Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-3891 Section "T"(5)
October 26, 2000
Before this Court is the Defendant's, Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana Inc., incorrectly named in Plaintiff's Petition as Windsor Court Hotel Limited Partnership, Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion came for hearing on October 25, 2000, and the parties waived oral argument. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties, the exhibits, the record, and the applicable law, is fully advised on the premises of this case and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND:
In April 1999, the Plaintiff, an African American woman, applied for the position as a housekeeper at the Windsor Court Hotel in New Orleans. At such time, the Plaintiff's hair was dyed blonde. During the course of the Plaintiff's interview at the Windsor Court, the Executive Housekeeper, Drena Alexander, informed the Plaintiff of the Hotel's grooming policy. Among other things, that policy prohibits Windsor Court employees from having extremes in hair color. Ms. Alexander found the Plaintiff's hair color to be extreme under the parameters of the Hotel's grooming policy, so she inquired into whether the Plaintiff would be willing to change her hair color for the job. The Plaintiff stated that she would not be willing to do so; accordingly, the Defendant did not offer the Plaintiff employment as a housekeeper.
Defense Exhibit "A."
The Plaintiff filed a Complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in which she alleged that the Defendant discriminated against her based on race. However, during her interview with the EEOC investigator, Santee stated that she believed that the Windsor Court denied her employment based on her hair color, not her race. After further inquiry, the EEOC concluded that the Plaintiff failed to establish a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or other discrimination statutes. The EEOC subsequently dismissed the Plaintiff's charge.
Nevertheless, the Plaintiff filed the instant action against the Windsor Court alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Louisiana Revised Statute 23:331, et seq., and "any other pertinent United States or Louisiana Constitutional Amendments." The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant engaged in race discrimination when it denied her employment based on the color of her hair. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that the Windsor Court refused to hire her because she was a black woman with dyed-blonde hair.
II. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES:
The Defendant filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Defendant claims that there exists no genuine issue of material fact, such that the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Windsor Court argues that Santee's allegations fail to state a cause of action because hair color is not an immutable characteristic; therefore, it is not protected, either statutorily or constitutionally. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff further fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because the Defendant's grooming policy applies to all applicants and employees uniformly, regardless of the race of the applicant or employee. In addition, the Defendant claims that there is no evidence showing that the Windsor Court hired a white housekeeper instead of Santee.
The Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in which she argues that the Plaintiff does not have to prove a prima facie case of discrimination on Motion for Summary Judgment. In addition, the Plaintiff argues that there exists genuine issues of fact in this case, such as whether the Plaintiff's hair color was extreme in comparison to persons of other races employed at the Hotel. Finally, the Plaintiff argues that Summary Judgment is premature at this time because discovery is still being conducted in the present case.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS:
A. The Law on Summary Judgment
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a court should grant a motion for summary judgment only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied);Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, when the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
Contrary to the Plaintiff's belief, in order to overcome a motion for summary judgment in a Title VII discrimination action, a plaintiff first must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. See Shackelford v. Deloitte Touche, L.L.P., 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must prove the following: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for the employment position; (3) that she was denied employment; and (4) that she was replaced by someone of a different race or that the defendant treated persons of a different race more favorably than it treated the plaintiff. See McDonell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, then the defendant must rebut the presumption of discrimination by proffering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for its actions. See Shackelford, 190 F.3d at 404 (citing Meinecke v. H R Block, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995)).
C. Constitutional Law:
In order to maintain a discrimination claim based on constitutional law, the Plaintiff must prove that the Defendant deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution and that the Defendant committed the alleged depravation under color of state law. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49 (1999). Mere private conduct, whether it is discriminatory or not, is not within the realm of protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. See id. (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S.Ct. 2777 (1982) (quotingShelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948)). Accordingly, the Plaintiff must make a showing of state action to be successful under both the United States Constitution and the Louisiana State Constitution.
D. Application of the Law to the Facts:
In the present action, the Court finds that the Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the Plaintiff is not a member of a protected class. In her deposition, the Plaintiff states that the basis for her lawsuit is the fact that she was denied employment by the Windsor Court because of her hair color. She excluded herself from being considered for the housekeeping position because she refused to change the color of her hair in order to comply with the Defendant's grooming policy. Further statements in the Plaintiff's deposition make it clear that her claim is based on her hair color, not her race.
The Court relies on the following excerpt from the Plaintiff's deposition:
A. And she said — she asked me my name, and she said, Well, let me pull the application. And on my application, I wasn't hired because of the color of hair.
