Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-1790-L
May 25, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 7, 2000. After careful consideration of the motion, response, reply, summary judgment evidence, and applicable authorities, the court, for the reasons stated herein, grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. Procedural and Factual Background
Plaintiff Maribel Santos, ("Plaintiff" or "Santos") filed this action against Defendant Prime Hospitality Corporation, d/b/a AmeriSuites ("Defendant" or "Prime Hospitality"), on August 9, 1999. Santos contends that Prime Hospitality discriminated against her on the basis of race and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and discriminated against her on the basis of disability or perceived disability in violation of the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Defendant denies that it discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of race, national origin, disability or perceived disability.
Prime Hospitality filed its motion for summary judgment on August 7, 2000, contending that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding any of Santos's claims because (1) she suffered no adverse employment action with respect to her race, national origin, and disability claims, (2) she is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, and (3) she presented no evidence that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of race, national origin, or perceived disability.
Santos contends that she suffered an adverse employment action "in the form of a demotion" and was later terminated by Defendant. Santos also contends that she had no difficulties in performing her job. Plaintiff further contends that Prime Hospitality perceived her as an individual with a medical impairment which substantially interfered with her ability to work and that Prime Hospitality replaced her with someone who had no perceived disability. Finally, Santos contends that the reasons for her demotion and discharge were pretextual and that the real reason for both the demotion and discharge actions was because of her national origin and disability.
The court now sets forth the facts it relies on in analyzing the summary judgment motion. Many of the key facts are not disputed; however, when they are in dispute, they are presented in the light most favorable to Santos. Of course, any matters stated as facts must be supported by competent summary judgment evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Statements which are not supported by competent summary judgment evidence do not create a genuine issue of material fact and will not be considered by the court.
Plaintiff worked at the AmeriSuites Hotel in the Dallas West End. The hotel has 149 rooms. The hotel was quite busy during Santos's employment because of its downtown location near the Dallas Convention Center and other business activity. The hotel opened in early October 1997, and had only recently opened when Santos was hired.
Santos was hired by Defendant Prime Hospitality near the end of October 1997. She was employed a total of nine months. She because Assistant General Manager for the AmeriSuites West End in early November 1997. Gail Jackson ("Jackson") was the General Manager during Santos's first five months. Jackson is white. Jackson's employment was terminated near the end of March 1998. When Jackson left, Santos did not request the General Manager job because the job in her words "would be biting off more than I could chew." Santos thought she needed training in several areas, including preparation of the hotel daily report and other Prime Hospitality procedures, to effectively perform her job as Assistant General Manager. Santos needed and wanted guidance on how Prime Hospitality "actually functioned on a day-to-day basis."
When Jackson was terminated, Kirk Kindred ("Kindred"), a white male, became the General Manager at the AmeriSuites West End around the middle of April 1998. Santos reported to Kindred for approximately three months, until she left her employment in July 1998. During this time, Kindred was also a district manager; he had responsibility for the operation of four other hotels. Because the AmeriSuites West End was a district-level property, the position of Assistant General Manager could at times entail more responsibilities than the typical Assistant General Manager position. Although not fully explained by the parties, the term "district-level" apparently refers to the size of the hotel, the volume of business, and the additional responsibilities associated with the size and amount of business of the hotel.
Kindred is the only person who Santos believes discriminated against her. Santos got along well with Kindred "all the way through" her employment. Santos is an Hispanic female. More than half of Kindred's housekeeping staff was Hispanic, including the executive housekeeper and at least two front desk associates. Kindred promoted Maria Soto (Hispanic) and Sandy Villareal (Hispanic). Santos is not aware of any comments by Kindred regarding any employee's national origin or race. Santos has no reason to believe that Kindred favors non-Hispanic employees over Hispanic employees. None of the other Hispanic employees ever complained to Santos about discrimination by Kindred, and none of the Hispanic employees had any problems getting along with Kindred.
