Opinion
Claim No. 139236
10-17-2023
Osvaldo SANTANA, Claimant, v. STATE of New York, Defendant.
On July 25, 2022 claimant Osvaldo Santana served a notice of intention to file a claim and on May 25, 2023 filed a claim seeking four million dollars for damages sustained as a result of Sing Sing Correctional Facilities’ alleged negligence and deliberate indifference to his medical needs and safety and its negligent hiring of correctional staff. Specifically, both the notice of intention to file a claim and the claim allege that on April 24, 2022 at approximately 4:30 P.M. claimant exited his cell at Sing Sing, became unconscious, and was left non-responsive without intervention by correction officers for more than 30 minutes on housing block B-V-gallery. Claimant was eventually taken to Mount Vernon Hospital where he was diagnosed with a zygoma fracture and underwent facial reconstruction surgery. (Notice of intention to file a claim at 1 - 2; claim at 2 - 3, 4 - 5, 7 - 9.)
In lieu of an answer, defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (2), and Court of Claims Act § 10 (3) (b) and § 11 (b) arguing that (1) neither the notice of intention nor the claim was served within 90 days of accrual of the claim; (2) the notice of intention fails to meet the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) and therefore did not extend claimant's time to serve his claim; and (3) the claim fails to meet the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b). Success on any one of these three arguments would deprive the Court of jurisdiction over the claim. Claimant did not answer the motion papers.
Defendant contends that claimant was required to serve his notice of intention or a claim by July 23, 2022. It argues that since it did not receive claimant's notice of intention to file a claim until July 25, 2022 it was untimely and therefore claimant did not extend the time to serve his claim. Accordingly, defendant argues, claimant's service of his claim upon defendant on May 24, 2023, more than a year after it accrued, was also untimely.
Court of Claims Act § 10 (3) provides that a negligence or unintentional tort claim must be "filed and served upon the attorney general within ninety days after the accrual of such claim, unless the claimant shall within such time serve upon the attorney general a written notice of intention to file a claim in which event the claim shall be filed and served upon the attorney general within two years after the accrual of such claim." The claim here accrued on April 24, 2022. The proper method to compute time periods excludes the day of the event. ( Bacalokonstantis v Nichols , 141 AD2d 482, 484 [2d Dept 1988], citing General Construction Law § 20.) Therefore, the 90th day for the purposes of calculating the deadline to serve the Attorney General was, in fact, July 24, 2022. Since July 24, 2022 fell on a Sunday, the time for service was extended until the next day. ( Triangle Radio Supply Co. v De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. , 208 AD 614, 615 [1st Dept 1924] citing General Construction Law § 20.) Mr. Santana therefore timely served his notice of intention to file a claim on the Attorney General on Monday, July 25, 2022.
Although the notice of intention to file a claim was timely served, the Court must now consider whether it met the substantive pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), affording the claimant the benefit of additional time to file his claim. Defendant argues that claimant's notice of intention does not include factual allegations about how claimant became unconscious, "any acts or omissions on the part of the defendant," or "the nature of any act or omission on the part of the defendant nor any intentional act." (Affirmation of defendant's counsel at 5, 16 - 17.)
The Court agrees that neither the notice nor the claim includes factual allegations about how the claimant became unconscious. Indeed, claimant himself asserts that he "woke up in the hospital without any knowledge of how he ended up in the hospital." (Notice of intention to file claim at 1; claim at 3, 8.) However, the Court disagrees with the defendant's conclusion that the notice and claim therefore fail to provide sufficient notice to the defendant regarding actions or omissions on its part as required by Court of Claims Act § 11 (b). Claimant's notice clearly and with specificity identifies the date, time, and location where his claim arose (at 4:30 P.M. on April 24, 2022 at Sing Sing Correctional Facility on housing block B V-gallery) and the nature of his claim, namely that he was, in one moment, out of his cell for a medication run and, in the next, unconscious on the company for a half-hour or more without any intervention by a correctional officer, and as a result he required hospitalization and facial reconstruction surgery. (Claimant's notice of intention to file a claim at 1-2.)
It is well established that the State's waiver of its sovereign immunity is conditioned upon claimant's satisfaction of the legislatively mandated pleading requirements set out in the Court of Claims Act § 11 (b). Both a notice of intention to file a claim and a claim must set forth the time when and the place where the claim arose and the nature of the claim. ( Court of Claims Act § 11 [b].) In describing the general nature of the claim, the notice of intention does not need to "include all of the facts needed to state a cause of action," but enough to "give some indication" of how the claimant was injured and how the State was negligent ( Cendales v State of New York , 2 AD3d 1165, 1167 [2003] ) or provide enough information so that "how the State was negligent can be reasonably inferred." ( Martinez v State of New York , 215 AD3d 815, 817 [2d Dept 2023] quoting Rodriguez v State of New York , 8 AD3d 647, 647 [2d Dept 2004].) Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) requirements are there so that there is sufficient information provided to allow the State to investigate the claim and assess its liability without needing to "ferret out or assemble" information and "specific enough so as not to mislead, deceive or prejudice the rights of the State." ( Sacher v State of New York , 211 AD3d 867, 873 [2d Dept 2022].) Enabling the State to investigate the claim is the "guiding principle" that informs section 11 (b). ( Martinez v State of New York , 215 AD3d 815, 817 [2d Dept 2023] quoting Lepkowski v State , 1 NY3d 201, 207 [2003].)
