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In Dos Santos, Santos, Durate, and Rodrigues were roommates in Belmere Luxury Apartments (Luxury) in Houma, Louisiana. 2017 WL 4082287 at *1.
Summary of this case from Rouse v. ArdOpinion
2017 CA 0283
09-15-2017
ROGERIO RIBEIRO DOS SANTOS, EDIMAR RIBEIRO DUARTE, AND JUSSARA DOS SANTOS RODRIGUES v. BELMERE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, FAIRFIELD PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, AND ROBIN HEBERT
Daniel A. Webb Brooke A. Riggs New Orleans, Louisiana Attorneys for Defendants - 1st Appellants, Belmere Limited Partnership, Fairfield Property Management and Robin Hebert Bryan J. Haydel, Jr. Kelly R. Englert Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Defendant - 2nd Appellant, Endurance American Specialty, Inc. Rusty Savoie Covington, Louisiana Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees Rogerio R. Dos Santos and Edimar R. Duarte
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEALED FROM THE 32nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT TERREBONNE PARISH, LOUISIANA
DOCKET NUMBER 169-305, DIVISION "C" HONORABLE JUAN W. PICKETT, JUDGE Daniel A. Webb
Brooke A. Riggs
New Orleans, Louisiana Attorneys for
Defendants - 1st Appellants,
Belmere Limited Partnership,
Fairfield Property Management
and Robin Hebert Bryan J. Haydel, Jr.
Kelly R. Englert
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for
Defendant - 2nd Appellant,
Endurance American Specialty, Inc. Rusty Savoie
Covington, Louisiana Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees
Rogerio R. Dos Santos and
Edimar R. Duarte BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., McDONALD, and CHUTZ, JJ. McDONALD, L.
In this appeal, an apartment complex owner, its property management company, and a property management employee challenge a judgment awarding damages to two former apartment residents whose possessions were removed from an apartment garage and discarded. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2010, Rogerio Dos Santos, Edimar Ribeiro Duarte, and Jussara Dos Santos Rodrigues (sometimes, roommates), Brazilian natives, moved from Florida to Louisiana due to a job relocation. Mr. Dos Santos and Mr. Duarte were employed as field technicians for Tiempo Broadband, a contractor that installed commercial and residential satellite services for DIRECTV. They were often asked to relocate as the demand for DIRECTV installations changed geographically.
In December 2010, the roommates moved into Belmere Luxury Apartments (Belmere Apartments) in Houma, Louisiana. Belmere Limited Partnership (Belmere) owns Belmere Apartments, and Fairfield Property Management (Fairfield) manages Belmere Apartments for Belmere. Belmere and Mr. Dos Santos signed a written six-month lease for Apartment 118, and Mr. Dos Santos listed Mr. Duarte and Ms. Rodrigues as additional occupants of the apartment. Mr. Dos Santos also signed an addendum to the written lease agreeing to pay an additional $100 per month for possession of Belmere Apartments Garage A20, an enclosed double-car garage (collectively, Written Lease). The roommates initially used Garage A20 to store furniture and other possessions they brought with them from Florida. The Written Lease renewed automatically on a month-to-month basis after the initial six-month term.
In August or September 2011, Mr. Dos Santos asked Fairfield employee Robin Hebert, the Belmere Apartments property manager, about putting the Written Lease "on hold." He explained that his boss had asked them to relocate to Texas for work; the roommates were going to go to Texas to investigate the possible relocation; but, they wanted the option to move back to Belmere Apartments if the relocation did not work out. Ms. Hebert explained the Written Lease could not be put on hold. According to Mr. Dos Santos, Ms. Hebert then told him he could temporarily continue to lease Garage A20 on a month-to-month basis to store the roommates' belongings until they decided whether or not they would stay in Texas. Mr. Dos Santos contends that, during this conversation, Ms. Hebert did not require that the Garage A20 lease be in writing or attached to an apartment lease. According to Mr. Duarte, Mr. Dos Santos' roommate, he was with Mr. Dos Santos for this conversation, and he specifically remembered Ms. Hebert saying the lease of the garage was month-to-month and that no contract was needed.
Conversely, Ms. Hebert claims Mr. Dos Santos was alone during this conversation, and she told him that he could not lease Garage A20 without an active apartment lease. She claims Mr. Dos Santos asked if Garage A20 could be attached to Apartment 432; according to Ms. Hebert, Apartment 432 was leased to someone that Mr. Dos Santos had referred to Belmere Apartments, and the record shows that person was Mr. Duarte's sister, Claudenice Dos Santos (no relation to Mr. Dos Santos). According to Ms. Hebert, she agreed that this arrangement would work, if the Apartment 432 lessee would sign an addendum attaching Garage A20 to Apartment 432. It is undisputed that no such addendum was signed.
At the end of October 2011, Mr. Dos Santos submitted a 30-day notice of the roommates' intent to move out of Apartment 118 on November 30, 2011. During the month of November, the roommates gradually moved their possessions from Apartment 118 to Garage A20. On November 30, 2011, Mr. Dos Santos turned in the keys to Apartment 118 to Fairfield employee Kristy Hebb Landry, a Belmere Apartments leasing agent, but told her he was keeping the Garage A20 keys because they were going to keep the garage and continue to pay on it. He also gave her a $100 check with "Garage A20" written on the memo line. Ms. Landry gave Mr. Dos Santos a receipt for the $100 payment and a second document explaining how future payments could be made to Belmere online. The roommates then traveled to a hotel in Dallas, Texas, taking enough personal items to last one to two weeks. The remainder of their possessions were stored in Garage A20.
