Sargent v. Smith

5 Citing cases

  1. Brennan v. Brennan Assocs.

    316 Conn. 677 (Conn. 2015)   Cited 11 times

    We normally would decline to review the defendants' challenge to the effect of the appellate stay years after the fact and merely because real estate values did not go in the direction the defendants had hoped. Cf. Sargent v. Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 733, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005) (denying plaintiff's claim in second appeal that he would have been entitled to money collected by receiver during pendency of first appeal, and noting that “no equitable considerations warrant a contrary result” because same parties were involved in both actions, that plaintiff could have alerted trial court in first action to his claim, and that plaintiff could have taken appeal challenging actions of receiver when actions actually occurred).I next note that the present case is not about the plaintiff's participation in partnership affairs: that was Brennan I. The present case is about the valuation of the plaintiff's partnership interest. Partnership law is not the only area of law in which a judgment effects a change in the parties' relationship and sets a date on which to value the parties' assets.

  2. Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport

    275 Conn. 105 (Conn. 2005)   Cited 270 times
    Holding that Connecticut's LLC statute “merely codifies” established liability principles of corporate law

    Because the issue of whether a corporate officer has committed or participated in the wrongful conduct of a corporation is a question of fact, it is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. See Sargent v. Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 728, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005). "[A reviewing court] cannot retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."

  3. Seymour v. Region One Bd.

    274 Conn. 92 (Conn. 2005)   Cited 69 times

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sargent v . Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 728-29, 865 A.2d 1129 (2004).On the basis of the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court's essential factual findings--that the plaintiff paid approximately the same or less in property taxes as similarly situated taxpayers in other Region One school district towns, and that the benefits of the ECS money offset whatever difference there possibly might be in those property taxes--were clearly erroneous.

  4. State v. Ross

    873 A.2d 131 (Conn. 2005)   Cited 7 times
    Reviewing finding that Ross was competent to waive further challenges to his death sentence

    See Demosthenes v. Baal, supra, 495 U.S. 735; Rumbaugh v. Procunier, supra, 753 F.2d 399. Accordingly, we must determine whether the trial court's finding that the defendant was competent to waive further challenges to his death sentences was clearly erroneous. See Sargent v. Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 728, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005) (trial court's factual finding is reversible only if clearly erroneous). The only colorable claim of governmental coercion was the suggestion in earlier proceedings that the defendant might suffer from "death row syndrome."

  5. Ocwen Federal Bank v. Charles

    95 Conn. App. 315 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 67 times
    Noting that passing of law day extinguishes right of equitable redemption and vests title absolutely in mortgagee

    " (Citations omitted.) Sargent v. Smith, 78 Conn. App. 691, 695-96, 828 A.2d 620 (2003), rev'd on other grounds, 272 Conn. 722, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005); see also Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development Associates, 244 Conn. 189, 201 n.10, 708 A.2d 1371 (1998). "The equity of redemption gives the mortgagor the right to redeem the legal title previously conveyed by performing whatever conditions are specified in the mortgage, the most important of which is usually the payment of money.