Opinion
No. FA07-400 69 16 S
February 18, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This matter was tried before the Regional Family Trial Docket on a referral from the Judicial District of Danbury. It is a dissolution of marriage action brought by Deborah Santoro against Glenn Santoro, by writ returnable on February 20, 2007. When evidence commenced in the matter, it was fully contested. After the testimony of the court-appointed psychologist evaluator (and other evidence), the parties came to a custodial agreement. That agreement was presented to the court to be ordered, and incorporated into the judgment, as part of this court's orders. Based on the evidence received by the court, it is found that the custodial agreement between these two parents is in the best interests of their three children. Therefore, the court accepts this agreement and enters in accordance with it herein.
The heart of the parties' financial disagreement centers around the disposition of an insurance agency business they own. They have agreed as to the ultimate disposition of substantially all of the balance of their holdings.
This matter was tried over several days from December 4, 2008, forward. Post-trial briefs were submitted.
Based upon the credible evidence, the court makes the following findings and orders.
The court has jurisdiction over the matter.
The parties were married in Redding, Connecticut, on May 22, 1993. Both parties have resided in the State of Connecticut for more than one year continuously, prior to the bringing of this action. The plaintiff, whose birth name was Deborah Buzzi, and the defendant, Glenn Santoro, have had three children born alive to them since the date of the marriage, who are all issue of the marriage. They are Joseph, born September 9, 1996, Kyle, born December 28, 1999, and Julia, born April 11, 2003. There are no other minor children who have been born to the wife since the date of the marriage. There are no other minor children issue of the marriage. No member of the family has been a recipient of public assistance.
For the reasons stated hereinafter, the court finds that the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably with no reasonable hope of its reconciliation.
The plaintiff is forty-two years of age. She is college educated with a bachelor's degree acquired in 1987. Her health is good.
The defendant is forty-four years of age. He has a two-year degree in mechanical engineering. His health is good except what he called mixed connective tissue disorder, which makes him feel pain and discomfort in cold weather. He takes no medication for this condition, though he treats himself by eating Knox Gelatin.
After college, the plaintiff intended to go into the insurance business and work for her father's business, All-Risk. He required she work in an insurance company elsewhere first. She went to work for Metropolitan Life for one year, and for Allstate for one year. She then went to work for her father's company in 1990, when he offered her a job. She was working there in April 1991, when she met the defendant.
At the time the parties met, the defendant owned his own HVAC Company. The parties became engaged in February 1992. They were married in May 1993.
Shortly after the parties married, the defendant sold his HVAC Company and then went into the fuel oil home delivery business. At trial, the defendant's testimony was totally inconsistent with his filed tax returns as to the amounts he received for the sale of the oil business. Based on that, the court accepts the tax returns as the more accurate portrayal of funds received.
The parties purchased several pieces of real estate together, some at or about the time of the marriage. Their real estate investments were all deals brought to them by the plaintiff's father. While the defendant complains about the terms in each instance, they were bargains he chose not to pass up. The division of ownership agreed to by the parties, with the values and equities attached, demonstrates that these investments all worked out well financially for the parties. In 1996, the parties started DJS Realty as a company for their real estate holdings. It is owned jointly.
In 1996, the defendant sold his fuel oil business because being out in the cold was difficult for him physically. He procured his insurance license. He worked with another agency and then came to work at All-Risk in 1997.
In 1998, the parties purchased 100% of the All-Risk Insurance Agency. The Agency is comprised of two companies which retained their own names. From 1998 to 2006, both patties worked at All-Risk. While each party did office work, the plaintiff largely ran the books and the defendant was on the road with customers.
All-Risk retained the plaintiff's father as a consultant after the purchase. His compensation was the payment of his medical insurance and homeowner's insurance by the company. The defendant denied he knew of his father-in-law's role remaining with the company and said he felt his wife deceived him about it. Observing the demeanor of the plaintiff at trial and considering her testimony, the court does not find her to be deceptive nor did the defendant prove any instance of her showing deception to him. Instead, she was clear about her anger, frustration and disappointment with him. It is the defendant who lied, manipulated and deceived in his actions to his family, his wife and even in his testimony before the court.
