Defendant had an improper motive. As to the former, there is no evidence that progressive discipline was either a formal program or was required in the face of allegations as serious as sexual harassment. As to the latter, a well-supported credibility determination does not give rise to an inference of gender bias. Plaintiff has not shown that "the Defendant's proffered reasons are weak, incoherent, implausible, or so inconsistent that `a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.'" Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1997)). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim of sex discrimination under Title VII must be DISMISSED.
IV. Conclusion
For all these reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. An appropriate order follows.