Opinion
No. 05-07-00456-CR
Opinion issued March 26, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F06-00932-PW.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, RICHTER, and MAZZANT.
OPINION
Flavio Quiones Sarinana appeals his conviction for aggravated assault of a public servant. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007). Appellant pleaded guilty to the charged offense. The State introduced appellant's judicial confession and, after the charge was read to the jury, the trial judge instructed the jury to find appellant guilty. Thereafter, the jury made an affirmative finding that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during commission of the offense and assessed punishment at seventy-five years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. In four points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case, and the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on good conduct time credit. We affirm the trial court's judgment. In his first and second points of error, appellant claims the evidence is legally insufficient to prove (i) the identity of the complaining witness as alleged in the indictment and (ii) the complaining witness was discharging an official duty at the time of the assault. In felony cases, when a defendant pleads guilty before the jury, he admits the existence of all necessary elements to establish guilt. Holland v. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988); Turnipseed v. State, 609 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Addicks v. State, 15 S.W.3d 608, 612 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 2000, pet. ref'd). In such cases, "the introduction of testimony by the State is to enable the jury to intelligently exercise the discretion which the law vests in them touching the penalty to be assessed." Darden v. State, 430 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex.Crim.App. 1968); Turnipseed, 609 S.W.2d at 801 ("It is well established that a plea of guilty to a felony charge before a jury admits the existence of all facts necessary to establish guilt and in such cases the introduction of testimony by the State is for the jury's benefit in fixing punishment."). In this case, a jury was selected and seated. Appellant pleaded guilty before the jury, and the State introduced appellant's signed judicial confession. Because appellant pleaded guilty before the jury, he admitted "the existence of all facts necessary to establish guilt." See Turnipseed, 609 S.W.2d at 801. Thus, "there is no question of the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal." Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). We overrule appellant's first and second points of error. In his third point of error, appellant claims the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this case because it was not "properly transferred" to the court's docket. Appellant argues
The instant case was presented to the 203rd District Court of Dallas County, Texas. Jurisdiction was thus invested in that Court. The instant case later appeared on the docket of Criminal District Court Number Six where it remained through the entry of judgment. However, there is nothing in the record showing that jurisdiction was ever transferred by the 203rd District Court to Criminal District Court Number Six. Therefore, it appears that the 283rd District Court "retains" jurisdiction, just as article 4.16 states.The record in this case clearly shows this case was tried in the 363rd Judicial District Court. Thus, it is unclear why appellant argues the case was inappropriately transferred to Criminal District Court Number Six and that the 283rd Judicial District Court retained jurisdiction. Nevertheless, as appellant concedes, he did not object at trial, and the failure to raise this complaint at trial waives "the right to question jurisdiction under article 4.16." Mills v. State, 742 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no pet.) (citing Flores v. State, 487 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972)). Thus, appellant waived any complaint by failing to object below. Furthermore, this Court previously addressed and rejected a similar argument (albeit raised as an ineffective assistance of counsel point of error). See Bourque v. State, 156 S.W.3d 675, 678 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. ref'd) (although specific district court may impanel grand jury, "it does not necessarily follow that all cases returned by that grand jury are assigned to that court."). Although the record shows the grand jury was impaneled "as an arm of the [203rd District Court] by which it is appointed," see Bourque, 156 S.W.3d at 678, nothing in the record indicates appellant's case was assigned to the 203rd District Court. Rather, the record reflects appellant's case was assigned to the 363rd Judicial District Court where it was tried to a jury. Under these circumstances, we conclude appellant's third point of error lacks merit. We overrule appellant's third point of error. In his final point of error, appellant argues the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on good time conduct credit when he was not entitled to the instruction. Appellant concedes, however, that article 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure mandates a trial judge instruct the jury on the availability of good time credit "as if Appellant were eligible for these considerations." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 2007) Nevertheless, he contends we must reverse this case for a new punishment hearing because he was "harmed to the point of receiving an unfair trial." We disagree. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has addressed this precise complaint and concluded
Trial judges, then, are faced with a dilemma. If they do not give the statutorily mandated instruction, they violate the Legislature's law. If they do give the instruction, defendants such as appellant and those similarly situated may claim that portions of the instruction might be misleading and inapplicable to them. Trial judges may occasionally doubt the wisdom of a particular law, but they are not free to ignore explicit legislative directions unless those directives are clearly unconstitutional. Therefore, because the trial judge in this case instructed the jury according to the legislative dictate expressed in article 37.07, section 4(a), he did not commit error.Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355, 363 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). We likewise conclude the trial judge did not err. We overrule appellant's final point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.