Summary
denying Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss pro se plaintiff's § 1983 claims, but granting motion to require plaintiff to replead them under Rule 12(e)
Summary of this case from Chalmers v. LaneOpinion
Civil Action No. 02-1857
January 2, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiffs, Alvin J. Sargent and Dorothy Williams Sargent, filed this lawsuit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Jennifer A. Riley, George B. Dean, and Paul Valteau. In this lawsuit plaintiffs apparently allege that defendants engaged in a conspiracy to fraudulently foreclosure on and evict plaintiffs from properties they once owned and utilized as part of their church. As relief, plaintiffs request monetary damages in excess of $5,000,000.
Rec. Doc. 4.
As all defendants correctly note, plaintiffs do not in their complaint state their claims with great precision and clarity. The complaint, to be generous, is a jumbled mess of conclusory allegations and legal buzzwords. Confronted with that reality, defendants have taken divergent approaches. Averring that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim, defendants Riley and Dean move that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In the alternative, should the Court find that a claim has been stated, defendants Riley and Dean seek a more definite statement pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). Defendant Valteau takes a different tack. He attempts to surmise from the complaint and his personal knowledge what plaintiffs' claims might be, and then he moves for summary judgment on those claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.56. Plaintiffs have responded to defendants' motions; however, little can be gleaned from their response other than the fact that they oppose the motions.
Rec. Doc. 15.
Rec. Doc. 13.
Rec. Doc. 18.
The Complaint
Plaintiffs, a married couple, state in their complaint that they are the pastor and treasurer of The Church of the Sanctified Vision. In this lawsuit, plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that defendants engaged in "fraud, records falsification, theft, destruction of church goods and properties, corporate corruption, and conspiracy to use public officials and public records unscrupulous, and lies on sheriffs sale property and management documents, fraudulent financial entries." As best as this Court can determine, the gravamen of the complaint is that defendants allegedly entered into a conspiracy to illegally foreclose on mortgaged church properties, to sell those properties through a sheriffs sale, and then to evict plaintiffs from the properties.Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
Defendants Riley and Dean argue that plaintiffs apparently brought the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Riley and Dean seek dismissal of the claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that they are not proper § 1983 defendants because they are not state actors.
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted:
Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are appropriate when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim. The test for determining the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) was set out by the United States Supreme Court as follows: "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)) (citations omitted), cert. denied, ___U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 2665, 153 L.Ed.2d 838 (2002).
As the Fifth Circuit recently reiterated, "When ruling on a rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must liberally construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff and assume the truth of all pleaded facts." Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 2002). "In other words, a motion to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim admits the facts alleged in the complaint, but challenges the plaintiffs rights to relief based upon those facts. . . . [W]hen considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court must examine the complaint to determine whether the allegations provide relief on any possible theory." Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161-62 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Because dismissals of pro se complaints pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) are disfavored, "a court should grant a pro se party every reasonable opportunity to amend." Pena v. United States, 157 F.3d 984, 987 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1998). "Generally a district court errs in dismissing a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend." Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998).
Even assuming that plaintiffs' lawsuit is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Riley and Dean are not necessarily entitled to dismissal for failure to state a claim simply because they are not state actors. Defendants are correct that action under color of state law is a prerequisite for liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g.,Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1989) ("A claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must contain two elements: 1) that plaintiffs have been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) that the defendant acted under color of state law.") However, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted: "[T]he defendant need not be an officer of the state to satisfy this requirement; private persons may be held liable under § 1983 if they willfully participate in joint action with state agents. Alleging a conspiracy between private and public actors satisfies this requirement."Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471, 480 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
Although the exact nature of the alleged conspiracy is unclear from the complaint, what is clear is that plaintiffs are alleging that Riley and Dean conspired with Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff Paul Valteau, who "cooperated with unscrupulous panhandling lawyers for personal profits," in an illegal scheme to allow "an illegal unregistered, unlicensed, unauthorized dummy" corporation to defraud plaintiffs and swindle them out of their church properties. Although this Court expresses no opinion as to the ultimate merit of the claims, the Court finds that plaintiffs' pro se complaint is sufficient to survive the Rule 12(b)(6) motion for dismissal on the ground that defendants Riley and Dean are not state actors. Therefore, the motion to dismiss is DENIED.
Rec Doc. 4, Complaint, ¶ XI.
Rule 12(e) Motion
In the alternative, defendants Riley and Dean have filed a motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(e) provides:
If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. if the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the. pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has distinguished a Rule 12(e) motion for more definite statement from a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as follows:
[The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim] allows no discretion in the usual sense. The complaint is either good or not good. The motion for more definite statement, on the other hand, involves, within the applicable standards of that rule, the exercise of that sound and considered discretion committed unavoidably and properly to the Trial Judge as he presides over the continuous process of adjudication from commencement of the litigation through pleadings, pretrial discovery, trial, submission and decision.
Under 12(e) the Court must determine whether the complaint is such that "a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." But the fact that a careful Judge, in the exercise of that wise discretion controlled by the prescribed principles of that rule, might so conclude does not permit him to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. "It may be that petitioner's complaint as now drawn is too vague, but that is no ground for dismissing his action. ***." Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern Terminal, 1959, 359 U.S. 231, 79 S.Ct. 760, 763, 3 L.Ed.2d 770, 774.Mitchell v. E-Z Towers. Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 130 (5th Cir. 1959).
"The Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) motion for a more definite statement is disfavored. It is universally deemed appropriate only when the pleading addressed is so vague it cannot be responded to." Prudhomme v. Proctor Gamble Co., 800 F. Supp. 390, 396 (E.D. La. 1992) (citations omitted). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has cautioned:
In view of the great liberality of F.R.Civ.P. 8, permitting notice pleading, it is clearly the policy of the Rules that Rule 12(e) should not be used to frustrate this policy by lightly requiring a plaintiff to amend his complaint which under Rule 8 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. It is to be noted that a motion for more definite statement is not to be used to assist in getting facts in preparation for trial as such. Other rules relating to discovery, interrogatories and the like exist for this purpose.Mitchell, 269 F.2d at 132.
The Court finds that ordering a more definite statement from plaintiffs is appropriate. This is not a case in which defendants are trying subvert the intent of the federal rule requiring only notice pleading, nor is their motion for a more definite statement merely a disguised attempt at discovery. Rather, defendants rightly protest that they cannot adequately respond to the complaint because it is impossible to discern with any degree of certainty exactly what claims plaintiffs mean to assert therein. Accordingly, the motion for a more definite statement is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are ORDERED to file with this Court, on or before January 22, 2003, a more definite statement of each claim for relief they intend to assert in this lawsuit and identify as to each claim the defendants against whom the claim is asserted. Plaintiffs' statement must meet, but need not exceed, the pleading requirements imposed by Rules 8 and 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 56 Motion
Defendant Valteau, while acknowledging that it is unclear from the complaint what claims plaintiffs are asserting, has filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Valteau argues that his involvement in the transactions mentioned in the complaint were limited and his actions were entirely proper. Therefore, Valteau is essentially arguing that he is not liable for any claims, whatever they may be, brought by plaintiffs. In light of this Court's order that plaintiffs file a more definite statement of their claims, Valteau's motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to its being reurged upon plaintiffs' compliance with that order.