About one week later, on Thursday, December 8, 2011, Elizabeth deGois, another Belmere tenant, and Ms. Rogrigues' good friend, passed Garage A20 on her way to take her son to school. She saw the garage door open, Belmere employees inside, and a large dumpster nearby. She called Ms. Rodrigues and Mr. Duarte at the hotel in Texas - and, both initially thought what she was telling them was a joke. Ms. Rodrigues then became very upset and asked Ms. deGois to find out what was going on. Ms. deGois went to the Belmere Apartments office for the first of many times that day, but Ms. Hebert told her she could not discuss the matter with her. After seeing Belmere employees move several items from Garage A20 into vehicles, and putting other items into the dumpster, Ms. deGois called the police to report theft. When Terrebonne Parish Sheriff Deputy Dustin Crabtree arrived, he spoke to Ms. deGois and Ms. Hebert. According to the police report, Ms. Hebert showed him the expired Written Lease and explained that Mr. Dos Santos had moved out. She also stated that the lease contract prohibited a garage lease without an apartment lease; that Mr. Dos Santos had transferred Garage A20 to residents in Apartment 432; that those residents had "snuck out" without paying their rent or the garage rental; and that consequently, Belmere considered Garage A20 abandoned and was exercising its contractual right to remove the contents. Deputy Crabtree explained this to Ms. deGois.
After hearing from Ms. deGois that Thursday morning, Mr. Duarte repeatedly tried to call Mr. Dos Santos who was in a meeting about their potential new work territory. Meanwhile, Mr. Duarte called Belmere Apartments, and Ms. Hebert told him that she could only give information to Mr. Dos Santos. Eventually, Mr. Duarte reached Mr. Dos Santos and told him their possessions were being removed from Garage A20. Mr. Dos Santos asked Mr. Duarte to call Ms. Hebert, ask them to stop, and tell her it was a mistake, because the roommates had paid the Garage A20 lease payment for the month of December. Thinking perhaps the $100 check had not cleared, Mr. Dos Santos also asked Mr. Duarte to verify that there were sufficient funds in the bank account upon which the $100 check had been written. Mr. Duarte confirmed that the check had been paid on Friday, December 2nd. Ultimately, Mr. Dos Santos left his work meeting, called Ms. Hebert, and she told him he could not lease a Belmere garage without an apartment. Mr. Dos Santos claims that this is the first time Ms. Hebert told him that the Garage A20 lease had to be attached to an active apartment lease. He also claims that he then asked if he could attach the Garage A20 lease to Ms. deGois' apartment, and Ms. Hebert said that he could, if Ms. deGois came to the office personally.
According to Ms. deGois, she went to the Belmere office five or six times on December 8th, trying "to find a solution." In her video deposition which was played at trial, she testified that she asked Ms. Hebert if she could rent a garage or a truck to get the roommates' things from Garage A20, but Ms. Hebert "did not want any agreement." She then testified that Ms. Hebert told her she could rent a garage but could only do so after Belmere employees had put everything from Garage A20 in the trash, and Ms. deGois would have to go get the items out of the trash. Ms. deGois testified that the Belmere employees had emptied Garage A20 by about 5:00 p.m., and she then removed items from the dumpster until about 9:00 p.m.
Mr. Dos Santos flew from Texas to New Orleans later that same day, Thursday, and returned to Belmere Apartments in Houma that night. He was unable to access Garage A20 because the locks had been changed. He climbed into the dumpster to see what he could salvage of his and his roommates' possessions.
Mr. Dos Santos called the police the next morning, Friday, December 9, 2011. When Terrebonne Parish Sheriff Deputy Thomas Arnold arrived, Mr. Dos Santos explained the roommates' temporary relocation to Texas. According to the police report, Mr. Dos Santos stated that he could not rent a storage unit unless he was a Belmere resident and that he had used a friend who was a current Belmere resident for the garage rental. Deputy Arnold and Mr. Dos Santos then spoke to Belmere Apartments Assistant Manager Shana Guidry, who stated that Belmere management had allowed Mr. Dos Santos to use a friend, but after the friend failed to pay his rent and left town, the contents of Garage A20 had to be removed. According to the police report, Mr. Dos Santos told Deputy Arnold that he "was not aware of the rules." Ms. Hebert was not at the Belmere office that Friday.
After the disposal of their possessions at Belmere Apartments, the roommates did remain in Texas, but Messrs. Dos Santos and Duarte did not work for approximately eight months. A Brazilian church in Dallas assisted the roommates by finding them a place to stay and giving them food and clothing. The church also helped Ms. Rodrigues find a job cleaning houses so the roommates could have some type of income. In August 2012, Messrs. Dos Santos and Duarte returned to work for Tiempo Broadband in Texas.
The roommates later filed suit in federal district court against Belmere, Fairfield, and Ms. Hebert (Belmere defendants), but that court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal. Dos Santos et al. v. Belmere Limited Partnership et al., 12-30795 (5th Cir. 2013) (unpublished per curiam). In April 2013, the roommates filed this suit against the Belmere defendants in the 32nd Judicial District Court, asserting numerous state law claims. The roommates later amended their petition to add Belmere's insurer, Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company (Endurance), as a defendant, to add additional factual allegations, and to further define their claims. The Belmere defendants and Endurance answered the petitions, asserted affirmative defenses, and filed various exceptions and motions.