During the period from 1998 to 2004, the parties continued to work and live together as a cohesive family. On a regular basis, the defendant was out after dinner several nights a week, during this entire period, to work on the rentals.
In 2004, the parties moved to Ridgefield. In anticipation of this move to that home, the defendant told the plaintiff he was going to the home to work on it several nights a week. However, after the parties moved in April 2004, the defendant persisted in these trips out at night until the plaintiff confronted him. She was upset and asked him if he was having an affair. He denied having an affair and stopped going out so frequently.
In 2006, however, in the early summer, the defendant again started going out frequently at night, often for several hours. During this time, the parties' (on defendant's side) nephew, Tanner, was living with them.
Over the 2006 summer, the defendant was out virtually every night. The plaintiff again accused him of having an affair. He denied it and said he was working and going to the gym.
Over this same time, the defendant's parents were up to Connecticut from Florida, living in a rental that the plaintiff had paid for them. In a fit of anger and frustration, one day in August, she told them that she was tired of supporting them and the defendant's whole family. Weeks later, she apologized to them for the outburst.
In August 2006, the plaintiff found a cell phone in a drawer in the defendant's workshop. She saw the phone's number.
In November 2006, during which time the defendant's nightly absences returned, the plaintiff again found the same cell phone behind the computer in the marital bedroom. She showed it to the defendant and asked him about it. He took the phone without saying anything. It was the same phone she had found in August 2006, confirmed by both appearance and the number.
The plaintiff served the defendant with dissolution of marriage papers in November 2006. He told the plaintiff he wanted to reconcile their marriage. The plaintiff withdrew the action in January 2007. He went away for the weekend to a New York Jets game. When he returned, he packed his bags and told the parties' children that the plaintiff had thrown him out of the house.
The defendant has asserted that the parties' marriage was strained by his wife never being happy with whatever he has done. He claims he decided his marriage was over when he heard his wife being rude to his parents in August 2006. The court finds this a convenient excuse for him to explain his taking up with Savoeun In. His behavior is what had stressed the plaintiff so much in August 2006. He was never home and was hiding a private cell phone. His lying about this to his family and others, after the parties separated, leads this court to the inevitable conclusion that he will say or do anything to cast himself in a better light.
The court finds that the defendant's affair, and deception about its existence before he moved out of the home, to be the cause of the breakdown of the marriage. The defendant's leading the plaintiff to believe there was hope for reconciliation was cruel. "While the court recognizes that both parties must share the responsibility for a deterioration of their relationship, it was the defendant's continued duplicity that prevented the parties' reconciliation." Burns v. Burns, FA 92-01211693 (Mar. 22, 1994), 1994 Ct.Sup. 3085, 3090, Leheny, J. Here, it is only the defendant's duplicity that prevented the parties from the opportunity to explore a reconciliation which the plaintiff was prepared to do.
From November 27, 2006, the parties have remained separated. On January 23, 2007, the plaintiff started the current dissolution of marriage action. Throughout the period from November 27, 2006, to the trial, the defendant lied under oath and to every family member about the following matters:
1. That he was the father of a child born to Savoeun In, on August 21, 2007.
2. That when he moved out of the marital home, he moved to Savoeun In's home.
3. That when the parties' oldest child moved out of the Ridgefield home in January 2007, he moved into Savoeun In's home with the defendant.
The parties' oldest child learned of the birth of his sibling with In and his father in February 2008.
From January 2007 forward, the defendant never told anyone except the oldest child about Ms. In and this child — not the plaintiff, his other two children, the oldest child's therapist, the psychological evaluator, or the children's guardian. The oldest boy also held in this secret. Ms. In, who remains the intimate partner of the defendant, lied to protect him.
