See Demosthenes v. Baal, supra, 495 U.S. 735; Rumbaugh v. Procunier, supra, 753 F.2d 399. Accordingly, we must determine whether the trial court's finding that the defendant was competent to waive further challenges to his death sentences was clearly erroneous. See Sargent v. Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 728, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005) (trial court's factual finding is reversible only if clearly erroneous). The only colorable claim of governmental coercion was the suggestion in earlier proceedings that the defendant might suffer from "death row syndrome."
" (Citations omitted.) Sargent v. Smith, 78 Conn. App. 691, 695-96, 828 A.2d 620 (2003), rev'd on other grounds, 272 Conn. 722, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005); see also Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development Associates, 244 Conn. 189, 201 n.10, 708 A.2d 1371 (1998). "The equity of redemption gives the mortgagor the right to redeem the legal title previously conveyed by performing whatever conditions are specified in the mortgage, the most important of which is usually the payment of money.
Questions of credibility are to be determined by the trier of fact, not by an appellate court on review. See Sargent v. Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 728-29, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005). On the basis of our review of the record, including the transcript of Taylor's testimony and the Mukhtaar hearing, we conclude that the court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and that the court properly concluded that the circumstances under which Taylor's written statement was taken did not render it unreliable.