Of relevance here, the district court signed a judgment stating that, in accordance with the Written Lease, Mr. Dos Santos' claims against Belmere would be tried via a bench trial, and his claims against the other defendants, as well as all of Mr. Duarte's and Ms. Rodrigues' claims, would be tried via a jury trial. After a three-day trial, the jury found that: (1) the roommates had an oral lease with Belmere for Garage A20; (2) the Belmere defendants wrongfully evicted the roommates; (3) the Belmere defendants were liable for detrimental reliance; and (4) the roommates suffered damages because of the wrongful eviction and detrimental reliance. The district court also made the same four findings as to Belmere and Mr. Dos Santos. The jury and district court awarded the roommates the following damages, as set forth in a September 28, 2016 judgment:
| Jury award to Mr. Dos Santosagainst Fairfield, Ms. Hebert,and Endurance, in solido | Property Loss - $12,500Income Loss - $51,346General Damages - $300,000Total: $363,846 |
|---|---|
| District court award to Mr. DosSantos against Belmere | Property Loss - $12,500Income Loss - $51,436General Damages - $40,000Total: $103,846*(*cumulative to jury verdict, not in addition to) |
| Jury award to Mr. Duarteagainst Fairfield, Ms. Hebert,Belmere and Endurance, in solido | Property Loss - $12,500Income Loss - $0General Damages - $300,000Total: $312,500 |
| Jury award to Ms. Rodriguesagainst Fairfield, Ms. Hebert,Belmere and Endurance, in solido | Property Loss - $12,500Income Loss - $0General Damages - $300,000Total: $312,500 |
The Belmere defendants filed a motion for new trial, or alternatively, for remittitur, and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which, after a hearing, the district court denied. The Belmere defendants and Endurance then appealed from the September 28, 2016 judgment. It is undisputed that after the appeal was taken, Ms. Rodrigues settled her claims with the defendants and Endurance. Thus, our review on appeal is limited to the judgment in favor of Messrs. Dos Santos and Duarte.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS ONE AND TWO
On appeal, the Belmere defendants and Endurance filed a joint brief, challenging the adverse judgment on several grounds. During oral arguments before this court, the Belmere defendants' counsel waived the ground raised in the appellants' first assignment of error. In their second assignment of error, the appellants argue the district court erred in permitting the jury to review Ms. Hebert's unredacted deposition before retiring for deliberations. Noting that appellants did not formally object on the record, the district court instructed the jury on the proper weight to be given to evidence, and further noting that appellants point to no specific prejudice, we agree with the district court that the jury's review of the deposition, if error, was harmless; this assignment of error has no merit. Arnaud v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 14-1809 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/18/15), 182 So.3d 97, 102.
EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT
In their third assignment of error, the appellants contend the district court correctly found the Written Lease controlled the rights of the parties but then erred in interpreting the Written Lease. The record shows that the district court did make certain rulings during the course of the litigation based on the Written Lease's terms, including the bench/jury trial bifurcation, and an oral ruling at the end of the trial analyzing whether the roommates had abandoned or surrendered their property, as defined in the Written Lease and as these terms were jurisprudentially interpreted. However, the actual signed judgment dated September 28, 2016, states that the district court found Belmere and Mr. Dos Santos had an oral lease for Garage A20; that Belmere, through its agents, wrongly evicted Mr. Dos Santos from Garage A20; Belmere was liable for detrimental reliance; and, that Mr. Dos Santos suffered damages from the wrongful eviction and detrimental reliance. This part of the judgment is consistent with the jury's verdict interrogatories and the judgment finding that each roommate had an oral contract with Belmere for Garage A20.
In any event, appellate courts review judgments, not reasons for judgment. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-0571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507, 572. Judgments are often upheld on appeal for reasons different than those assigned by the district court. Id. Because we conclude the judgment correctly awarded Mr. Dos Santos and Mr. Duarte damages for detrimental reliance, we need not resolve the apparent inconsistency in the district court's rulings about a written versus an oral lease, nor need we address the appellants' fourth assignment of error challenging the jury's finding of a verbal lease.
DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE
In their fifth assignment of error, the appellants contend the district court and jury erred in finding them liable for damages to Messrs. Dos Santos and Duarte under a theory of detrimental reliance.
A detrimental reliance claim is based on LSA-C.C. art. 1967, which states that a party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying. The doctrine of detrimental reliance is designed to prevent injustice by barring a party from taking a position contrary to his prior acts, admissions, representations, or silence. Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Govt., 04-1459 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 59; Louisiana Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Richard, 13-0890 (La. 10/15/13), 125 So.3d 398, 402 (per curiam). A party claiming detrimental reliance must prove three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change in position to one's detriment because of the reliance. Id. To prevail on a detrimental reliance claim, a party need not prove a formal, valid, and enforceable contract. Suire, 907 So.2d at 59; see Saba v. Emerson, 16-0317 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/31/16), 2016 WL 6427697 *7 (unpublished). Nor does the existence of a contract between the parties per se preclude a party's assertion of a detrimental reliance claim. See Water Craft Management, L.L.C. v. Mercury Marine, 361 F.Supp.2d 518, 557, (M.D.La. 2004), affirmed, 457 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2006). It is difficult, however, to recover under the detrimental reliance theory, because it is a form of equitable estoppel, and Louisiana law does not favor estoppel. Louisiana Office of Risk Mgmt., 125 So.3d at 402.