The court finds the defendant's lies, and continued and sustained concealment from his family and court affiliated individuals, to have wrought a terrible emotional cost on this family. His continuing concealment and lies distorted the litigation and resulted in financially costing the plaintiff far more than it otherwise would have. Finally, in light of these facts found, and his demeanor, where the court was required to adjudge the credibility of the parties, the court has deemed the defendant untrustworthy.
The parties are each 50% owners of All-Risk, Inc., which does business under the names of Northeastern Insurance Agency and A.T. Patella Associates. The parties each retained a forensic accountant to assist them in valuing the assets and give them advice as to its disposition.
The parties stipulate that All-Risk has a fair market value of $1,150,000 to a buyer at arm's length if the buyer had no concern about the seller being able to compete with them or secure any portion of the company's book of business.
The plaintiff seeks to retain the business for herself. She offers, in her claims for relief, to buy him out for $200,000 over ten years, so long as there is a non-compete clause. The defendant seeks orders that would effectively divide the book of business of All-Risk so that the defendant could take his part to work within another insurance agency. The defendant has identified a prospective employer in Meriden. He does not seek a non-compete, but instead, a court order for neither party to solicit the business divided out to the other, provided the court orders a division of the book of business of All-Risk.
The defendant claimed, without proof, that the plaintiff had injured his reputation in the insurance and consumer community by libelous and slanderous statements. He reserved the right to bring a civil action against her for these claims, except that after a hiatus in his testimony when he came back to court appearing much more remorseful, he stated he had changed his mind and would not pursue such a claim. The defendant is manipulative and not credible.
The court will not issue a non-compete order (nor a non-solicitation order), nor is it clear that Connecticut law would authorize such an order. The forensic accountants for both parties testified before the court. Plaintiff's expert viewed the non-compete as integral to valuing the book of business: that there was a one-to-one ratio in value between the two, and he valued that as over 90% of the value of the business. Defendant's expert viewed the non-compete as important to the value because he received about 80% of the value comprised of the book of business. Based upon the evidence before the court, it cannot conclude a definitive value of the business if the defendant were to compete with the plaintiff within a range of territory or closeness in time such that he could acquire some of All-Risk's customers, whose premium payments have been factored into the $1,150,000 value the forensic accountants and parties have stipulated to. The court can only conclude that competition diminishes the value in the range of 80-90% since an arms-length buyer would likely correlate the lack of a non-compete as resulting in such a diminution in value. "[W]hen neither party in a dissolution proceeding chooses to introduce detailed information as to the value of a given asset, neither party may later claim that it is not satisfied with the court's valuation of that asset." Bornemann v. Bornemann 245 Conn., 508, 535, 752 A.2d 978 (1998). Accordingly, the court bases these orders on that value but is forced to provide some relief to the plaintiff as the payor of value if the defendant were to choose to compete with All-Risk in its market under certain conditions. The court first notes that the defendant has not been at All-Risk for 21 months.
The court finds that the defendant has not retained, either through his own efforts or those of any former All-Risk employee, a list of the All-Risk customers with their attendant customer needs.
During the pendente lite period of this case, the parties went through financial arrangements that were court ordered. In the first instance, they shared expenses, and with the assistance of an accountant, adjusted their respective expenditures.
There came a time during the pendente lite period that the plaintiff exercised her authority under All-Risk's bylaws to terminate the defendant's employment with the company. The defendant had been arrested for his behavior toward the plaintiff at the office and an order of protection had been issued against him.
Subsequent to that event, the plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendant alimony in the amount of $8300 per month. The defendant did not seek employment during the pendency of the action. His reason was that he thought the parties were going to divide the business. He did speak to one insurance company in Meriden during the trial, as indicated above. It is the defendant's position that he must receive half of All-Risk's customers so that he has a book of business to bring to an insurance company. Throughout the trial, on various occasions, he had wanted to take the same book of business and have the option of opening his own company.