As discussed above, claimant alleged that on a specific date, at a specific time, and in a specific location he became unconscious and further injured by being left on the floor for more than half an hour without any intervention by correction officers. Although defendant insists that the notice and claim both fail to meet the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), it has not demonstrated - or even claimed - in its motion papers that it has been unable to conduct an investigation based on the information provided in the notice and claim. "When a defendant contends that a claim falls short of this standard, it is incumbent upon the defendant to demonstrate that it was unable to conduct an investigation based upon the information that was provided. " (See Matter of M.C. v State of New York , 74 Misc 3d 682, 691 [Ct Cl 2022] [emphasis in original] quoting Smith v State of New York , 74 Misc 3d 1216[A] [2006].) The Second Department recently clarified that the determination regarding the sufficiency of a notice or claim is based on whether the State could investigate and ascertain liability and that this is a sui generis determination "depending upon the nature of the claim and specificity of allegations set forth in the claim." ( Meyer v State of New York , 213 AD3d 753, 755 [2d Dept 2023] ; Fenton v State of New York , 213 AD3d 737, 739 [2d Dept 2023] ; Fletcher v State of New York , 218 AD3d 647, 648 .)
The allegations contained in claimant's notice of intention to file a claim provided the defendant with a sufficient basis on which to conduct an investigation and determine its liability, if any. Defendant has not argued in its motion that it was unable to investigate with the information provided in the notice of intention to file a claim or the claim and would be hard-pressed to do so given the specificity of the details that are included. Defendant's negligence can reasonably be inferred from the limited facts, particularly given the grievous nature of the injury that allegedly caused claimant to become unconscious, requiring reconstructive surgery, and leaving claimant himself unable to recall the details of what happened. If defendant was responsible for the harm to claimant, it should not be able to benefit from claimant's unconsciousness and inability to recall the specific details of what occurred as a result of the injuries he sustained. In these circumstances, not knowing whether claimant was assaulted by someone or whether he tripped over his own shoelaces does not impede defendant's ability to investigate in the way that not knowing the time when and date where it occurred could. Defendant's liability is, of course, claimant's ultimate burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence. Since the Court concludes that the claimant's notice of intention to file a claim met the substantive pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), the time to serve his claim was extended.
Turning now to defendant's final argument that the claim also fails to meet the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), defendant repeats its argument that the claimant has failed to "identify any act allegedly performed by the State or the basis for its alleged liability" (affirmation of defendant's counsel at 22). The Court again disagrees, as noted in the discussion of the sufficiency of the notice of intention to file a claim above. The claim restates the notice's allegations that on April 24, 2022 at approximately 4:30 P.M. claimant exited his cell at Sing Sing, became unconscious, and was left non-responsive without intervention by correction officers for more than 30 minutes on housing block B-V-gallery. Claimant was ultimately taken to Mount Vernon Hospital where he was diagnosed with a zygoma fracture and underwent facial reconstruction surgery. (Notice of intention to file a claim at 1 - 2; claim at 2 - 3, 4 - 5, 7 - 9.) While the pleading may lack details describing how claimant went from leaving his cell for a medication run to becoming unconscious to waking up in the hospital, there is enough information to infer how the State may have been negligent and the claim is sufficiently limiting and specific as to time when and place where to afford the benefits of the pleading requirement. (Vassenelli v State of New York , UID No. 2019-028-575 [Ct. Cl., Sise, J., Sept. 18, 2019] ["Though the pleading lacks detail in describing the particular nature of the injuries suffered, the allegation is sufficiently specific and limiting to afford defendant the benefits of the pleading requirement"].) The act, or omission, by defendant that is the basis for the alleged liability, along with the time when and place where the claim arose, the injuries, and the total sum claimed are sufficiently articulated in the claim. (See Wagner v State of New York , 214 AD3d 930, 931 [2d Dept 2023] "[A]bsolute exactness is not required, so long as the particulars of the claim are detailed in a manner sufficient to permit investigation" [internal quotation marks omitted].) Again, at no point in its motion has the State argued that it has been prevented from being able to investigate claimant's allegations. Therefore, the claim meets the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act Sec. 11 (b). The Court retains jurisdiction and defendant's motion is denied.
Accordingly, it is:
ORDERED, that defendant's motion to dismiss (M-99720) is denied. Defendant has forty-five days from the date of filing of this decision and order within which to serve and file its answer to the claim.
The Court read and considered the following documents in rendering a decision on defendant's motion to dismiss:
1. Notice of motion filed on June 8, 2023;
2. Affirmation in support by Dorothy M. Keogh, Assistant Attorney General, affirmed on June 8, 2023, with Exhibits A through C, including the notice of intention to file a claim and the affidavit of Jacqueline Riley, sworn to on June 7, 2023; and
3. Claim filed on May 25, 2023.