We review the trial court's decision on a motion to withdraw or amend admissions under CR 36 for an abuse of discretion. Santos v. Dean, 96 Wn.App. 849, 857-58, 982 P.2d 632 (1999). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or is based on untenable grounds.
¶29 The purpose of requests for admission is to eliminate from controversy factual matters that will not be disputed at trial. Santos v. Dean, 96 Wn. App. 849, 861, 982 P.2d 632 (1999); Brust v. Newton, 70 Wn. App. 286, 295, 852 P.2d 1092 (1993). A party is not required to concede either factual matters central to the lawsuit or legal conclusions.
Moreover, the trial court can extend the time limit even after the 30-day deadline has expired. Santos v. Dean , 96 Wash. App. 849, 858-59, 982 P.2d 632 (1999). The trial court must consider whether permitting the extension improves the presentation of the case on its merits and "whether the extension will prejudice the opposing party."
And a trial court's rulings against a party are generally not evidence of actual or potential bias. See Santos v. Dean, 96 Wn.App. 849, 857, 982 P.2d 632 (1999) (while Division Three would have "concluded differently than the trial court" on summary judgment, "that does not establish evidence of [the trial judge's] actual or potential bias"). Crouch fails to show judicial bias.
Litigants are entitled to an impartial judge. Santos v. Dean, 96 Wn.App. 849, 857, 982 P.2d 632 (1999). But Metcalfe shows no bias by the trial judge.
The appearance of fairness doctrine entitles litigants to an impartial judge. Santos v. Dean, 96 Wn.App. 849, 856-57, 982 P.2d 632 (1999). But Janice fails to show bias warranting reassignment to a different judicial officer.
Thus, the rule plainly allows the trial court to extend the allowable time for answering. Moreover, the trial court can extend the time limit even after the 30-day deadline has expired. Santos v. Dean, 96 Wn.App. 849, 858-59, 982 P.2d 632 (1999). The trial court must consider whether permitting the extension improves the presentation of the case on its merits and "whether the extension will prejudice the opposing party."
CR 36; Melbv v. Hawkins Pontiac, Inc.. 13 Wn.App. 745, 748, 537 P.2d 807 (1975) ("The plaintiffs requests for admissions, because they were not timely answered, must be treated as admitted."): see also Peralta v. State. 187 Wn.2d 888, 900, 389 P.3d 596 (2017) (an admission is "conclusively established" if party does not seek to withdraw or amend it); Santos v. Dean. 96 Wn.App. 849, 861, 982 P.2d 632 (1999) ("[A] party is not required to admit legal conclusions under CR 36."). Meridian argued below and on appeal that the terms of the 2015 agreement provided Mascio with the contractual authorization to engage in the risky, speculative trades.
Litigants must submit proof of actual or perceived bias to support a claim of appearance of impartiality. Santos v. Dean, 96 Wash. App. 849, 857, 982 P.2d 632 (1999), review denied, 139 Wash.2d 1026, 994 P.2d 845 (2000). ¶ 18 A finding that a party lacks credibility does not mean the judge is biased.
CR 36(a) expressly authorizes requests for admission that relate to application of law to fact, but a party is not required to admit legal conclusions under this rule. Santos v. Dean, 96 Wash.App. 849, 861, 982 P.2d 632 (1999). ¶ 30