Ex. 2, Pinyuk v. CBE Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-5753. The defendant claims that this case is more similar to two other recent E.D.N.Y. decisions: my decision in Park v. Forster & Garbus, LLP, No. 19-cv-3621 (ARR) (ST), 2019 WL 5895703 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2019) and Judge Cogan's decision in Saraci v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., No. 18-cv-6505 (BMC), 2019 WL 1062098 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019). While those cases do involve related issues, the letter at issue in this case is different in important ways.
Compare Rhee, 2020 WL 4188161, at * 7 (finding that where a debt collection letter contained two addresses, one indicating where to remit payment and another with a PO box, “the least sophisticated debtor may be confused as to which address [s]he may use to dispute [her] debt”) with Bacalzo v. Credit Control, No. 20-16904, 2022 WL 2063461, at *6 (D.N.J. June 7, 2022) (finding that multiple addresses in a collection letter “does not overshadow or detract from” a defendant's validation notice) and Saraci v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., No. 18-6505, 2019 WL 1062098, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2019) (finding that not every inclusion of two addresses in a collection letter is necessarily misleading). The Court decides this question at this stage because “[t]he question of whether the least sophisticated debtor would be confused or misled by a debt collector's notice is a question of law for [the court] to decide.” Szczurek v. Pro. Mgmt., Inc., 59 F.Supp.3d 721, 724 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing Wilson, 225 F.3d at 353 n.2) (deciding this issue in defendant's favor on a motion for a judgment on the pleadings); see also Nunez v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC, No. 19-2962, 2020 WL 2475619, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2020) (deciding this issue in a defendant's favor at the motion to dismiss stage).
First, in Saraci v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., the court granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims alleging violations of the FDCPA relating to defendant's debt collection letter. No. 18-CV-6505 (BMC), 2019 WL 1062098, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019). In that case, defendant's address appeared in several locations in the letter: the top right-hand corner listed beneath the “Convergent” logo: Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 800 SW 39th St./PO Box 9004, Renton, WA 98057, Mon-Fri 8AM-5PM PT, 877-227-0063; below the body of the letter, in a section labeled “3 CONVENIENT WAYS TO PAY, ” consumers were directed to mail payments to Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., PO Box 9004, Renton, WA 98057-9004; and in the top left-hand corner of the letter the following address appeared, ATERSO01, PO Box 1280, Oaks, PA 19456-1280, CHANGE SERVICE REQUESTED.
, CCI argues, particularly because the PO Box is never accompanied by any of this additional information. See Def's Mem. at 7 (citing Saraci v. Convergent Outsourcing, LLC, 2019 WL 1062098, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019)). Even if the least sophisticated consumer lacked this understanding, CCI contends that the letter differentiates the PO Box and the
Courts in this circuit have held that the inclusion of a debt collector's physical and P.O. Box addresses "would not confuse the least sophisticated consumer," particularly where consumers are explicitly directed to only one address. Nunez v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC, No. 19-CV-02962, 2020 WL 2475619, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2020) (citing Gansburg v. Credit Control, LLC, No. 18-CV-5054, 2020 WL 1862928, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2020)); see Park v. Forster & Garbus, LLP, No. 19-CV-3621, 2019 WL 5895703, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2019); Saraci v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., No. 18-CV-6505, 2019 WL 1062098, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019).
Indeed, contrary to plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish it, the present case is on all fours with Saraci v. Convergent Outsourcing, LLC, in which a similar letter containing two addresses was found to comply with FDCPA because the correct address for correspondence was, as here, "listed on the letter three times" underneath the name of the debt collection agency, while the return address was a PO box listed only one time and without the name of the agency. No. 18-CV-6505 (BMC), 2019 WL 1062098, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019). Significantly, the court in Saraci took care to note the fact that the "office" address on the letter was, as here, "listed next to defendant's office hours and telephone number, providing further support that th[e] address is correct."
In assessing whether the validation notice is overshadowed by the format of the letter, this court must evaluate the letter in its entirety. See McStay v. I.C. System, Inc., 308 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 2002) (when read in its entirety, the least sophisticated consumer would not be confused about his validation rights, which were included on the reverse side of the letter.); see also Saraci v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 2019 WL 1062098, at *4 ("when the letter is read in its entirety, there is no ambiguity."). The second paragraph of the letter clearly advises the plaintiff of her validation rights:
By contrast, the Court distinguished Adler from both Park and Saraci. See Park v. Forster & Garbus, LLP, No. 19-CV-3621, 2019 WL 5895703 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2019); Saraci v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., No. 18-CV-6505, 2019 WL 1062098 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019). "In Park, the detachable coupon included only two addresses, one of which belonged to the consumer, . . . the coupon specifically directed the plaintiff to 'return [it] with payment to [the P.O. box address],' and a 'prominent arrow' on the coupon pointed to the same address 'for extra emphasis.'"
As my colleagues in the Eastern District of New York have observed in connection with similar remedial statutes that lawyers have attempted to apply in ways Congress never imagined or intended, "remedial laws can themselves be abused and perverted into money-making vehicles for individuals and lawyers." Saunders v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 2d 464, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); see Saraci v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., No. 18-CV-6505, 2019 WL 1062098, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019) ("Stretching the statute to unreasonable lengths does no one any good except lawyers."); Huebner v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 85 F. Supp. 3d 672, 673 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ("The majority of cases that I see under the statute are brought by a handful of the same lawyers . . . [f]requently . . . on behalf of the same debtor-plaintiffs . . . often brought for the non-salutary purpose of squeezing a nuisance settlement and a pittance of attorneys' fees out of a collection company, which it will often find cheaper to pay than to litigate."); Turner v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 302 F. Supp. 2d 56, 59 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Congress enacted the FDCPA in order to combat egregious abuses of debtors, abuses that are real and troubling. It is almost as troubling, however, for an attorney to take unreasonable advantage of Congress's good intentions and the sound legislation it has enacted.").
In addition, Address 3 is positioned to be visible through a window of a courtesy return envelope so that the consumer does not have to address his or her own envelope. See Saraci v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., No. 18-CV-6505, 2019 WL 1062098, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019) ("to boot, the collection letter includes a return envelope which, unless ignored or misused in some fashion, ensures dispatch of the communication to the proper address"). Though Plaintiff argues that "not every individual would save or use extraneous materials enclosed with a dunning letter," (ECF No. 21 at 21), the standard for analyzing the Letters is not to consider every conceivable way a consumer could interpret them.