The plaintiff, based on her draw that she has been taking as W-2 income in 2008, earns $306,000 gross per year, which is $241,124.00 net yearly.
Both plaintiff and defendant are skilled in the insurance industry. Defendant is also skilled in the oil delivery and HVAC businesses as well. He asserts he cannot go back into the oil business because it requires work outside which would be painful for him since he testified he has a condition known as mixed connective tissue disorder. There is no evidence except the defendant's own testimony that he is unable to work outside. Through the 2006 football season, the defendant voluntarily attended Jets football games (7 or 8 games in 2006) and cooks outside for a tailgating party that has been described as a major social event; he has been outside for the event and game for approximately 8 hours at a time. The court takes notice that football season can be very cold. From this, the court determines that the defendant may choose to attend outside events for recreational purposes but chooses not to expose himself to employment that would place him outside frequently.
The plaintiff was with the All-Risk insurance company for approximately 7 years (1990-1997) before the defendant came to work for the company. Both were employed there because it was the plaintiff's father's business, owned with a couple of partners. There is no evidence before the court that the defendant would have had the opportunity to purchase a share in All-Risk if he had not been married to the plaintiff. The parties only owned the business together for approximately 6 years (1998-2004) before the defendant engaged in the behavior which caused the breakdown of the parties' marriage.
The parties each have sought a variety of orders addressing other assets and financial obligations. The plaintiff has retirement assets valued at $128,578, as shown on her financial affidavit. The defendant has retirement assets valued at $93,448.45 on his financial affidavit. Of that sum, he asserts that the $30,034.66 Fidelity IRA was owned before the marriage.
The parties owned a home together which they sold during the pendency of this action. To prepare the house for sale, the plaintiff spent approximately $25,850 for stone work and other associated items. The defendant has never contributed to those expenses, alternating between claiming them as excessive or that he could have done them for less. Of course, at this time, the defendant was living a lie and so the court concludes it cannot trust his assertion that these costs were excessive. The plaintiff is deserving of reimbursement of half of these funds since the proceeds of the home were divided in half, which is reflected in the orders.
From the sale of the marital home, the plaintiff has $31,340 left (having paid $50,000 in attorneys fees during the trial), and $4,000 in her checking. She has a custodial account for one of the children valued at $375. The defendant has approximately $1,400 in the bank and stock valued at $600. He has custodial accounts for the children, as shown on his affidavit, valued in total at $23,291.26.
Both parties have $50,000 of life insurance. There is no cash value.
There are a variety of motor vehicles which the parties own which they have stipulated as to value and distribution. That is undisturbed by these orders. The plaintiff drives a vehicle valued at $21,549 which is owned by JK Maintenance, LLC, though the business valuators included it in the All-Risk value.
The defendant bought a home during the pendente lite period. It is valued at $770,000 and is mortgaged to his father for $400,000. This was done in excess of the court authority granted to him. The plaintiff invested the lion's share of her proceeds from the sale of the marital home in attorneys fees. Her balance is presently about $31,324.
As testified to, both the children's guardian ad litem's fees and the forensic psychologist's fees are approved.
"The statutory authority for the award of counsel fees is found in General Statutes § 46b-62. Section 46b-62 provides in relevant part: "If, in any proceeding under this chapter and said sections, the court appoints an attorney for a minor child, the court may order the father, mother or an intervening party, individually or in any combination, to pay the reasonable fees of the attorney . . ." "The court may order either party to pay the fees . . . pursuant to . . . § 46b-62, and how such expenses will be paid is within the court's discretion . . . An abuse of discretion in granting . . . fees will be found only if [an appellate court] determines that the trial court could not reasonably have concluded as it did." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lamacchia v. Chilinsky, 79 Conn.App. 372, 374-75, 830 A.2d 329 (2003).
