Opinion
# 2014-040-016 Motion No. M-84612
03-28-2014
SARANTAKIS v. STATE OF NEW YORK
Christopher Sarantakis, Pro Se ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esq., AAG
Synopsis
Pro se prisoner's motion to late file, CCA § 10(6), is granted.
Case information
| UID: | 2014-040-016 |
| Claimant(s): | CHRISTOPHER SARANTAKIS, 12A2434 |
| Claimant short name: | SARANTAKIS |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | NONE |
| Motion number(s): | M-84612 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | CHRISTOPHER J. McCARTHY |
| Claimant's attorney: | Christopher Sarantakis, Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esq., AAG |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | March 28, 2014 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
For the reasons set forth below, the application of pro se Movant, Christopher Sarantakis, to serve and file a late Claim pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10(6) is granted.
The proposed Claim, attached to the motion papers as Exhibit A, alleges that: on September 16, 2013, Movant was incarcerated at Franklin Correctional Facility located in Malone, New York ("Franklin"); he was strip searched prior to boarding a bus for a trip to Court; following the search, his Court trip was canceled by the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision and he was placed in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") at Franklin pursuant to an order of Sergeant Dumas because a handcuff key allegedly was recovered from Movant during the strip search (Proposed Claim, ¶ 5). Movant asserts that he did not receive a misbehavior report in connection with the alleged infraction (id., ¶ 7). He states that he received two misbehavior reports involving incidents later that day, one for an incident at 4:25 p.m. and the other at approximately 9:55 p.m. when he was housed in SHU at Franklin in cell number 2 (see Exs. A & B attached to proposed Claim). Movant also received a misbehavior report for an incident that occurred in SHU on September 20, 2013 at 2:15 p.m. (Ex. C attached to proposed Claim). Movant asserts that he was improperly placed in SHU since he never received a misbehavior report for the incident that occurred on the morning of September 16, 2013 during the strip search before his scheduled Court appearance. He also asserts that his disciplinary hearing for the incidents that allegedly occurred on September 16, 2013 were not timely commenced within seven days as required by 7 NYCRR §251-5.1.
Pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10(6), it is within the Court's discretion to allow the filing of a late claim if the applicable statute of limitations set forth in Article 2 of the CPLR has not expired. Thus, the first issue for determination upon any late claim motion is whether the application is timely. The proposed Claim asserts a cause of action for the intentional tort of wrongful confinement, which is a form of false imprisonment (CPLR § 215[3], a one-year statute of limitations). A claim for wrongful excessive confinement in a prison setting, which is a species of the tort of false imprisonment (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 407 [Ct Cl 1986]), accrues on the date of release from confinement (Roche v Village of Tarrytown, 309 AD2d 842, 843 [2d Dept 2003]; Nunez v City of New York, 307 AD2d 218, 219 [1st Dept 2003]; Collins v McMillan, 102 AD2d 860, 861 [2d Dept 1984]). Movant states, in his proposed Claim, that he was released from SHU on October 20, 2013 (Proposed Claim, ¶ 28). Thus, the statute of limitations has not expired.
The Court rejects the State's contention that Movant should have brought an Article 78 proceeding. He is not seeking to reverse an administrative disciplinary determination. He is seeking damages for wrongful confinement to SHU.
Next, in determining whether to grant a motion to file a late claim, Court of Claims Act § 10(6) sets forth six factors that should be considered, although other factors deemed relevant also may be taken into account (Plate v State of New York, 92 Misc 2d 1033, 1036 [Ct Cl 1978]). Movant need not satisfy every statutory element (see Bay Terrace Coop. Section IV v New York State Employees' Retirement Sys. Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Sys., 55 NY2d 979, 981 [1982]). However, the burden rests with Movant to persuade the Court to grant his or her late claim motion (see Matter of Flannery v State of New York, 91 Misc 2d 797 [Ct Cl 1977]; Matter of Santana v New York State Thruway Auth., 92 Misc 2d 1 [Ct Cl 1977]).
