We normally would decline to review the defendants' challenge to the effect of the appellate stay years after the fact and merely because real estate values did not go in the direction the defendants had hoped. Cf. Sargent v. Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 733, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005) (denying plaintiff's claim in second appeal that he would have been entitled to money collected by receiver during pendency of first appeal, and noting that "no equitable considerations warrant a contrary result" because same parties were involved in both actions, that plaintiff could have alerted trial court in first action to his claim, and that plaintiff could have taken appeal challenging actions of receiver when actions actually occurred). I next note that the present case is not about the plaintiff's participation in partnership affairs: that was Brennan I. The present case is about the valuation of the plaintiff's partnership interest.
We normally would decline to review the defendants' challenge to the effect of the appellate stay years after the fact and merely because real estate values did not go in the direction the defendants had hoped. Cf. Sargent v. Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 733, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005) (denying plaintiff's claim in second appeal that he would have been entitled to money collected by receiver during pendency of first appeal, and noting that “no equitable considerations warrant a contrary result” because same parties were involved in both actions, that plaintiff could have alerted trial court in first action to his claim, and that plaintiff could have taken appeal challenging actions of receiver when actions actually occurred).I next note that the present case is not about the plaintiff's participation in partnership affairs: that was Brennan I. The present case is about the valuation of the plaintiff's partnership interest. Partnership law is not the only area of law in which a judgment effects a change in the parties' relationship and sets a date on which to value the parties' assets.
Because the issue of whether a corporate officer has committed or participated in the wrongful conduct of a corporation is a question of fact, it is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. See Sargent v. Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 728, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005). "[A reviewing court] cannot retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sargent v . Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 728-29, 865 A.2d 1129 (2004).On the basis of the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court's essential factual findings--that the plaintiff paid approximately the same or less in property taxes as similarly situated taxpayers in other Region One school district towns, and that the benefits of the ECS money offset whatever difference there possibly might be in those property taxes--were clearly erroneous.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sargent v. Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 728-29, 865 A.2d 1129 (2004). "We do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached."
See Demosthenes v. Baal, supra, 495 U.S. 735; Rumbaugh v. Procunier, supra, 753 F.2d 399. Accordingly, we must determine whether the trial court's finding that the defendant was competent to waive further challenges to his death sentences was clearly erroneous. See Sargent v. Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 728, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005) (trial court's factual finding is reversible only if clearly erroneous). The only colorable claim of governmental coercion was the suggestion in earlier proceedings that the defendant might suffer from "death row syndrome."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sargent v. Smith, 78 Conn. App. 691, 694, 828 A.2d 620 (2003), rev'd on other grounds, 272 Conn. 722, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005). "When construing a lease, we bear in mind three fundamental principles: (1) The intention of the parties is controlling and must be gathered from the language of the lease in the light of the circumstances surrounding the parties at the execution of the instrument; (2) the language must be given its ordinary meaning unless a technical or special meaning is clearly intended; (3) the lease must be construed as a whole and in such a manner as to give effect to every provision, if reasonably possible. . . . Where contract language is clear and unambiguous, the question of contractual intent presents a question of law for the court. . . ."
" (Citations omitted.) Sargent v. Smith, 78 Conn. App. 691, 695-96, 828 A.2d 620 (2003), rev'd on other grounds, 272 Conn. 722, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005); see also Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development Associates, 244 Conn. 189, 201 n.10, 708 A.2d 1371 (1998). "The equity of redemption gives the mortgagor the right to redeem the legal title previously conveyed by performing whatever conditions are specified in the mortgage, the most important of which is usually the payment of money.
"Connecticut follows the `title theory' of mortgages, which provides that on the execution of a mortgage on real property, the mortgagee holds legal title and the mortgagor holds equitable title to the property." Sargent v. Smith, 78 Conn. App. 691, 695, 828 A.2d 620 (2003), rev'd on other grounds, 272 Conn. 722, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005). "In a title theory state such as Connecticut, a mortgage is a vested fee simple interest subject to complete defeasance by the timely payment of the mortgage debt."
Questions of credibility are to be determined by the trier of fact, not by an appellate court on review. See Sargent v. Smith, 272 Conn. 722, 728-29, 865 A.2d 1129 (2005). On the basis of our review of the record, including the transcript of Taylor's testimony and the Mukhtaar hearing, we conclude that the court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and that the court properly concluded that the circumstances under which Taylor's written statement was taken did not render it unreliable.