After Kindred started as General Manager at AmeriSuites West End, he believed that Santos was having difficulty performing several of her responsibilities as Assistant General Manager. According to Kindred, he believed that Santos did not have the proper training to be an Assistant General Manager at a property of the size of AmeriSuites West End. Because he believed that Santos had the potential to be a successful Assistant General Manager with more training, Kindred discussed with his immediate supervisor and Human Resources regarding the possibility of providing Santos with additional training in another position. According to Kindred, Prime Hospitality decided to offer Santos the position of Front Desk Manager so that she would have an opportunity to receive the additional training she needed at a slower pace than her position of Assistant General Manager would permit.
Kindred met with Santos on approximately July 6, 1998, to discuss her performance. At this meeting, Kindred offered Santos the position of Front Desk Manager or Front Office Manager. Kindred made no reference to Santos's national origin or race during this meeting. The position of Front Desk Manager was created for Santos, and it was a newly-created position for the hotel. The Front Desk Manager position was at the same rate of pay and provided the same benefits as Santos's position as Assistant General Manager, except that the Front Desk Manager would not be eligible for a bonus every six months as was the Assistant General Manager. Kindred told Santos the position of Front Desk Manager would provide her an opportunity for additional training, and Santos appreciated the opportunity to acquire more training. Santos acknowledges that the job of Front Desk Manager could have given her additional training which might have benefited her in the future. Kindred told Santos that he would allow her some time to consider the offer he made to her.
Santos hotly disputes Kindred's account of her performance. According to Santos, Kindred never once mentioned her performance to her until he informed her on July 6, 1998 that he was demoting her. Kindred made no mention of Santos's performance being unacceptable or her being unreliable. Kindred told Santos that he had a lot of responsibilities and he needed someone he felt he could "count on," that he had already hired someone else to take her position, and that she would be arriving in two weeks after completing her training. The performance evaluation, which is attached to Kindred's affidavit, was never presented to Santos or discussed with her. She never signed or received it, and it was never presented to her during her July 6, 1998 meeting with Kindred. Santos avers she was not having any "performance difficulties regarding several of [her] responsibilities." Kindred asked Santos who had hired her, and she told him. Kindred then informed her he had already discussed her demotion from Assistant General Manager to Front Desk Manager with Human Resources and that Human Resources had approved his decision. Santos was then moved out of her office but was expected to continue the Assistant General Manager duties until her replacement arrived.
As it must in the summary judgment context, the court accepts Santos's version of the facts regarding her performance and what transpired at the July 6, 1998 meeting, to the extent that these matters are in dispute.
Santos did not consider the position of Front Desk Manager to be a serious option for her. She considered the position to be a demotion because it "stripped [her] of [her] responsibilities." On July 29, 1998, Santos informed Kindred that she did not want to accept the position. Santos's employment ended when she decided not to take the job of Front Desk Manager. Santos's employment with Prime Hospitality officially ended on July 30, 1998.
Santos filed her first Charge of Discrimination against Prime Hospitality on July 15, 1998. Her initial Charge of Discrimination mentions only national origin discrimination. On September 24, 1998, Santos filed an Amended Charge of Discrimination, adding disability discrimination to her Charge.
Santos states that she has never been disabled and has never considered herself to be disabled. According to Santos, Kindred perceived her to be disabled due to a condition called "polycystic ovarian syndrome" (PCOS). This is a sclerocystic disease or condition of the ovary, characterized by hirsutism (excessive body and facial hair), obesity, menstrual abnormalities, infertility and enlarged ovaries. The American Heritage Stedman's Medical Dictionary 655 (1995); Santos's Deposition at 123-128. Santos states that this condition does not impact her ability to function, work, or perform daily activities, and it did not impact her ability to perform her job in any way. Santos states that Kindred never made any comments she considered to be inappropriate regarding her medical condition and never criticized her because of her medical condition. Kindred did not complain or criticize Santos for the time she took off going to the doctor for her condition. The job of Front Desk Manager that was offered to Santos was a full-time job offer that was open to her at all times until she left. Kindred never said anything to Santos indicating that she could not handle a full-time job because of her medical condition.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994). The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim. Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed fact issues which are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. This standard, as set forth herein, will be applied by the court in its analysis of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
III. Analysis
A. Santos's Race Claim
Santos initially claimed, among other things, that Prime Hospitality discriminated against her because she is Hispanic. See Plaintiff's Original Complaint ("Complaint") ¶¶ 1, 17, 19, 20. Prime Hospitality contends that Santos did not properly preserve her claim of race discrimination because she failed to include such a claim in her charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and therefore her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies precludes her claim for race discrimination. Santos acknowledges that she did properly preserve her claim of race discrimination. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4. Accordingly, Plaintiff's race claim is not before the court and will not be considered.