The first factor to be considered is whether the delay in filing the claim was excusable. In his affidavit submitted in support of his motion, Movant asserts that, on December 29, 2013, he prepared a Claim to be sent to the Attorney General by certified mail, return receipt requested, as required by statute. He asserts that he placed the Claim in an envelope and affixed advance disbursement forms for processing and sent it to inmate accounts at the correctional facility (Sarantakis Affidavit, ¶ 4). It appears that Movant did not have enough funds in his account to mail the letter and was requesting an advance of funds to mail the Claim to the Attorney General. Movant stated that he was not informed if his advance disbursement form was approved. He wrote a letter to the inmate account clerk on January 5, 2014, inquiring if his request had been granted and had not received a response at the time he made this motion (id., ¶¶ 6 and 7). The Court finds that this is not a reasonable excuse as there is no requirement Movant has referred to that requires the correctional facility to advance funds to him to mail letters. However, tender of a reasonable excuse for delay in filing a claim is not a precondition to permission to file a late claim such as to constitute a sine qua non for the requested relief (Bay Terrace Coop. Section IV v New York State Employees' Retirement Sys. Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Sys., supra at 981).
The next three factors to be addressed - whether Defendant had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim, whether Defendant had an opportunity to investigate the circumstances underlying the claim, and whether the failure to file or serve a timely claim or to serve a notice of intention resulted in substantial prejudice to Defendant - are interrelated and will be considered together. Defendant does not argue lack of notice, lack of opportunity to investigate, or that it will be substantially prejudiced by a delay in filing a claim (see Affirmation in Opposition of Michael T. Krenrich, Esq.). These factors, therefore, weigh in Movant's favor.
The fifth factor to be considered is whether Movant has another remedy available. It appears that Movant does not have a possible alternate remedy.
The sixth, final and perhaps most important factor to be considered is whether the proposed Claim has the appearance of merit, for it would be futile to permit a defective claim to be filed, subject to dismissal, even if other factors tended to favor the request (Ortiz v State of New York, 78 AD3d 1314, 1314 [3d Dept 2010], lv granted 16 NY3d 703 [2011], affd sub nom. Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011], quoting Savino v State of New York, 199 AD2d 254, 255 [2d Dept 1993]). It is Movant's burden to show that the claim is not patently groundless, frivolous or legally defective, and, based upon the entire record, including the proposed claim and any affidavits, that there is reasonable cause to believe that a valid cause of action exists. While this standard clearly places a heavier burden upon a party who has filed late than upon one whose claim is timely, it does not, and should not, require Movant to establish definitively the merit of the claim, or overcome all legal objections thereto, before the Court will permit Movant to file a late claim (Matter of Santana v New York State Thruway Auth., supra at 11-12).
At this stage of the proceeding, it should be noted the Court generally takes as true factual allegations of Movant. Based upon the entire record, the Court finds that the proposed Claim has the appearance of merit. Movant need only establish the appearance of merit; he need not prove a prima facie case at this stage of the proceedings.
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court finds that the preponderance of factors considered weigh in Movant's favor. The mix of circumstances presented by this case fall well within the remedial purposes of the amendments to the Court of Claims Act enacted in 1976 (L 1976, ch 280), which was designed to vest in the Court of Claims broader discretion than previously existed to permit late filing, indicating a strong concern that litigants with meritorious claims be afforded their day in court (Calzada v State of New York, 121 AD2d 988, 989 [1st Dept 1986]; Plate v State of New York, supra at 1036). Movant has provided ample basis for a favorable exercise of this Court's discretion to grant him leave to file a late claim against the State as set forth above. Therefore, within forty-five (45) days of the date of filing of this Decision and Order, Movant shall file with the Clerk of the Court his proposed Claim against the State and serve a copy of the proposed Claim upon the Attorney General personally or by certified mail, return receipt requested. In serving and filing the Claim, Movant is directed to follow all of the requirements of the Court of Claims Act, including § 11-a, regarding the filing fee, and the Uniform Rules for the Court of Claims.
March 28, 2014
Albany, New York
CHRISTOPHER J. McCARTHY
Judge of the Court of Claims
The following papers were read on Movant's application for permission to file a late claim:
Papers Numbered
Notice of Motion, Affidavit in Support & Exhibits attached 1
Affirmation in Opposition 2
Reply & Exhibit attached 3