Accordingly, under the circumstances, dismissal of the petition was warranted, rather than transfer to a Family Court Judge. Family Court Act § 438 authorizes an award of an attorney's fee in support proceedings ( see Matter of Sarfaty v. Recine, 57 A.D.3d 552, 867 N.Y.S.2d 704; Matter of Israel v. Israel, 273 A.D.2d 385, 710 N.Y.S.2d 903). In light of the circumstances of this case, the award of an attorney's fee was a proper exercise of the Support Magistrate's discretion ( see Matter of Sarfaty v. Recine, 57 A.D.3d at 552, 867 N.Y.S.2d 704; Matter of Israel v. Israel, 273 A.D.2d at 385, 710 N.Y.S.2d 903), based on the legal services provided in connection with this support proceeding ( see Matter of Olesh v. Auerbach, 227 A.D.2d 406, 407, 642 N.Y.S.2d 65; Matter of Lazaar v. Lazaar, 248 A.D.2d 618, 669 N.Y.S.2d 927). Contrary to the father's contention, “[t]here is no impediment to reimbursement to a wife of counsel fees advanced by her which the court later finds the husband should have paid” ( Silver v. Silver, 63 A.D.2d 1017, 1017, 406 N.Y.S.2d 352; see Ross v. Ross, 90 A.D.2d 541, 455 N.Y.S.2d 113).

ORDERED that the order dated October 9, 2012, is affirmed, with costs. The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the mother counsel fees pursuant to Family Court Act § 438(a) ( see Matter of Dinhofer v. Zabezhanskaya, 79 A.D.3d 1039, 1040, 912 N.Y.S.2d 899). “[T]he award of reasonable counsel fees is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court” (Matter of Grald v. Grald, 33 A.D.3d 922, 923, 824 N.Y.S.2d 100;see Matter of Westergaard v. Westergaard, 106 A.D.3d 926, 965 N.Y.S.2d 179;Matter of Sarfaty v. Recine, 57 A.D.3d 552, 867 N.Y.S.2d 704). The specific factors to be considered in computing an appropriate award include “the parties' ability to pay, the merits of the parties' positions, the nature and extent of the services rendered, the complexity of the issues involved, and the reasonableness of counsel's performance and the fees under the circumstances” (Matter of Westergaard v. Westergaard, 106 A.D.3d at 926–927, 965 N.Y.S.2d 179;see Matter of Dinhofer v. Zabezhanskaya, 79 A.D.3d at 1040, 912 N.Y.S.2d 899;Matter of Nieves–Ford v. Gordon, 47 A.D.3d 936, 937, 850 N.Y.S.2d 588;Matter of Musarra v. Musarra, 28 A.D.3d 668, 669, 814 N.Y.S.2d 657;Matter of Finell v. Finell, 25 A.D.3d 703, 704, 811 N.Y.S.2d 733;Giuffrida v. Giuffrida, 81 A.D.2d 905, 906, 439 N.Y.S.2d 398). “Further, the merits of the parties' positions are relevant considerations” (Matter of Dinhofer v. Zabezhanskaya, 79 A.D.3d at 1040, 912 N.Y.S.2d 899;see Matter of Finell v. Finell, 25 A.D.3d at 704, 811 N.Y.S.2d 733;Giuffrida v. Giuffrida, 81 A.D.2d at 9

The Support Magistrate providently exercised her discretion in granting the father's motion pursuant to Family Court Act § 438(a) for an award of an attorney's fee only to the extent of awarding him the sum of $1,000. “[T]he award of reasonable counsel fees is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court” (Matter of Grald v. Grald, 33 A.D.3d 922, 923, 824 N.Y.S.2d 100;see Matter of Sarfaty v. Recine, 57 A.D.3d 552, 867 N.Y.S.2d 704). The factors to be considered in computing an appropriate award include the parties' ability to pay, the merits of the parties' positions, the nature and extent of the services rendered, the complexity of the issues involved, and the reasonableness of counsel's performance and the fees underthe circumstances ( see Matter of Dinhofer v. Zabezhanskaya, 79 A.D.3d 1039, 1040, 912 N.Y.S.2d 899;Matter of Nieves–Ford v. Gordon, 47 A.D.3d 936, 937, 850 N.Y.S.2d 588;Matter of Musarra v. Musarra, 28 A.D.3d 668, 669, 814 N.Y.S.2d 657;Matter of Finell v. Finell, 25 A.D.3d 703, 704, 811 N.Y.S.2d 733;Giuffrida v. Giuffrida, 81 A.D.2d 905, 906, 439 N.Y.S.2d 398). Under the totality of the circumstances, including the mother's limited income, the award of limited counsel fees to the father was appropriate. Accordingly, the Family Court properly denied the father's objection to the Support Magistrate's order.

“As with an award of an attorney's fee made pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237(b), the court will base its decision primarily upon both parties' ability to pay, the nature and extent of the services required to deal with the support dispute, and the reasonableness of their performance under the circumstances” ( Matter of Nieves–Ford v. Gordon, 47 A.D.3d 936, 937, 850 N.Y.S.2d 588). “The determination of whether to award an attorney's fee is within the sound discretion of the hearing court” ( Matter of Wade v. Smith, 86 A.D.3d 577, 578, 926 N.Y.S.2d 906; see Matter of Dinhofer v. Zabezhanskaya, 79 A.D.3d 1039, 1040, 912 N.Y.S.2d 899; Matter of Sarfaty v. Recine, 57 A.D.3d 552, 552, 867 N.Y.S.2d 704).

The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the father's objections to the Support Magistrate's determination that the mother was due an attorney's fee in the sum of $1,200 pursuant to Family Court Act § 438 (a) with respect to the petitions the mother filed seeking an upward modification of the father's child support obligation ( see Matter of Dinhofer v Zabezhanskaya, 79 AD3d 1039, 1040; Matter of Nieves-Ford v Gordon, 47 AD3d 936, 937; Matter of Katz v Pecora, 39 AD3d 646, 648). The determination of whether to award an attorney's fee is within the sound discretion of the hearing court ( see Matter of Dinhofer v Zabezhanskaya, 79 AD3d 1039; Matter of Sarfaty v Recine, 57 AD3d 552). The Family Court properly determined that the mother was entitled to an attorney's fee in the sum of $1,200.

The father failed to meet his burden of establishing a substantial change of circumstances since the time the original award was made. Further, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the mother counsel fees pursuant to Family Court Act § 438 (a) ( see Matter of Nieves-Ford v Gordon, 47 AD3d 936, 937; Matter of Simmons v Simmons, 71 AD3d 775; Matter of Katz v Pecora, 39 AD3d 646, 648). A determination with respect to an award of counsel fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court (see Matter of Sarfaty v Recine, 57 AD3d 552). Factors to consider in awarding counsel fees include the parties' ability to pay, the nature and extent of the services rendered, the complexity of the issues involved, and the reasonableness of counsel's performance and the fees under the circumstances ( see Matter of Nieves-Ford v Gordon, 47 AD3d at 937; Grumet v Grumet, 37 AD3d 534, 536; Matter of Musarra v Musarra, 28 AD3d 668, 669). Further, the merits of the parties' positions are relevant considerations ( see Matter of Finell v Finell, 25 AD3d 703, 704; Giuffrida v Giuffrida, 81 AD2d 905). Under the totality of the circumstances, the award of counsel fees was proper.