Suire's three-element test for a detrimental reliance claim has been repeated in Luther v. IOM Co. LLC, 13-0353 (La. 10/15/13), 130 So.3d 817, 825; Saba 2016 WL 6427697 *7: Hitachi Medical Systems America, Inc. v. Bridges, 15-0658 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/9/15), 2015 WL 8479021 *7 (unpublished), writ denied, 16-0042 (La. 2/26/16), 187 So.3d 1004; Star Acquisitions, LLC v. Town of Abita Springs, 14-1272 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/6/15), 2015 WL 996838 *4 (unpublished), writ denied, 15-0679 (La. 5/22/15), 171 So.3d 257; and Patrick v. Dupont, 14-0812 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/11/15), 2015 WL 1129092 *10 (unpublished), writs denied, 15-0715, 15-0722 (La. 6/1/15), 171 So.3d 259, 931. This court has also stated the elements of a detrimental reliance cause of action are: (1) the defendant made a promise to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant knew or should have known that the promise would induce the plaintiff to rely on it to his detriment; (3) the plaintiff relied on the promise to his detriment; (4) the plaintiff was reasonable in relying on the promise; and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages because of the reliance. McLin v. Hi Ho, Inc., 12-1702 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/7/13), 118 So.3d 462, 470, citing Wooley v. Lucksinger, 06-1167 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 1228, 1238; see also Harrell v. La. School Empl. Ret. Sys., 13-1914 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/17/14), 2014 WL 3537882 *3 (unpublished). One commentator has noted that Suire's simple 3-part test "encapsulates the black-letter meaning of [LSA-C.C. art.] 1967, yet it omits crucial questions from the test and consequently leaves room for error." Welch, S.T., Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government and Detrimental Reliance: Transforming Lightning into a Lightning Bug, 67 La. Law Rev. 991, 999 (2007). Without addressing the accuracy of the commentator's observation, we use the oft-repeated Suire test.
In this case, both the district court and the jury found that Mr. Dos Santos and Mr. Duarte proved detrimental reliance claims. The determination of whether a party has proven a detrimental reliance claim presents mixed questions of law and fact; that is, the trier of fact must decide if the facts presented trigger application of a particular legal standard. See Barnett v. Saizon, 08-0336 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/23/08), 994 So.2d 668, 672. In such cases, we apply the manifest error standard of review. Id. at 672 and 674-75. To reverse the factfinder's factual determinations, we must find that the record does not contain a reasonable factual basis for the finding and that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong. Id. at 672. Further, when the factfinder's factual findings are based on witness credibility, the manifest error standard demands great deference to those findings. Id. We address each element of the detrimental reliance claims separately.
A Representation by Conduct or Word
We first review whether the record contains a reasonable factual basis for the finding that the Belmere defendants made a representation to Messrs. Dos Santos and Duarte. As earlier stated, Ms. Hebert had a conversation with Mr. Dos Santos, and possibly Mr. Duarte, in August or September 2011, regarding the possibility of continuing to lease Garage A20 on a temporary basis when the roommates went to Texas. The record shows a clear dispute about the substance of this conversation.
Mr. Dos Santos testified in pretrial depositions as well as at trial. He consistently testified that, in August or September 2011, Ms. Hebert told him he could temporarily continue to lease Garage A20 after the roommates went to Texas, but that she did not tell him "at that moment" that the Garage A20 lease had to be in writing or attached to an apartment lease. At trial, Mr. Dos Santos explained the conversation:
Well, when I went to talk to Ms. [Hebert,] I explain her that the reason that we are moving is because we maybe are going to start a new job in Texas. And we needed to - maybe it's not going to work. And I like the place. I like - Belmere - and I would like to come back if it's possible. And in the meantime, I don't want to take all of my belongings if it's not going to work, that area. If you find a place and move it permanently to Texas, or come back to Louisiana, I would like to keep the contract on hold. She said, I cannot put a contract on hold; but what you can do, you can rent the garage month by month, and you can keep your garage. You move your stuff to the garage and pay month by month; and you come back and I put in the lease of three bedrooms again, if you come back to Louisiana, you are able to have another apartment here.
Mr. Dos Santos further testified that it was not until December 8th, the day Garage A20 was emptied, that he "called Ms. Hebert to ask her why she is doing that; because I already paid the rent" and she then responded, "[W]ell, I'm sorry but you are not living here. You cannot rent a garage."
On cross examination, defense counsel questioned Mr. Dos Santos about the agreement made with Ms. Hebert. Defense counsel pointed out that, on December 9th, Mr. Dos Santos told Deputy Arnold that he had used a friend who was a current Belmere resident to rent the garage because he could not do so because he was no longer a resident. Mr. Dos Santos explained, "I don't know what's say (sic) the police report, but what happened was, I told the police that when I called Ms. [Hebert], she told me that I have to have somebody that live at apartment (sic) to put the garage under their name." (Emphasis added.) He further explained that, after Ms. Hebert told him this on December 8th, he then called Ms. deGois to go to the Belmere office and attach the Garage A20 lease to her apartment lease.
Mr. Duarte also testified at trial about the agreement made with Ms. Hebert. He testified that he was with Mr. Dos Santos when he spoke to Ms. Hebert about leasing Garage A20. When asked if Ms. Hebert told him and Mr. Dos Santos if they could rent the garage, Mr. Duarte testified: "Her words do not leave my mind, I can almost hear in my ear that she said, yes, of course; your rental for the garage is month by month. You don't need to have a contract for that." Mr. Duarte also stated that "at no time at all" did Ms. Hebert mention anything about his sister, Claudenice, the Apartment 432 lessee.