B. Santos's ADA Claim
The ADA is an antidiscrimination statute designed to remove barriers which prevent qualified individuals with disabilities from enjoying employment opportunities available to persons without disabilities. Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1029 (1996). The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual because of a disability "in regard to job application procedures; the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees; employee compensation; job training; and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
A person may establish a claim of discrimination under the ADA either by presenting direct evidence or by using the indirect method of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). See Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1999). To establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must show that she (1) suffers from a disability; (2) was qualified for the job; (3) was subject to an adverse employment action, and (4) was replaced by a non-disabled person or treated less favorably than non-disabled employees. Id. The employer then must show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. The employee ultimately bears the burden of showing that the employer's actions were motivated by considerations prohibited by the statute. Id.
A person is disabled under the ADA if she (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities, (2) has a record of such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Santos argues that Kindred perceived her as having a medical condition substantial enough to hinder performance of her job, or ability to work, to the extent that he could not "count on [Santos] to perform [her] job." Santos has failed to present evidence showing that Prime Hospitality regarded her as disabled.
There are two ways an individual "may fall within this statutory definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities." Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). Major life activities can include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). A person is "substantially limited" if she is unable to perform a major life activity that can be performed by the average person in the general population or she is significantly restricted as to the time, place, condition, duration, or manner under which she can perform the activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). For an employer to regard an employee as substantially limited in a major life activity, and thus disabled, "it is necessary that [the employer] entertain misperceptions about the individual." Id. The Court noted that these "misperceptions" often times `"resul[t] from the stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of . . . individual ability.'" Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)).
Santos has failed to come forward with any evidence indicating that Kindred or Prime Hospitality believed Santos was unable to perform her job because of her medical condition, or had any misperceptions about Santos's ability to perform her job because of her medical condition. Santos's evidence only indicates that Kindred knew she had this particular medical condition, not that Kindred perceived her to be substantially limited in her ability to work. The only trace of evidence on which Santos relies is that Kindred told her he needed someone whom he could "count on." Subjectively, Santos attempts to connect this statement with her medical condition, but there is simply no basis for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that this statement alone establishes that Kindred or Prime Hospitality regarded Santos as disabled. This is simply too slender a reed upon which one can raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning disability discrimination. Santos has wholly failed to show, or raise a genuine issue of material fact, that she is disabled under the ADA. Accordingly, Prime Hospitality is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's disability claim.
The court notes that even if Plaintiff is disabled, she has not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext for disability discrimination. For this additional reason, Prime Hospitality is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's disability claim.
C. Santos's National Origin Claim
Santos also contends that Prime Hospitality demoted and discharged her because of her national origin. She states that her national origin is Hispanic because both of her parents are Hispanic. Santos's Deposition at 50. National origin, though often confused with race, refers to "the country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came." Espinoza v. Farrah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973). Based on Plaintiff's statement, she really appears to be asserting a race claim, as neither the record nor the Complaint reflects Plaintiff's country of birth or that of her ancestors. In any event, in some contexts national origin and racial discrimination are "so closely related . . . as to be indistinguishable." Bullard v. OMI Georgia, Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). Discrimination against Hispanics is often referred to interchangeably under both of these categories. Cf., e.g., Gonzalez v. Trinity Marine Group, Inc., 117 F.3d 894, 895-96 (5th Cir. 1997) (claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981). Accordingly, the court will consider Plaintiff's Complaint as having sufficiently asserted a claim for discrimination based on national origin.