Q. And what color was your hair?
A. Blonde.
Q. And is that the basis of your lawsuit?
A. Yes, (Plaintiff's Deposition, Defense Exhibit B, page 34, lines 11-19).
The Court relies on the following excerpt from the Plaintiff's deposition:
Q. Okay. Do you believe that you would have been hired if you had told Ms. Alexander you would have toned down your hair?
A. Yes.
Q. So, if you had been the same race but with different color hair, you would have been hired?
A. Right.
(Plaintiff's Deposition, Defense Exhibit B, page 51, lines 10-17).
Employers are only prohibited from discriminating against employees on the basis of immutable characteristics, such as race and national origin. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975). A hiring policy that distinguishes on any other ground, such as hair color, "is related more closely to the employer's choice of how to run his business than to equality of employment opportunity." Id. An employer's grooming code constitutes discrimination based on grooming standards; consequently, such a code lies outside the realm of the Civil Rights Act. See id. at 1088. Accordingly, a hiring policy that makes distinctions based on the employer's subjective determination of what constitutes an "extreme" hair color is perfectly acceptable under Title VII. Because "hair color" is not a recognized protected class under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this Court finds that the Plaintiff fails to prove the first element of a prima facie case of discrimination.
The Court notes that even if it were to find that the Plaintiff's claim is based on race and therefore places her within a protected class, the Plaintiff still cannot prove the fourth element of a prima facie case of discrimination that the Defendant treated persons of a different race more favorably than it treated the Plaintiff. There is no evidence indicating that the Windsor Court hired a white housekeeper instead of the Plaintiff or that the Windsor Court discriminated against Africa Americans in its hiring practices. The evidence is quite to the contrary, for the Windsor Court hired 25 African American housekeepers between the months of April and May of 1999. Moreover, there is no evidence to support the notion that the Windsor Court failed to apply its grooming policy to all employees uniformly, regardless of race. The Defendant produced two affidavits in support of the notion that the Windsor Court applies its grooming policy prohibiting extremes in hair color to all employees equally. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff fails to prove the fourth element of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Defense Exhibit "A", paragraph 12.
Defense Exhibits "A" and "G".
With regard to the Plaintiff's constitutional claims, the Court finds that there is no question as to whether due process or equal protection standards apply in this case because the Plaintiff failed to show that any "state action" occurred giving rise to valid Constitutional claims. The Defendant is a private entity, and as such, the Plaintiff's constitutional claims against the Defendant are without merit. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's constitutional claims cannot survive.
Finally, the Court addresses the Plaintiff's claim that summary judgment is premature at this time because discovery has not been completed. Specifically, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant has not answered an interrogatory inquiring into the identity of all Windsor Court employees who have blonde hair. The Plaintiff claims that such information "goes right to the heart of her case" because if it is found that there are other employees who have the same shade of hair color as Santee hut are of a different race, then it will prove that Santee was discriminated against by the Defendant. (Doc. 14).
First, as the Defendant points out, the Plaintiff advances this argument in improper form. Pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff is to submit affidavits to the Court that contain "specific facts explaining how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him to rebut the movant's showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact."Cormier v. Pennzoil Exploration Prod. Co., 969 F.2d 1559, 1561 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir. 1990)). In the instant action, the Plaintiff merely asserted this argument in her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Second, it is an established rule that a plaintiffs entitlement to discovery prior to a ruling on a motion for summary judgment "may be cut off when, within the trial court's discretion, the record indicates that further discovery will not likely produce facts necessary to defeat the motion." Cormier, 969 F.2d at 1561 (citing Fisher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 1073, 1078 (5th Cir. 1990)).
As discussed above, employers are only prohibited from discriminating against employees on the basis of immutable characteristics, such as race and national origin. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091. A hiring policy that distinguishes on any other ground, such as hair color, "is related more closely to the employer's choice of how to run his business than to equality of employment opportunity." Id. The actual shade of the Plaintiff's hair, even in comparison to other employees' hair, is impertiment and not for this Court to consider because the Civil Rights Act should not be used "to limit an employer's right to exercise his informed judgment as to how best to run his shop."Id. It is not the role of this Court to decide what is and is not "extreme" under the Defendant's grooming policy. Therefore, information regarding Windsor Court employees with blonde hair is immaterial to the Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claim. Even if further discovery revealed employees who have the same color hair as the Plainitff, such evidence is not probative of whether the Defendant failed to hire Santee on the basis of her race. Accordingly, the Court finds that further discovery will not likely lead to additional helpful information in this case, for it is not likely to uncover evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Thus, summary judgment is not premature at this time.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court is of the opinion that summary judgment in favor of the Defendant is appropriate at this time. The record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the Plaintiff; therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13), be, and the same is hereby GRANTED pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.