Opinion
H051813
09-12-2024
In re S.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. A.R., Defendant and Appellant. SANTA CRUZ COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. 23JU00246)
Greenwood, P. J.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (c), authorizes the juvenile court to take jurisdiction of a child who is suffering, or at substantial risk of suffering, serious emotional damage as evidenced by, amongst other things, untoward aggressive behavior. Mother, A.R. (Mother), appeals from the juvenile court's jurisdiction order declaring her son, S.H., a dependent of the court under said statute. Mother contends there was no evidence that S.H. exhibited untoward aggressive behavior. Respondent Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (Respondent) contends that substantial evidence supports the court's findings. We affirm.
Unless otherwise specified, all undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Events Leading Up to Current Dependency Proceeding
This is the third dependency case involving five-year-old S.H. Born in 2018 with methamphetamines in his system, S.H. was placed in foster care for the first nine months of his life. Mother and S.H.'s father, C.H. (Father), addressed their issues of homelessness and substance abuse and regained custody of S.H. The Department closed the case at the end of 2019.
In 2021, the Department opened another case involving S.H. based on allegations of neglect, Father's continued substance abuse, and Mother's potential relapse. Shortly after that, S.H. was diagnosed with leukemia at age three. S.H. immediately commenced chemotherapy. Mother successfully met S.H.'s medical needs, ensuring S.H. stayed current on his treatment plan. In January 2023, the court granted Mother sole physical custody of S.H. with supervised visitation for Father, and the Department closed the second dependency case.
About six months later, as S.H. was starting kindergarten, the Department received multiple referrals expressing concerns over Mother's conduct and S.H.'s behaviors. Based on the Department's investigation, observers reported Mother yelling obscenities at S.H., saying to him "Do you realize that everyone hates you, you are ruining our lives, and you are a bad kid[,]" and telling him that she would send him to boarding school where older children will "beat the shit" out of him because that's what he deserved. Relatives and professionals who had worked with S.H. noticed a change in his disposition, which they described as "sweet and loving" in the past. S.H. began to display aggression at school by hitting other children, biting, kicking, punching, spitting and destroying things. The school suspended S.H. temporarily for biting another student. S.H.'s former court-appointed special advocate also observed S.H. biting Mother. S.H.'s paternal grandfather indicated an incident when S.H. hit another child at the park, causing that child to cry. S.H. used profanity to describe his peers and teachers and stated that he learned profanity from his mother.
After receiving six referrals since the second dependency case and conducting two investigations (which included interviews with relatives and professionals who had been working with the family), the Department filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (c), for serious emotional damage to S.H. by Mother. The Department did not seek removal of S.H., and he remained in Mother's custody throughout the proceedings. The Department recommended a case plan which included therapy for Mother to address the way she spoke to her son, parenting classes, and continued therapy for S.H. Mother contested the allegations and the juvenile court set the matter for a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
B. The Contested Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing
At the hearing, Mother submitted two exhibits, which the court admitted into evidence. The first was a letter from her substance abuse counselor. The letter noted Mother's accomplishments in her recovery, her ability to navigate stressors, and her attentiveness to S.H.'s medical needs. Mother also submitted a report from a neuropsychological evaluation for S.H. conducted five months before the hearing by the hospital overseeing S.H.'s leukemia treatment.
The hospital had referred S.H. for evaluation based on Mother's concerns about his transition to kindergarten, which included challenges with "attention, impulse control, and behavioral regulation." Mother reported "significant concerns for [S.H.'s] aggressive behaviors (e.g., threatens to hurt others, argues when denied own way)." The evaluation was requested "to document [S.H.'s] current neuropsychological status and to assist in creating appropriate recommendations for educational planning and clinical management." During the evaluation, S.H. was observed as being "behaviorally dysregulated," irritable, and exhibited "impulsive behaviors that were somewhat inappropriate for his age and the setting[.]" At one point, S.H. told the examiner to "shut up now."
Following the evaluation, S.H.'s weaknesses were identified as "[s]ustained attention and emerging executive functioning" and "[b]ehavioral and emotional regulation," and the report indicated that S.H. met the diagnostic criteria for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The report noted that S.H.'s "neuropsychological profile is consistent with his complex history which includes [leukemia], intrauterine exposure to methamphetamines, and experiences with foster care at an early age." The report noted that young leukemia survivors like S.H. are "likely to display some degree of neurocognitive impairment[,]" such as "increased risk for disruptions in typical development, particularly in the areas of attention, emerging executive functions, cognitive efficiency (processing speed), visual-spatial processing, and motor coordination/control." As to S.H.'s exposure to methamphetamines and foster care early in his life, the reported noted that children with such experiences exhibit "increased emotional reactivity, anxiety, depression, withdrawal behavior, and higher incidence of ADHD by age 5[,]" and are "likely to display some degrees of behavioral dysregulation[.]" The report concluded with medical, educational, and behavioral recommendations to implement at school and home for S.H., which included strategies on how Mother should use praise to motivate S.H. and how to stay calm and teach by example for S.H.