As in any discrimination case, a plaintiff complaining of discrimination on the basis of national origin bears the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that her employment was adversely affected by her protected class status. This burden can be met by presenting direct evidence or, in the absence of direct evidence, plaintiff may prove her case with indirect or circumstantial evidence. Here, there is no direct evidence, so Plaintiff attempts to prove her case, or create a genuine issue of material fact, through circumstantial evidence. Proving a case with circumstantial evidence involves the burden-shifting process articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a Title VII plaintiff must first show the following: (a) she was in a protected class; (b) she is qualified for the position she lost; (c) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (d) similarly situated employees who were not in a protected class were treated more favorably than she. Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1000 (1998); see also Rutherford v. Harris County, Tex., 197 F.3d 173, 184 (5th Cir. 1999). The burden then shifts to Prime Hospitality which must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If Prime Hospitality is successful, the burden shifts back to Santos who must show that the proffered reason is a pretext for intentional discrimination.
Prime Hospitality contends that Santos suffered no adverse employment action. Santos contends that her "demotion" and "discharge" were both adverse employment actions. The court need not decide this issue and, for the purpose of its analysis, assumes that (1) both are adverse employment actions, (2) all elements of a prima facie case have been met, and (3) Prime Hospitality has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action against Santos.
The record is devoid of any evidence that Kindred or Prime Hospitality considered Santos's national origin when she was "demoted" or "discharged." Despite being requested to do so in her deposition, Santos came forward with not even a scintilla of evidence to support a finding that any adverse action taken against her was because of her national origin. At most, she has a subjective belief that her national origin was a determinative or motivating factor; however, such a subjective belief cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext or that Santos was the victim of intentional discrimination. Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1997); Southard v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 555 (5th Cir. 1997); Douglas v. United Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) ( en banc). Since Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact whether she was the victim of intentional discrimination based on her national origin, Prime Hospitality is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Santos contends that she has "called in to question" the articulated reason for Prime Hospitality taking adverse employment action against her and therefore has raised a genuine-issue of material fact regarding national origin and disability discrimination. The court disagrees because Plaintiff misinterprets and misapplies the applicable law. After a Title VII case reaches the pretext stage, the question for summary judgment is whether a rational factfinder could find that the employer discriminated against a plaintiff on the basis of national origin. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). "A prima facie case and sufficient evidence to reject the employer's explanation" may permit a trier of fact to determine that an employer unlawfully discriminated, and may therefore be enough to prevent summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). This showing, however, is not always enough to prevent summary judgment in favor of the employer. By way of example, an employer would be entitled to summary judgment "if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination occurred." Id. On the other hand, in the context of an unlawful discrimination claim, summary judgment is inappropriate "if the evidence taken as a whole (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that national origin or disability was a determinative factor in the actions of which plaintiff complains." See Vadie v. Mississippi State Univ., 218 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1092 (2001). With respect to Santos's national origin claim, evidence of discrimination based on national origin is simply nonexistent. Under these facts, the law mandates summary judgment on behalf of Prime Hospitality.
The court has already ruled on Plaintiff's disability claim. Accordingly, this discussion is confined to Plaintiff's claim of national origin discrimination, although it applies equally to Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim.
IV. Miscellaneous
Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Evidence, filed September 20, 2000, are also before the court. The court has not considered any evidence which is not competent summary judgment evidence under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and other applicable authority. In any event, even if the court considered the evidence to which objection has been made, it reaches the same result insofar as this opinion is concerned. Finally, the court addressed only matters which were necessary to rule on Prime Hospitality's summary judgment motion. If a matter was not discussed, the court did not deem it necessary or relevant to the court's analysis.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning any of Plaintiff's discrimination claims, and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. This action is dismissed with prejudice against Defendant Prime Hospitality Corporation. Judgment will issue by separate document.
It is so ordered.