Ms. Hebert no longer worked for Fairfield at the time of trial in July 2016, nor did she attend the trial; but, excerpts from a deposition she gave in November 2014 were read aloud at trial. Ms. Hebert testified that Mr. Duarte was not with Mr. Dos Santos when they had the conversation about the Garage A20 lease, but that Ms. Landry, the Belmere leasing agent, was in the room. Ms. Hebert described the conversation:
From my recollection, Mr. [Dos] Santos came in and he was leaving the state; was transferring to another state and wanted to give his notice, and at which time we discussed the garage unit that he had. I told him that without an active lease, we would not be able to rent the garage to him. He then asked if we could transfer the garage unit to [Apartment] 432, which was a unit that he had referred. And I told him, yes, he could with ... the understanding that he would sign a hold harmless agreement stating that we are not responsible for anything in that garage; and that 432 would have to come in and sign to take over that garage, to attach it to their apartment home. ... He understood ... to my understanding.
Ms. Hebert went on to testify that the Apartment 432 lessees did not timely pay the December 2011 lease payment, and on December 6th, she discovered that they had "skipped" out on their lease, and the Garage A20 lease had not been attached to the Apartment 432 lease. She called Patsy Lester, her Fairfield supervisor, and after she explained the situation, Ms. Lester told her to clear out Garage A20. Ms. Hebert then ordered the dumpster, which arrived a day or so later, and instructed her employees to empty Garage A20. Ms. Hebert testified that, before she ordered the dumpster, Ms. Landry told her that Mr. Dos Santos had paid $100 for Garage A20 for the month of December 2011. Ms. Hebert admitted that she did not attempt to contact Mr. Dos Santos any time before Garage A20 was emptied. She remembered talking to him after she directed Belmere employees to empty Garage A20, but did not recall telling him that he could then attach the Garage A20 lease to an existing Belmere lessee's apartment. She also said that someone named Elizabeth "possibly" came to talk to Assistant Manager Shana Guidry about the roommates' garage situation, but that she was not at the Belmere office at the time.
Pasty Lester was the Fairfield regional manager in 2011. She confirmed that, at that time, Belmere policy did not allow a lessee to lease a garage without an apartment lease and that the Written Lease did not allow for any verbal agreements. She also testified that, after the Written Lease expired at the end of November 2011, Mr. Dos Santos should not have had any possessions in Garage A20, even if he paid $100, because required paperwork was not in place. However, she also testified that, when Ms. Hebert called her on December 6th to explain the situation, it was "very important" to her that Ms. Hebert try to contact the persons whose belongings were in Garage A20, and when she asked, Ms. Hebert told her she had repeatedly tried to call them but got no answer.
Ms. Landry, the Belmere leasing agent who accepted Mr. Dos Santos' $100 payment for Garage A20, issued him a receipt, and gave him written instructions to make future payments online, also testified at trial. Ms. Landry agreed that Belmere policy required a garage lease to be attached to an apartment lease. According to Ms. Landry, she overheard a conversation wherein Ms. Hebert explained this policy to the occupants of Apartment 118, but she could not exactly recall when the conversation occurred. She explained that, when Mr. Dos Santos paid the $100, it did not "raise a red flag," because she assumed the garage had been placed in a relative's name. She also testified that part of her duties at Belmere Apartments included posting late notices on apartment doors when lease payments were overdue. She remembered delivering a late notice on December 6, 2011, to what she said may have been Apartment 432. When no one answered, she followed Belmere policy and used a master key to open the door. Finding the apartment basically empty, Ms. Landry told Ms. Hebert that it looked like the lessees in that apartment had "skipped." Ms. Hebert became upset and called a Belmere maintenance employee with instructions to get a dumpster to empty Garage A20.
During Ms. Landry's testimony, she explained that after the events at issue, she handwrote a statement containing her recollection of relevant events. Plaintiffs' counsel introduced a purported-typed version of Ms. Landry's statement into evidence as Exhibit P13. On cross examination, Ms. Landry admitted that her signature appeared on the exhibit, but stated that she did not type the statement, did not remember signing it, the handwritten date under her signature was not in her handwriting, and she "wish[ed] y'all had the handwritten one that I wrote[.]" Her version of relevant events in this opinion is taken from her trial testimony.
The above record evidence provides a reasonable factual basis to conclude that the Belmere defendants represented to Mr. Dos Santos and to Mr. Duarte that, after the Written Lease ended on November 30, 2011, they could temporarily continue to lease Garage A20 for $100 per month, on a month to month basis, until they decided whether they would move to Texas permanently or stay in Houma. Ms. Hebert, Ms. Lester, and Ms. Landry all testified that Belmere's general policy prohibited a garage lease without an apartment lease, and the December 8th and 9th police reports support their testimony. But, accepting the conflicting testimony of Mr. Dos Santos, Mr. Duarte, and Ms. deGois, the district court and jury reasonably could have believed that Ms. Hebert knew the roommates were undecided about whether they would permanently move to Texas, knew they wanted to again lease a Belmere apartment if they returned to Houma, and that she agreed that they could pay to leave their possessions in Garage A20 until that decision was made. This finding is supported by the evidence that: (1) the roommates moved most of their possessions from Apartment 118 into Garage A20 during the month of November 2011, rather than finding an alternate storage solution; (2) on the last day of the Written Lease, Mr. Dos Santos gave Ms. Landry a $100 check expressly designated for "Garage A20" and kept the garage keys with her knowledge; (3) she gave him a receipt for the payment marked "A-20" and instructions on how to pay Belmere online; (4) the roommates took very few belongings with them to Texas; (5) Mr. Duarte checked to make sure the $100 check had cleared the roommates' bank account; and (6) Mr. Dos Santos thought Ms. Hebert had made a mistake. Without Ms. Hebert's words and Ms. Landry's actions, indicating that the roommates' possessions could stay in Garage A20, it is difficult to imagine why any of the above conduct would have otherwise occurred.