We note that although § 46b-62 addresses only the issue of attorneys fees, we previously have recognized that the same criteria properly informs the court's exercise of discretion regarding fees for a guardian ad litem appointed for a minor child in a dissolution of marriage action or in an action seeking a modification of custody and visitation. See Ruggiero v. Ruggiero, 76 Conn.App. 338, 347-48, 819 A.2d 864 (2003); Roach v. Roach, 20 Conn.App. 500, 508, 568 A.2d 1037 (1990).
"The order for payment of . . . fees under . . . § 46b-62 requires consideration of the financial resources of both parties and the criteria set forth in . . . § 46b-82 . . . Section 46b-82 instructs the court to consider, inter alia, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties . . . Although the trial court is not required to find expressly on each of the § 46b-82 factors, it must have sufficient evidence to support each factor." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 376. Utz v. Utz, (AC 28780), published February 2009.
The parties' adjustment of their agreement on the disposition of real estate resulted in an agreement that the plaintiff owes the defendant $40,403.92. The plaintiff's attorney fees and disbursements have totaled $144,255. The defendant's attorney fees and disbursements have totaled $110,258, or $33,997 less than the plaintiff. Inasmuch as the plaintiff's attorneys fees were much higher than they might have been because of the defendant's lying and subterfuge, the court declines to order any sums to the defendant on the real estate adjustment, treating it as a set-off against fees the court otherwise would have ordered the defendant to pay for the plaintiff's attorney.
The court has reviewed the statutory criteria under § 46b-82, which includes causes of the dissolution of marriage, as well as the factors noticed in Utz. These factors are applied to the facts of this case, including the defendant's fault in the breakdown of the marriage, and willful choice not to look for employment for well over a year so that his present earnings are willfully repressed.
The court has carefully considered the statutory criteria found in the Connecticut General Statutes, including §§ 46b-56, 46b-62, 46b-81, 46b-82, 46b-84. Based upon statutory law and case law, and the finding of facts herein, the court orders:
1. Dissolution of the marriage.
2. The Custody and Parenting Time Stipulation, dated December 10, 2008 (as modified in open court to provide for St. Joseph's School in Danbury in lieu of the Wooster School at paragraph 1.2), signed by the parties and recommended by the guardian ad litem, is made orders of the court and ordered incorporated by reference into the judgment file.
3. The parties' stipulation, dated December 14, 2008, which provides for binding arbitration of their final division of marital household furniture and furnishings, is approved and ordered.
4. Pursuant to the child support guidelines, the husband shall pay child support to the wife for two children, upon employment. The matter of a child support order is continued until May 2009, for the setting of an order based on actual earnings or earning capacity depending on the factual circumstances at the time and the evidence offered at the hearing. Since one of the parties' children is staying with a host family, no child support order shall enter for either party at this time. A change of that arrangement, or a motion for payment of child support to the host family, shall constitute a substantial change of circumstances for child support for that child.
5. The defendant shall indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless on any 2006 tax liabilities.
6. The plaintiff shall be the sole owner of the business All-Risk Insurance Agency, Inc. Within thirty days, the defendant shall resign all of his position and offices with that company and transfer all of his right, title, and interest in and to the company to the plaintiff. Only if the defendant executes a release in favor of the plaintiff of all claims that he may have or assert against her, except those arising out of the terms of this judgment, then pursuant to this judgment, the plaintiff shall simultaneously indemnify and hold the defendant harmless from all claims arising out of his ownership, position, and officer status with All-Risk.
7. Upon the defendant's execution of all the documents required in paragraph 6, the plaintiff shall execute a promissory note in favor of the defendant in the amount of $255,000, which shall be paid on an amortized basis over 7 years, paid quarterly at the rate of $9,017.14 for each payment, commencing three months from the date of this decision. If any payment is more than ten days late, it shall bear interest at the rate of 5 percent. The promissory note shall provide for the payment of costs of collection including a reasonable attorneys fee.
