Opinion
24A-CR-154
11-13-2024
Yari Pacheco Santiago, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jan B. Berg Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Cynthia L. Oetjen, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D30-2203-F1-8271
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jan B. Berg Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Judges Felix and DeBoer concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Kenworthy, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] Yari Pacheco Santiago appeals his conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting. He presents one issue for our review: Did the State present sufficient evidence to prove Santiago was over twenty-one years of age at the time of the offense? We affirm.
Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2021).
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] A.P. was born in October 2009. She lived with her parents, older sister M.P., and three other siblings in a three-bedroom house in Indianapolis. For a few months in 2021, A.P.'s uncle, Santiago, lived with them.
[¶3] When A.P. was in fifth or sixth grade, a friend disclosed to A.P. during a conversation at school that someone had touched her inappropriately. In response, A.P. told her friend she had also been molested. A.P. told the friend because, "I didn't want her to feel by herself, . . . because I know . . . how it feels" and what "she's going through." Tr. Vol. 2 at 35. A teacher overheard their conversation and reported the abuse.
[¶4] The Department of Child Services opened an investigation in October or November 2021, but A.P. did not disclose the molestation to investigators at the time. Later, A.P.'s mother took A.P. to the hospital for a medical exam because she "didn't know if [A.P.] was telling the truth or not." Id. at 37. During a subsequent forensic interview of A.P. and M.P. in early 2022, A.P. disclosed she had been sexually abused. The State charged Santiago with Level 1 felony child molesting, two counts of Level 4 felony child molesting, and Class A misdemeanor intimidation.
The State alleged M.P. was the victim of one of the counts of Level 4 felony child molesting.
[¶5] The trial court held a bench trial on November 29, 2023. A.P. had just turned fourteen years old. She testified when she was "eleven, twelve-ish" and in "sixth or fifth grade," Santiago came into her bedroom at night and laid down on the bed. Id. at 25. He then put his "dick" inside of the "private area" of her body "where pee comes out of on girls" and moved "back and forth." Id. at 30, 29, 32. M.P. also testified at trial but denied Santiago molested her.
[¶6] The trial court found Santiago guilty of Level 1 felony child molesting and not guilty of one count of Level 4 felony child molesting. On Santiago's Trial Rule 41(B) motion, it dismissed the other charges. The trial court sentenced Santiago to thirty years in the Indiana Department of Correction.
There was sufficient evidence to establish Santiago was at least twenty-one years old at the time of the offense.
[¶7] Santiago alleges there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he was over twenty-one years old at the time he molested A.P. A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a "deferential standard of review in which we 'neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]'" Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the fact-finder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is "not necessary that the evidence 'overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.'" Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)). "A conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the victim." Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012).
[¶8] To convict Santiago of Level 1 felony child molesting as charged, the State was required to prove that between September 27 and October 31, 2021, Santiago, a person of at least twenty-one years of age, did knowingly or intentionally perform or submit to sexual intercourse with A.P., a child under the age of fourteen years.
[¶9] The State introduced a copy of Santiago's driver's license showing a birth date of June 1, 1998. Therefore, Santiago turned twenty-one years old in 2019. A.P. testified Santiago molested her when she was "eleven, twelve-ish" and in "sixth or fifth grade." Tr. Vol. 2 at 25. Because A.P. was born in October 2009, she turned eleven years old in October 2020 and twelve in 2021. The molestation also occurred when Santiago was living with A.P.'s family. M.P. testified Santiago lived with them "maybe two years" before trial, or in 2021. Id. at 52.
[¶10] Time is not of the essence in the crime of child molesting. Barger v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1304, 1307 (Ind. 1992). It can be difficult for children to remember specific dates, especially when the incident is not immediately reported as is often true in child molesting cases. Id. The exact date becomes important only in limited circumstances, such as the case where the victim's age at the time of the offense falls at or near the dividing line between classes of felonies. Id.
[¶11] This is not a case where the exact date is important. Under the timeline established by A.P.'s testimony, Santiago turned twenty-one years old more than a year before the earliest possible date of the molestation. There is no question the molestation occurred when Santiago was at least twenty-one years old and A.P. was younger than fourteen years old. Santiago's argument amounts to a mere request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244.
Conclusion
[¶12] The State presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Santiago was at least twenty-one years old at the time he molested A.P.
[¶13] Affirmed.
Felix, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.