Further, based on Mr. Dos Santos' testimony, Mr. Duarte's testimony, and Ms. deGois' testimony, the factfinders also had a reasonable basis to conclude that the August or September 2011 conversation was with both men, that Ms. Hebert's representation to Mr. Dos Santos and Mr. Duarte did not require that the Garage A20 lease be connected to an active apartment lease, and Mr. Dos Santos did not ask, at that time, to connect the Garage A20 lease to Apartment 432. Rather, apparently based on the credibility of the witnesses, the factfinders chose to believe that the first time Ms. Hebert mentioned the requirement was on December 8th when the roommates learned that Garage A20 was being emptied and both Mr. Dos Santos and Mr. Duarte called Ms. Hebert for an explanation; and, that it was only then that Mr. Dos Santos asked to connect the Garage A20 lease to Ms. deGois' apartment lease, and not to Apartment 432. Given the great deference we owe to credibility determinations, we find no manifest error in the factfinders' choice to believe the plaintiffs' version of the representation made by the Belmere defendants over the appellants' version of the representation.
Justifiable Reliance
The second element of a detrimental reliance claim is the claimant's justifiable reliance on the representation made. Louisiana Office of Risk Mgmt., 125 So.3d at 402. The appellants argue that it was unreasonable for Mr. Dos Santos to rely on any oral representations, because the Written Lease prohibited oral agreements. They also argue that Mr. Dos Santos knew he had to sign the Garage A20 addendum when he first executed the Written Lease, so it was unreasonable to think that he could lease the garage a second time without a writing.
We do not find these arguments persuasive. First, the fact that the Written Lease was in effect when Ms. Hebert told Mr. Dos Santos and Mr. Duarte that they could lease Garage A20 does not make their reliance on her oral representation unjustified. The existence of a contract between the parties does not preclude detrimental reliance. See Water Craft Management, L.L.C., 361 F.Supp.2d at 557. All parties knew that the Written Lease was going to end on November 30, 2011, when the roommates moved out, so belief that it provisions would not control after November 30th would not have been unreasonable. Further, Ms. Hebert was the Belmere Apartments property manager whose job it was to know and properly administer Belmere's policies. It was not unreasonable for Mr. Dos Santos and Mr. Duarte to think she had the authority to lease Garage A20 to them without an apartment lease or any writing until they decided whether they were going to stay in Texas. Compare Louisiana Office of Risk Mgmt., 125 So.3d at 402 (Employee was not justified in relying on a co-employees assurances without knowing her title within the company or what her job duties were.) Further, Ms. Landry was a Belmere leasing agent with the authority to lease Belmere apartments and accept lease payments. She accepted the $100 payment for Garage A20 without question, did not question Mr. Dos Santos keeping the Garage A20 keys, and she provided him with instructions about how to make future payments online.
Notably, Ms. Hebert knew Mr. Dos Santos paid $100 for Garage A20 before she ordered the dumpster. Contrary to what she told Ms. Lester, Ms. Hebert admitted in her deposition that she did not try to contact Mr. Dos Santos before Garage A20 was emptied. Had she done so, perhaps the unfortunate circumstances that followed and this litigation could have been avoided. Her inaction makes the roommates' reliance even more justified. Thus, based on Mr. Dos Santos' and Mr. Duarte's conversation with Ms. Hebert, coupled with her and Ms. Landry's later actions and inactions, the district court and jury had ample evidence upon which to conclude that the men justifiably thought that the $100 payment was sufficient to secure continued use of Garage A20 to store their possessions after the Written Lease ended. The district court and jury did not manifestly err in so finding.
Change in Position due to Reliance
The third element of a detrimental reliance claim is proof of a detrimental change in the claimant's position because he relied on another's representation. A claimant establishes this element by showing that he suffered damages for which the defendant did not adequately compensate him. See Suire, 907 So.2d at 59. Our review of this element requires little discussion. During the month of November 2011, the roommates moved their possessions from Apartment 118 into Garage A20, a double-car garage. All three testified at trial that essentially everything they owned was in Garage A20, except for personal items they took to Texas to last one to two weeks. Ms. Landry testified that she went into Garage A20 before its contents were removed and that it was hard to get around because the garage was 80-85% full, with things stacked from the front to the back. She saw bedroom furniture, chairs, beds, filled plastic totes, televisions, video gaming devices and games, crafts, television satellites, tools, ladders, and personal records. Further, at trial, the roommates introduced a lengthy inventory itemizing what was stored in Garage A20, and the parties stipulated that the value of the contents of Garage A20 was $37,500. Thus, based on this evidence, the district court and jury had a reasonable factual basis to conclude that the roommates detrimentally changed their positions, and suffered damages, by moving their possessions, of significant value, into Garage A20 due to justifiable reliance on the Belmere defendants' representations.
