Opinion
No. 2D20-3652
02-02-2022
Jordan SANTOS, Appellant, v. Danielle BARTOLETTA, Appellee.
Brett Metcalf of Brett Metcalf Criminal Defense Attorney, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant. Dana A. Friedlander of Law Offices of Dana A. Friedlander, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
Brett Metcalf of Brett Metcalf Criminal Defense Attorney, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
Dana A. Friedlander of Law Offices of Dana A. Friedlander, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
SILBERMAN, Judge.
Jordan Santos appeals a final judgment of injunction for protection against dating violence entered in favor of Danielle Bartoletta. Because the evidence failed to establish that Bartoletta had reasonable cause to believe that she was in imminent danger of becoming the victim of another act of dating violence, we reverse.
On October 13, 2020, Bartoletta filed her petition for an injunction for protection against dating violence against Santos following an episode of dating violence that occurred in the early hours of October 9, 2020. In response to that petition, the trial court entered a temporary injunction in Bartoletta's favor to remain in effect until a final hearing could take place. During the final hearing the following month, Bartoletta testified as to the events that occurred on October 9, 2020.
Bartoletta told the court that she and Santos were involved in a romantic relationship. Although Santos was never violent towards her and had never threatened her previously, on October 9 he attacked and choked her, causing her significant injuries. She also testified that, during the attack but before she was able to escape, Santos said to her, "Holy shit, you're good!"
In the time between the entering of the temporary injunction and the final hearing, Bartoletta acknowledged that Santos had not attempted to contact her even though he knew her home and work addresses, her phone number, and her social media information.
"While ‘a trial court has broad discretion in entering an injunction for protection against violence[,] ... it must be supported by competent, substantial evidence.’ " Frost v. Wilson , 320 So. 3d 820, 823-24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Brungart v. Pullen , 296 So. 3d 973, 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ). We conduct a de novo review on the question of "[w]hether the evidence is legally sufficient to support issuance of the injunction." Id. at 824 (quoting Schultz v. Moore , 282 So. 3d 152, 154 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) ).
To obtain a final judgment of injunction for protection against dating violence, the petitioner must show "reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming the victim of an act of dating violence in the future." Alderman v. Thomas , 141 So. 3d 668, 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). "When considering whether a petitioner has such reasonable cause, ‘the trial court must consider the current allegations, the parties’ behavior within the relationship, and the history of the relationship as a whole.’ " Di Stefano v. Long , 279 So. 3d 758, 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (quoting Toubail v. White , 141 So. 3d 649, 650 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ).
Section 784.046(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2020), provides for an injunction for protection against dating violence. Pursuant to section 784.046(2)(b) :
Any person who is the victim of dating violence and has reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming the victim of another act of dating violence ... has standing in the circuit court to file a sworn petition for an injunction for protection against dating violence.
It is well recognized that "regardless of whether the petitioner has been the victim of dating violence in the past, the petitioner must show that he or she has reasonable cause to believe that he or she is in imminent danger of becoming the victim of an act of dating violence in the future ." Di Stefano , 279 So. 3d at 759 (citing Alderman , 141 So. 3d at 669 ).
Here, the evidence presented was such that the trial court could have properly found that Bartoletta was the victim of one instance of dating violence by Santos. However, on appeal Santos argues that there was no competent, substantial evidence to support a reasonable belief that Bartoletta was in imminent danger of becoming the victim of another act of dating violence. In response, Bartoletta argues that she presented competent, substantial evidence during the final hearing, including her detailed description of the violent episode, photographs of injuries resulting from the incident, and testimony regarding her physical and mental conditions following the violent episode. Additionally, she argues that Santos's statement of "Holy shit, you're good!" creates a reasonable belief that Santos knew the extent of the violence in which he was engaging, and "since Santos had not accomplished his goal of ending her life on the night in question, he would attempt to complete his task [to kill Bartoletta] if allowed contact with her again." She also notes that Santos owns a gun and that it was on the bedside table in the room in which the attack began.
The trial court did not make any factual findings about the alleged gun but directed Santos to turn over any gun, should he own or possess one, to the sheriff's office upon the entry of the final judgment.
In support of her argument, Bartoletta emphasizes the short period of time that elapsed between the dating violence incident and the filing and granting of the final judgment of injunction for protection against dating violence. She argues that case law reversing final judgments is distinguishable from the present case because of alleged remoteness in time in those cases. However, the amount of time that has elapsed between alleged dating violence incidents and the filing or granting of injunctions for protection against dating violence is not dispositive.
Recently, in Brungart , this court reversed a final judgment of injunction for protection against dating violence where the petitioner filed for the injunction two weeks after an alleged episode of dating violence. 296 So. 3d at 975. There, "the evidence failed to establish that [the petitioner] had reasonable cause to believe that she was in imminent danger of becoming the victim of another act of dating violence." Id. In that case, the petitioner testified that she and Brungart were involved in a physical altercation over her cellphone. Id. After the altercation, Brungart continued to send text messages to her, went to her apartment complex, and "after learning that she had moved out, represented himself to the property manager as a furniture delivery person in an attempt to find out more information." Id. at 976. Further, he attempted to contact the petitioner through her son and ex-husband. Id. Brungart also sent videos to the petitioner's ex-husband showing Brungart and the petitioner engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Id. Even so, this court determined that "there was no evidence to support a conclusion that [the petitioner] had reasonable cause to believe that she was in imminent danger of physical violence[,] ... there was no evidence to support a conclusion that [the petitioner] had reasonable cause to believe that she was in imminent danger of being ‘stalked[,]’ " and Brungart's attempts to contact the petitioner fell "short of meeting the statutory definition of ‘harassment.’ " Id. at 977-78.
Here, the record supports the trial court's conclusion that Bartoletta was the victim of one instance of dating violence. But the record lacks competent, substantial evidence to support the finding that Bartoletta had reasonable cause to believe she was in imminent danger of another act of physical violence. Bartoletta acknowledged that Santos has not attempted to contact her, and the incident that occurred on October 9, 2020, appears to be isolated. Before the night of the incident, Santos had never been physically violent, and he had never previously threatened her. Although the trial court indicated that Bartoletta's testimony was dependable and detail-oriented, this one instance of dating violence alone is insufficient to obtain an injunction for protection against dating violence. See Brungart , 296 So. 3d at 976 ; see also Alderman , 141 So. 3d at 669 ("It is not sufficient to have been the victim of one incident of dating violence in the past."). Therefore, we reverse the final judgment of injunction for protection against dating violence entered by the trial court.
Reversed.
LaROSE and BLACK, JJ., Concur.