Opinion
No. H-1310, HDSP-137470
May 31, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a summary process action based on nonpayment of rent. Fay Santouse, hereinafter ("Landlord"), seeks a judgment of immediate possession. She initiated the action by serving the notice to quit on April 25, 2006. Ayanna Scott, hereinafter ("Tenant"), raises in her answer special defenses relating to her status as a Section 8 tenant. At the trial on May 23, 2006, both parties appeared pro se.
"Although our courts are "consistently . . . solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants," the rules of practice cannot be ignored to the detriment of other parties. Connecticut Light Power Co. v. Kluczinsky, 171 Conn. 516, 519, 370 A.2d 1306 (1976); see also Higgins v. Hartford County Bar Assn., 109 Conn. 690, 692, 145 A. 20 (1929)." Gallogly v. Kurrus, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield at Bantam, Docket No. CV 18-9808 (Trombley, J.; May 16, 2005) ( 2005 Ct. Sup. 8500, 8517).
Facts
"It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony. . . . It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)" In re Antonio M., 56 Conn. App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). "The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact]." Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123, 438 A.2d 842 (1981). "[N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to their testimony." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Toffolon v. Avon, 173 Conn. 525, 530, 378 A.2d 580 (1977). "The trier is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party." Smith v. Smith, supra, 183 Conn. 123. "That determination of credibility is a function of the trial court." Heritage Square, LLC v. Eoanou, 61 Conn. App. 329, 333, 763 A.2d 199 (2001). The trial court's function as the fact finder "is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christine F., 6 Conn. App. 360, 366, 505 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808, 508 A.2d 769 (1986).
"While a plaintiff is entitled to every favorable inference that may be legitimately drawn from the evidence, and has the same right to submit a weak case as a strong one, the plaintiff must still sustain the burden of proof on the contested issues in the complaint and the defendant need not present any evidence to contradict it. Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn. 205, 211, 439 A.2d 949 (1981). The general burden of proof in civil actions is on the plaintiff, who must prove all the essential allegations of the complaint. Id." Gulycz v. Stop Shop Cos., 29 Conn. App. 519, 523, 615 A.2d 1087 (1992).
The standard of proof in summary process actions, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is "properly defined as the better evidence, the evidence having the greater weight, the more convincing force in your mind." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 394, 440 A.2d 952 (1981);
The Court finds the following facts by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
The Landlord is the owner of the premises at 64 Earle Street, 2nd Floor, Hartford, Connecticut.
The parties entered into a written lease commencing on April 1, 2005. The Landlord does not dispute that the Tenant was a recipient of the Section 8/Housing Voucher program through Imagineers, LLC, the local public housing authority, hereinafter ("PHA"). The PHA paid the entire rent.
In February 2006, the Landlord agreed to renew the Section 8 lease with a rent increase. Afterwards, the Landlord approached the Tenant about renewing the lease, but the Tenant did not agree to the renewal with a rent increase. During this period, the PHA conducted an annual inspection which resulted in the apartment failing inspection.
Since then, the Landlord was unable to make all the required repairs. The parties differ as to the reason for the delay. The Landlord claims that the Tenant has obstructed the repairs by being abusive to the Landlord and the contractors hired to make the repairs. The Tenant also did not make the premises readily available for the repairs. The Tenant, however, contends that the Landlord hired inept contractors who did not come when scheduled.
The parties agree that the rent was not paid for April 2006 by either the PHA or the Tenant. The Tenant claims that the apartment failed inspection, and she was not responsible for paying the rent because she was still a Section 8 tenant. The Tenant also contends that the Landlord did not repair all the problems with the apartment. The PHA was scheduled to reinspect the apartment on May 31, 2006. The Landlord argues that the Tenant was no longer a Section 8 tenant after March 31, 2006, because the Tenant did not sign the lease renewal. The Landlord claims that the Tenant was personally responsible for paying the April 2006 rent.
The Court will provide additional facts as needed.
Discussion
In a summary process action based on nonpayment of rent, the landlord must prove all the elements of the case by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The essential elements are: (1) On or about a certain date, the landlord and the tenant entered into an oral or written, lease/rental agreement for a weekly/monthly/yearly term for use and occupancy of a certain premises; (2) The tenant agreed to pay an agreed upon rent by a certain date; (3) The tenant took possession of the premises pursuant to the lease; (4) The tenant failed to pay the rent due under the lease by a certain date; (5) The landlord caused a proper Notice to Quit Possession to be served on the tenant to vacate the premises on or before a certain termination date; and (6) Although the time given in the Notice to Quit Possession of the premises has passed, the tenant remains in possession of the premises. See General Statutes Sec. 47a-23(a)(1)(D).
"[B]efore a landlord may pursue its statutory remedy of summary process under 47a-23, the landlord must prove its compliance with all the applicable preconditions set by state and federal law for the termination of a lease." Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, 202 Conn. 128, 143, 520 A.2d 173 (1987). "When a landlord seeks to evict a federally subsidized tenant, the notice to quit must comply with 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(e)(2)(ii), which provides: `The owner must give the PHA a copy of an owner eviction notice to the tenant.'" Zeoli v. Vargas, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV04-0287703 (Tanzer, J.; August 19, 2004).
Failure of the landlord to establish any of the necessary elements of the case, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, results in judgment for the tenant. Gulycz v. Stop Shop Cos., supra, 29 Conn. App. 523.
After weighing all the evidence and assessing the credibility of the witnesses, the court makes the following findings.
In April 2006, the Tenant was still a Section 8 tenant. However, the Landlord did not offer any evidence that she provided the PHA with notice of the eviction. The Landlord failed to prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that she gave "the PHA a copy of an owner eviction notice to the tenant as required by 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(e)(2)(ii)."
Based on the evidence presented, the court finds that the Landlord has failed to prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, all the elements of the case. The Landlord has not sustained her burden of proof.
Accordingly, the Court enters Judgment for the Tenant.