The promissory note executed by the plaintiff in favor of the defendant shall contain a provision that if in the next 15 months from the date of these orders, the defendant shall, on his own, or working for a company, solicit business to sell insurance to any individual or business within Danbury or any contiguous town or city, then the plaintiff shall be entitled to a setoff of no more than 5 quarters of payments from her obligations under this paragraph, plus reasonable attorneys fees. The right of set off shall exist for only those quarters in which the defendant has, on his own, or working for a company, solicited business to sell insurance to any individual or business within Danbury or any contiguous town or city.
8. The plaintiff shall pay the defendant alimony in the amount of $4,000 per month commencing on March 1, 2009, for a period of three (3) years, to sooner terminate on the death of either party, the remarriage of the defendant or his cohabitation, as provided for in Conn. Gen. State. § 46b-86. Said alimony is non modifiable as to term.
9. The plaintiff shall maintain life insurance to secure said alimony in an amount not to exceed $36,000 so long as she has an alimony obligation.
10. The defendant shall maintain life insurance to secure his child support obligation as will be imposed at the time of the setting of the child support order.
11. The plaintiff shall maintain health insurance for the benefit of the three minor children. Until the child support is modified, the court deviates from the guidelines which would have the unreimbursed health expenditures for the minor children paid 80% by the plaintiff and 20% by the defendant, deviating to 50% paid by the plaintiff and 50% paid by the defendant except as ordered in paragraph 28.
12. The parties shall share equally the costs of the therapy they agreed to attend in their parenting agreement.
13. The defendant shall be the sole owner of the Altria and Philip Morris Stock, his Bank of America checking account, the Wachovia Florida security, and the Wachovia joint savings free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall be the sole owner of the balance of her proceeds from the home sale at approximately $31,324, her union savings bank checking, and all bank accounts associated with All-Risk. Each party who is the custodian of accounts for the children shall maintain the same, and account by January 31 of each year to the other party as to the status and value of those accounts by providing copies of statements.
14. The plaintiff shall keep her jewelry and the defendant shall keep his classic cars, each free and clear of any claim by the other.
15. The defendant shall be the sole owner of the real estate located at 40 Kingswood Place Ridgefield, CT, and he shall indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless for all matters arising out of the ownership thereof.
16. The defendant is entitled to claim his COBRA benefits under the All-Risk health insurances at his cost. The plaintiff shall co-operate in the processing of the paperwork. Each party is responsible for his or her own health expenditures and shall indemnify and hold the other harmless thereon.
17. The defendant shall be the sole owner of his Fidelity IRA free and clear of any claim from the plaintiff.
18. Within thirty days, the parties' other retirement funds: the plaintiff's Janus IRAs and All Risk 401K, and the defendant's ING Simple 401K, shall be equalized as of the date of these orders (or the date closest thereto allowed by an administrator not related to the parties) and divided equally, by QDRO or simple transfer as the case may be. The accruals and losses from the date of these orders to the date of transfer shall accrue to the party's respective share. Each party shall pay their own attorneys fees for the division of the retirement funds as ordered herein and in the next paragraph; the cost of a QDRO shall be divided evenly; the plaintiff shall retain the individual who shall prepare any necessary QDRO. The court shall retain jurisdiction over the issuance of the QDRO for the purposes of its effectuation in accordance with the terms of these provisions.
19. Within thirty days, the defendant's Fidelity Roth IRA shall be split evenly between the parties as of the date of these orders. The accruals and losses from the date of these orders to the date of transfer shall accrue to the party's respective share.
20. The Capodilupo escrow of $6,700 shall be first applied to the fees of Attorney Klein, the balance of which shall be paid 2/3s by the defendant and 1/3 by the plaintiff within 30 days.
21. Each party shall pay their own counsel fees.
22. The plaintiff shall be entitled to all 3 children as dependency exemptions. At such time as a child support order to be paid by the defendant is set, this order shall be re-examined by the court contemporaneously.
23. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56c, the court retains jurisdiction pertaining to an educational support order for all three minor children.
