Sarges v. State

7 Citing cases

  1. Morneau v. State

    150 Conn. App. 237 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014)   Cited 26 times
    Discussing procedure claimant must follow to obtain permission to sue state for monetary damages

    Id., at 712, 937 A.2d 675. We note that the rationale of Sarges v. State, 26 Conn.Supp. 24, 209 A.2d 886 (1965), bolsters our analysis. In Sarges, the plaintiff obtained permission to sue the state for $20,000 in damages.

  2. Smith v. State

    2003 Ct. Sup. 6282 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003)

    Therefore, the defendant requests that the plaintiff's complaint seeking an amount of damages of "not less than $15,000" should be dismissed. The defendant cites Calvert v. State of Connecticut, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich (March 9, 1995, Hendel, J.), 14 Conn.L.Rptr., and Sarges v. State, 26 Conn. Sup. 24, 209 A.2d 886 (1965), both of which are not binding on this court. In Calvert, the claimant sought permission to sue the State for $15,000. After being granted this permission, the claimant sought to increase his claim of monetary damages to $25,472.

  3. Dept. of Community Affairs v. M. Davis Sons

    412 A.2d 939 (Del. 1980)   Cited 22 times
    Finding that lease provisions contemplating general improvements constituted prior written consent

    Moreover, where a party seeks to hold the State or a state agency liable under a statute, any reasonable doubts as to the proper construction of the statute should be resolved in favor of the State. See Rogan v. Baltimore Ohio Ry. Co., Md. App., 188 Md. 44, 52 A.2d 261 (1947); Sarges v. State, Conn.Super., 26 Conn. Sup. 24, 209 A.2d 886 (1965); 3 Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 64.01, P. 106 (4th ed. 1974). With these principles in mind, we must conclude that, in failing to manifest a clear intent that mechanics' liens attach to state owned property, absent any statutory or contractual authority apart from 25 Del. C. Ch. 27 to the contrary, a mechanic's lien will not attach to state owned property used for the benefit of the public.

  4. 184 Windsor Ave., LLC v. State

    2008 Ct. Sup. 8256 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)

    The state argues that damages cannot exceed the sum sought in the notice of claim which was $99,940.90. The state has cited the case of Sarges v. State of Connecticut, 26 Conn.Sup. 24, which held that the claim was limited to the amount alleged in the notice of claim. In Sarges, the plaintiff filed a notice of claim requesting permission to sue the state for damages in the amount of $20,000.

  5. Nealy v. Ward

    1996 Ct. Sup. 2048 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996)   Cited 1 times
    In Nealy v. Ward, supra, 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 329, the court held that the State had not waived its immunity as to the driver's estate and Agency Rent-A-Car. "Construing the terms of General Statutes § 4-160 strictly as we must the State can only waive suit to parties that have presented it with claims."

    The court can not stretch that immunity to include them because General Statutes § 4-160 is to be strictly construed. The State did not waive its immunity to Ward and Agency, and can not be sued. Sarges v. State, 26 Conn. Sup. 24, 26, 209 A.2d 886 (1965). Statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed in favor of the State. Berger Lehman Associates. Inc. v. State, 178 Conn. 352, 356, 422 A.2d 268 (1979).

  6. Calvert v. State

    1995 Ct. Sup. 2181 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995)   Cited 1 times

    It is undisputed that William Calvert properly presented a claim in accordance with Section 4-147. The defendant relies on Sarges v. State, 26 Conn. Sup. 24 (Super.Ct. 1965), for the proposition that the claimant cannot sue the state for an amount in excess of the amount claimed before the Claims Commissioner. Sarges, although not controlling authority, is persuasive. In Sarges, the claimant, by notice pursuant to General Statutes § 4-147, sought permission to sue the state for $20,000. After being granted permission to sue, in which no amount to be sought in damages was specified, the claimant filed suit for $75,000. The court in Sarges stated, at page 28:

  7. Plainville v. Burns

    327 A.2d 598 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974)

    Lee v. Lee, 145 Conn. 355, 358; Bird v. Plunkett, 139 Conn. 491, 504. Also, the intent of the General Assembly in passing an act, as expressed by it, is the controlling factor, and, in ascertaining this, the application of common sense to the language is not to be excluded. State v. Bello, 133 Conn. 600, 604; Sarges v. State, 26 Conn. Sup. 24, 28. Common sense as well as the application of legislative history dictates but one conclusion, i.e. that § 13b-42 (d) applies strictly to municipally owned airports.