Although an inventory submitted into evidence indicates the actual value of their possessions exceeded $90,000, the parties stipulated at trial that the total value of Garage A20's contents was $37,500. --------
In sum, we note that the focus of analysis of a detrimental reliance claim is whether a representation was made in such a matter that the promisor should have expected the promisee to rely upon it and whether the promise did so to his detriment. Suire, 907 So.2d at 59. Our record review shows there is a reasonable basis for the factfinders' conclusion that the Belmere defendants represented to the roommates they could continue to lease Garage A20 after moving out of Apartment 118, and Belmere should have expected that the roommates would take advantage of this representation. Although a detrimental reliance claim is difficult to prove, the district court and jury were not manifestly erroneous in finding that Mr. Dos Santos and Mr. Duarte proved all elements of their detrimental reliance claims by a preponderance of the evidence.
DAMAGE AWARD FOR INCOME LOSS
In their sixth assignment of error, the appellants contend the district court and jury erred in awarding Mr. Dos Santos $51,346 for loss of income, because there is insufficient evidence to support the award.
When a detrimental reliance claim is proved, recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the promisee's reliance on the promise. LSA-C.C. art. 1967. Loss of income is a type of special damages that must be proved with reasonable certainty and cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. Driscoll v. Stucker, 04-0589 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 32, 53; Nick Farone Music Ministry v. City of Bastrop, 50066 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/30/15), 179 So.3d 629, 631. A judge or jury's assessment of quantum is a factual determination, and as such, much discretion is left to the judge or jury in that assessment, as to both special and general damages. See LSA-C.C. art. 2324.1; Menard v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 09-1869 (La. 3/16/10), 31 So.3d 996, 1006-07. In reviewing factual conclusions as to a special damage award, an appellate court cannot reverse or modify that award unless there is manifest error - i.e., the record as a whole shows there is no reasonable basis for the factfinder's conclusion and that the finding is clearly wrong. Id. at 1007.
In support of Mr. Dos Santos' lost income claim, the plaintiffs introduced an economic loss estimate prepared by economist Dr. Shael N. Wolfson and the video deposition of Broadband Tiempo's general manager, Jose Flores. Further, Mr. Dos Santos was questioned about his income loss on both direct and cross examination.
Dr. Wolfson did not testify at trial, but his estimate of Mr. Dos Santos' economic loss was submitted as an exhibit. In his estimate, Dr. Wolfson looked at what Tiempo Broadband paid Mr. Dos Santos from May 2011 through December 2012, and during that period, no payments were made from December 14, 2011 through August 28, 2012. The testimony of Mr. Flores, Broadband Tiempo's general manager, and of Mr. Dos Santos, shows that Mr. Dos Santos and Mr. Duarte did not work for Tiempo Broadband during that period, because the company was transitioning from Louisiana to Texas, and because Tiempo Broadband's new contract with DIRECTV required the completion of new personnel paperwork, such as drug testing and background checks, and the men did not have the necessary documentation (social security card, work permit, driver's license) to complete the process. Mr. Dos Santos and Mr. Duarte, both Brazilian natives, testified at trial that their personal documentation, including birth certificates and immigration papers, were part of the Garage A20 contents that were thrown away. Mr. Dos Santos testified that it took a while to replace this documentation, and meanwhile, he did not work. Dr. Wolfson also reviewed relevant tax returns for Mr. Dos Santos and Skyway Express Services (an entity Mr. Dos Santos testified belonged to him and Mr. Duarte). Dr. Wolfson's estimate notes that the $51,346 represents Mr. Dos Santos' loss of gross revenue and does not account for variable costs such as expenses. And, according to Mr. Flores and company records, Tiempo Broadband paid Mr. Dos Santos "by the job" and deducted no taxes from the payments.
The appellants argue that the $51,346 should be reduced for expenses, taxes, and by what Mr. Dos Santos paid to Mr. Duarte and Ms. Rodrigues; but, the appellants have provided no contradictory evidence or argument indicating what the proper reduction should be. The trier of fact may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the uncontradicted opinions expressed by any witness, including experts. Cotton v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 10-1609 (La App. 1 Cir. 5/5/11), 65 So.3d 213, 219, writ denied, 11-1084 (La. 9/2/11), 68 So.3d 522. The district court and jury heard the testimony and saw documentary evidence presented by the plaintiffs regarding Mr. Dos Santos' loss of income. They also heard the defense's attempt to discredit the accuracy of the plaintiffs' evidence, but the defense presented the factfinders with no other evidence on the subject. Thus, we find no abuse of the factfinders' discretion in accepting plaintiffs' figures and in awarding $51,346. This assignment of error is without merit.
GENERAL DAMAGES
In their last assignment of error, the appellants contend the district court and jury abused their discretion in awarding $300,000 in general damages each to Messrs. Dos Santos and Duarte for their detrimental reliance and wrongful eviction.
A lessor may be liable for general damages for wrongful eviction. See Bradford v. Mangano, 6 So.2d 162, 163-64 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1942). Also see Watkins v. Waller Oil Co., Inc., 341 So.2d 1264 (La. App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 344 So.2d 382 (La. 1977); Buchanan v. Daspit, 245 So.2d 506 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1971); Rivers v. Tessitore, 165 So.2d 888 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1964); see generally Hursh, R.D., and Dunn, W.J., Recovery by Tenant of Damages for Physical Injury or Mental Anguish Occasioned by Wrongful Eviction, 17 ALR 2d 936 (originally published in 1951). The circumstances attending the eviction, and the evicted tenant's trouble, inconvenience, humiliation, and embarrassment are relevant in determining a proper award. Bradford, 6 So.2d at 164. The role of the appellate court in reviewing general damages is not to decide what an appropriate award is, but rather to review the trier of fact's exercise of discretion. See LSA-C.C. art. 2324.1. The initial inquiry is whether the award for the particular injuries and their effects under the particular circumstances of the particular injured person is a clear abuse of the "much discretion" of the trier of fact. Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257, 1260 (La.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114, 114 S.Ct. 1059, 127 L.Ed .2d 379 (1994); Lee v. Briggs, 08-2120 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/10/09), 23 So.3d 362, 364-65. Because the discretion vested in the trier of fact is so great, and even vast, an appellate court should rarely disturb an award on review. Youn, 623 So.2d at 1261; Menard, 31 So.3d at 1007. It is only when the award is, in either direction, beyond that which a reasonable trier of fact could assess for the effect of the particular injury, to the particular plaintiff, under the particular circumstances, that the appellate court should increase or reduce the award. Youn, 623 So.2d at 1261.