24. Except as otherwise ordered herein, each party shall be responsible for the debts on their respective financial affidavits. The defendant shall indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless from any claims of money owed from his parents. The parties shall each be responsible to their own parents respectively for any sums due and owing.
25. The defendant seeks an order regarding some trusts that the wife may be the beneficiary of. The court received insufficient evidence to issue such an order and specifically declines to do so.
26. The defendant has made claims for sums due from the plaintiff for a variety of items as listed in paragraph 18 of his claims for relief. Having reviewed each and every claim and the evidence adduced regarding the same, the court specifically declines to order any sums from the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant as sought in these claims except as otherwise provided in these orders.
The plaintiff has made claims for sums due from the defendant for a variety of items as listed in her Amended Financial Proposal, Schedules A and B accounting. Having reviewed each and every claim and the evidence adduced regarding the same, the court specifically declines to order any sums from the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff as sought in said Schedules A and B, except as otherwise provided in these orders.
27. The parties shall provide each other a copy of the custodial accounts' statements not later than January 31 for the year previous.
28. The defendant shall be solely responsible for all outstanding therapy bills for the oldest child that are unpaid as of the date of these orders, which shall be paid within 30 days.
29. The defendant shall be solely responsible for the payment of Dr. Horowitz' outstanding fee which shall be paid within 30 days.
30. As to the non-classic autos, the parties shall each retain those vehicles in their control and the plaintiff shall be the sole owner of the holding company (JK Maintenance) that has title to her vehicle.
31. All bonds and coins gifted to the children shall be held for their benefit by the parent currently in possession of the same.
32. Each party shall pay one-half of the children's private and parochial school tuition, fees, costs, and activities.
33. Within 30 days of these orders, the plaintiff, for herself and collectively with the defendant as the sole owners of the DGS (also known as D.G.S.) Realty, LLC, and North Street Properties, LLC, shall quit claim to the defendant or such company as he shall designate, all of the plaintiff's right, title, and interest (personally and as a member of an LLC) in and to 152 Gull Circle, North Daytona, Florida; 22 Thorpe Street, Danbury, CT; 7 Peace Street, Danbury, CT; and 170 South Street, Danbury, CT. The defendant shall indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless for all obligations arising out of those properties including a blanket mortgage on the Peace Street, South Street, and a third property (62 Lake Avenue, Danbury, CT) which will vest solely in the plaintiff in these orders.
Within 30 days of these orders, the defendant, for himself, and collectively with the plaintiff as the sole owners of the DGS Realty, LLC, and North Street Properties, LLC, shall quit claim to the plaintiff, or such company as she shall designate, all of the defendant's right, title, and interest (personally and as a member of an LLC) in and to 60 and 62 Lake Avenue, Danbury, CT. With the exception of the blanket mortgage that the defendant is assuming in full that covers 62 Lake Avenue, Danbury, CT, the plaintiff shall otherwise indemnify and hold the defendant harmless from all obligations arising out of the two Lake Avenue properties, except as further provided herein.
34. Within 30 days of the date of these orders, the parties shall execute such documents as are reasonably presented to them to remove them from ownership, position, and title of any other business entities as follows: defendant to be removed from JK Maintenance if he is thereon and plaintiff to be removed from DGS Realty, LLC. It is not clear from the parties' agreement regarding real estate as to what is the disposition of the North Street Property, LLC; therefore, if the parties do not file a joint statement of intent for one of them to retain it, then the court orders that the plaintiff shall be the sole owner of the North Street Property, LLC, the purpose to give each party one holding company for the purpose of managing the rental properties they are awarded herein.
35. Each party shall, within 30 days, convey to the other party the security deposits for tenants applicable to the real estate that they are assuming with identification as to which tenant's security deposit is represented and necessary information for the party to discharge his/her statutory duties including but not limited to interest and return of deposit.
36. Within thirty days, as to the one tenant at Lake Avenue that the defendant allowed to be several months behind in his rent, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the amount of past due rent, less any retained security deposit, computed as of March 1, 2009.