As its evidence, the Department submitted a jurisdiction/disposition report, which included its prior investigations, and an updated report filed the day before the hearing. In the updated report, S.H.'s school reported ongoing issues with his aggressive behaviors, such as hitting, biting, slapping, and spitting on other students. S.H. made negative statements about himself, such as he was "undeserving of love" and "worthless." About two months before the hearing, the Department received another referral over concerns that S.H. did not want to go home with Mother and, in response, Mother told him that "he could stay at school and sleep in the wilderness." On another occasion, Mother was observed yelling at S.H. because he acted aggressively in school. Mother refused to engage with the Department, continued to deny the allegations, and would not authorize releases for the Department to speak with S.H.'s therapist regarding his progress. The court admitted the Department's reports into evidence. The Department did not call any witnesses at the hearing.
Mother called no witnesses other than herself. Under oath, Mother acknowledged S.H.'s behavioral outbursts and aggressive behaviors but attributed such changes in S.H. to his leukemia treatments. She testified: "So if you're injecting poison into the spine of a child, you have to be able to expect that there is going to be some kind of ramification from that, from doing that, and one of the things is behavioral outbursts. . . ." Mother testified that, although S.H. had previously displayed aggressive behavior at school and at home, by the time of the hearing, S.H.'s aggressive behavior was exclusively occurring only at school. A plan had to be made for Mother to pick up S.H. from school if he continued to escalate after a warning. Mother faulted the school for S.H.'s outbursts, stating that "it got to a point where they were calling me every day over little things."
Mother testified that her statements to her son were made in jest. Mother stated, "[i]f people don't see an obvious joke, that's on them. That is not on me." Nevertheless, Mother stated that she has addressed the way she speaks to S.H. in her therapy and the events from six months ago "have no reflection on the way that I speak to my child today. . . ." Throughout the hearing, Mother denied responsibility for S.H.'s aggressive behaviors, describing the dependency proceedings as a waste of her and S.H.'s time, insulting, and superfluous. Although Mother admitted to making inappropriate statements to S.H., she felt she was being unfairly judged for isolated incidents during one of her life's worst times.
The juvenile court disagreed with Mother's claims as it found multiple incidents, including recent events, where Mother was observed speaking negatively to S.H. and was emotionally abusive to him. The court rendered its decision, finding S.H. was a person subject to serious emotional damage by Mother under section 300, subdivision (c), and ordered family maintenance services with S.H. remaining in Mother's custody. Mother filed a timely appeal from that ruling.
II. DISCUSSION
Mother contends there was no evidence that S.H. exhibited untoward aggressive behavior to support a finding under section 300, subdivision (c) for serious emotional damage. Conceding S.H. exhibited aggressive behaviors, Mother instead argues that his behaviors were not untowardly aggressive when considering S.H.'s circumstances (leukemia, intrauterine exposure to methamphetamines, being in foster care, and ADHD diagnosis).
"Serious emotional damage" can be shown by several behaviors identified in section 300, subdivision (c), including evidence of "severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others[.]" In this case, the only behavior at issue is S.H.'s untoward aggressive behavior toward others. The record contains no allegation or evidence that S.H. exhibited severe anxiety, depression, or withdrawal. The Department has not argued otherwise.
"We review the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence." (In re Roxanne B. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 916, 920 (Roxanne B.).) Under this standard, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings; we review the record and resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prevailing party; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the juvenile court. (Ibid.) "The juvenile determination will not be disturbed unless it exceeds the bounds of reason." (Ibid.)
Under section 300, subdivision (c), a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if "[t]he child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent. . . ." Under this section, the Department must prove all three elements: (1) the parent's offending conduct, (2) causation, and (3) the child's severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward aggressive behavior. (Roxanne B., supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 921.) While past conduct may be probative, the court examines whether circumstances at the time of the jurisdiction hearing subject the minor to the defined harm or risk of harm. (Ibid; In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1379 (Brison C.).)