Mr. Dos Santos testified that, at the time of trial, he had lived in America for over 30 years. He worked very hard and bought lots of possessions in America because, in Brazil, it is too expensive to have lots of things. He testified that everything he owned was in Garage A20, including tools, clothes, furniture, electronics, and personal documents. He also lost "beloved" items such as his son's first drawing, gifts his son had given him, and many souvenirs he had bought when traveling. He also had several brand new, unopened items, that he bought at the November 2011 Black Friday Sale, including clothing, shoes, and Christmas gifts, in Garage A20. When Mr. Dos Santos flew back to Louisiana on December 8th, he saw many of the roommates' belongings in the dumpster, broken and covered by garbage. He climbed into the dumpster and found Mr. Duarte's wallet. Mr. Dos Santos described that he was unable to work in Dallas for about eight months, because it took a while to replace the necessary work papers, which he had left in Garage A20. He stated that the Brazilian Baptist Church in Dallas "helped us a lot. They did everything in the beginning. They gave us clothes. They gave us gift cards. They gave food. They helped us find a place to live." He described that he and his roommates shared a single bedroom in someone's home for a while. Mr. Dos Santos stated that accepting charity made him feel "terrible." He now becomes upset when he goes into a customer's house and sees family photographs and children's gifts and drawings, because they remind him of belongings he lost. He also stated that he had planned to bring his son to America to attend high school, but after the Belmere incident, he did not have the money to do so. Mr. Dos Santos testified that, after the incident, he had a few counseling sessions at the church in Dallas, but he did not receive medical or psychological treatment.
Mr. Duarte, 26 years old at the time of trial, testified that he too had lots of possessions stored in Garage A20. He particularly liked video games and owned over 50 of them. Garage A20 contained everything from his Apartment 118 bedroom, including furniture, lots of electronics, several televisions, lots of shoes, and clothes, which he liked. He explained that South America was dangerous; even if a person has money, he cannot have lots of things because "[i]f you walk outside with a phone in your hand, you are about to lose your arm." In America, he explained, "this was making a dream come true ... because I was able to go into the store and buy anything I want." Further, he felt safe in America before the Belmere incident and left his doors unlocked. After the incident, Mr. Duarte no longer trusts people, has security cameras and dogs in his house, and a family member present to watch his belongings when he is gone. Mr. Duarte stated that he had never before taken charity, but the Brazilian Baptist Church "maintained his life" after the incident, when he had lost all trust and was contemplating suicide. He noted that he and Ms. Rodrigues had been a couple before the incident, but afterwards, in Dallas, they "had no more patience between [them]" and their relationship ended. Mr. Duarte admitted that he did not return to Houma after the incident and did not seek medical attention.
The above record evidence plainly establishes a reasonable factual basis for the district court's and jury's conclusion that the Belmere defendants' removal and disposal of Garage A20's contents caused Mr. Dos Santos and Mr. Duarte significant trouble, inconvenience, humiliation, and embarrassment. See Bradford, 6 So.2d at 164. Despite their effort to properly pay for storage for their possessions before going to Texas, and their further efforts to save their possessions from the dumpster only a week later, Mr. Dos Santos and Mr. Duarte both lost essentially everything they owned when Belmere employees emptied Garage A20. The Belmere employees took items for their own personal use that belonged to the men. Mr. Dos Santos lost items that cannot be replaced. The loss of their personal documentation caused the men to be out of work for about eight months. For the first time in their lives, they had to accept charitable housing, food, and clothing. Both men experienced personal relationship losses to some degree - Mr. Dos Santos with his son, and Mr. Duarte with Ms. Rodrigues. At the time of trial, both men had continuing mental issues associated with their losses, as demonstrated by their emotionally fraught testimony.
After reviewing the record, we conclude the trial court and jury reasonably assessed general damages in this case based on the particular circumstances and particular injuries suffered by Messrs. Dos Santos and Duarte. The jury listened to the men testify and reasonably concluded that both suffered considerable, long term inconvenience, humiliation, and distress from losing their possessions. While we find the awards of $300,000 each to be on the high end for the injuries suffered by the men, we are unable to conclude, on the record before us, that the awards were beyond the permissible range of the factfinders' vast discretion. See Milazzo v. Wilkins, 06-0062 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/06), 2006 WL 3113477 *1 (unpublished). This assignment of error has no merit.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the district court's September 28, 2016 judgment, in favor of Rogerio Dos Santos and Edimar Riberio Duarte, and against Belmere Limited Partnership, Fairfield Property Management, Robin Hebert, and Endurance American Specialty, Inc., is affirmed. Costs of the appeal are assessed to Belmere Limited Partnership, Fairfield Property Management, Robin Hebert, and Endurance American Specialty, Inc.
AFFIRMED.