We note that Mother does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence supporting the juvenile court's conclusion that her conduct caused S.H. to behave aggressively, but rather argues that S.H.'s behavior was not aggressive within the meaning of the statute. We thus do not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the other two elements necessary to sustain an order under section 300, subdivision (c). (Roxanne B., supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 921.)
Mother argues that this case is "generally analogous" to Brison C., where the appellate court reversed the jurisdiction order based on insufficient evidence of harm. (Brison C., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1380-1382.) In that case, there was no evidence the child-caught in the crossfire of his parents' contentious divorce-exhibited behavioral abnormalities. (Id. at pp. 1376, 1380-1381.) Evidence of the child's fear and deep dislike of his father were insufficient to support a finding of serious emotional damage. (Id. at p. 1380.) The facts in the case before us are quite different.
Here, the record contains ample evidence of S.H.'s aggressive behavior towards others, which Mother does not appear to dispute. Multiple persons reported S.H. hitting, biting, kicking, punching, and spitting on other children. S.H.'s aggressive behaviors occurred at his school, the park, with Mother, and during his neuropsychological examination. His behaviors continued to the time of the jurisdiction hearing. At the hearing, Mother testified that the situation had reached a point where the school called her daily about S.H.'s aggressive conduct.
Acknowledging S.H.'s aggressive behaviors, Mother argues that S.H. did not engage in "untoward aggressive behavior" sufficient to demonstrate evidence of serious emotional abuse as required to sustain a finding under section 300, subdivision (c). Citing the Oxford Learner's Dictionary's definition of "untoward" as "unusual and unexpected, and usually unpleasant[,]" Mother contends that S.H.'s aggressive behaviors were not unusual and unexpected for a child recovering from leukemia and with ADHD. Relying on S.H.'s neuropsychological report, Mother claims the evidence showed that S.H.'s behaviors were expected due to his circumstances and, thus, his behavior did not fall within the definition of "untoward aggressive behavior" under section 300, subdivision (c). This argument implies that the meaning of "untoward aggressive behavior" to be applied under the statute is defined by the child's individual deficits. We are not persuaded.
When interpreting a statute to give effect to its underlying purpose, "our first task is to look to the language of the statute itself. [Citation.] When the language is clear and there is no uncertainty as to the legislative intent, we look no further and simply enforce the statute according to its terms." (DuBois v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 387-388 (DuBois).) "A court 'may not rewrite a statute, either by inserting or omitting language, to make it conform to a presumed intent that is not expressed.' [Citation.]" (Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 158, 171.) Section 300, subdivision (c), is designed to protect the child by authorizing the court to take jurisdiction over a child if a parent has caused serious emotional damage evidenced by, among other features, "untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others…." (§ 300, subd. (c).) The statute does not include any language that directs the court's assessment of "untoward" to the normative conduct of a child with the multitude of challenges that can bring them into dependency proceedings, as Mother's argument suggests. Nor are we authorized to insert this meaning into the statute.
We look instead to the plain meaning of the statutory language. Dictionaries define the word "untoward" as "difficult to manage, restrain, or control; intractable, unruly, perverse" (Oxford English Dict. (Compact, Vol. II 1971) p. 378, [when used in relation to persons and their disposition]); "difficult to guide, manage, or influence," "marked by or causing trouble or unhappiness," "not in accordance with propriety," (Webster's 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 2513); improper, unseemly, unfavorable or adverse (American Heritage Dict. (5th ed. 2011) p. 1901). Applying these definitions, the record contains substantial evidence of S.H.'s aggressive behaviors demonstrating that he was difficult to manage, unruly, and acted improperly. As Mother stated at the hearing, she received daily calls from the school concerning S.H.'s conduct. Several people, including Mother, reported difficulties controlling or managing S.H.'s aggressive behaviors. Many observers described S.H.'s behaviors-hitting, biting, spitting, use of profanity-as unruly and out of the norm for a kindergartener. The juvenile court did not err by concluding that this conduct was "untoward aggressive behavior" within the plain meaning of section 300, subdivision (c).
We do not minimize Mother's efforts in her path toward recovery, as she has made significant strides in those areas. We also note Mother's prompt action to address S.H.'s medical needs when he was diagnosed with leukemia. However, with respect to S.H.'s emotional well-being, the record before us contains ample documentation of his untoward aggressive behavior toward others and, thus, there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's findings and orders under section 300, subdivision (c).
III. Disposition
The jurisdiction and dispositional orders entered on February 16, 2024, are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: GROVER, J., DANNER, J.