Opinion
H047563
10-30-2020
In re I.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPT. OF FAMILY & CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. I.W., Objector and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JD024192)
On November 3, 2016, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children's Services (Department) filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (c), and (g) relative to a boy, I.W., then 16 years old (I.W.). C.B. is I.W.'s mother (mother), and I.W. (father) is the presumed father. I.W. had been placed into protective custody because he had no available safe parental caretaker. Mother had previously requested and consented to the protective custody arrangement because she had indicated she was "unable to meet [I.W.'s] mental health and behavioral needs, or to make arrangements for [his] care." The petition was later amended to eliminate allegations under subdivisions (b)(1) and (g) of section 300. The petition, as amended, was sustained by the juvenile court in December 2016, and the court declared I.W. and his twin brother, I.W. (hereafter referred to as twin I.W.), as dependent children, and they were placed in out-of-home foster care. After I.W. turned 18, and in March 2018, the juvenile court, over I.W.'s objection, terminated jurisdiction pursuant to section 391.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
The nonminor dependent, his twin brother, and the father all have the initials I.W.
In February 2019, the court granted a request by I.W. to resume jurisdiction and reinstate dependency, with I.W. as a nonminor dependent. Thereafter, on November 7, 2019, based upon the Department's position that I.W. did not meet the criteria for extended foster care, the court terminated jurisdiction, concluding that I.W. did not meet the criteria to remain under the court's jurisdiction, and that the Department had made reasonable efforts to comply with I.W.'s transitional living case plan.
I.W. has appealed the order terminating jurisdiction. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion, and we will therefore affirm the order.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Detention & Jurisdiction (November-December 2016)
On November 3, 2016, the Department filed a petition relative to I.W., who was then 16 years old, which petition was later amended. As amended, the petition was brought under section 300, subdivision (c). It was alleged in the petition that on November 1, 2016, the superior court had issued an order (1) dismissing I.W.'s juvenile justice status, (2) that I.W. be served under the dependency system, and (3) that I.W. be placed into protective custody because he had no available safe parental caretaker.
There was also a petition filed by the Department on October 17, 2016, concerning twin I.W. after he was placed into protective custody on October 12, based upon mother's request and with her consent because of her being unable to meet his mental health and behavioral needs. That proceeding is not part of this appeal.
"The child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian or who has no parent or guardian capable of providing appropriate care. A child shall not be found to be a person described by this subdivision if the willful failure of the parent or guardian to provide adequate mental health treatment is based on a sincerely held religious belief and if a less intrusive judicial intervention is available." (§ 300, subd. (c).)
By way of background, I.W. had been detained on September 21, 2015, after having committed an assault and battery upon mother. It was indicated in the police report for the incident that I.W. had "placed his mother in a 'headlock' and punched her in the ribs with a closed fist." On November 30, 2015, the court sustained a petition and declared the minor a ward of the court pursuant to section 602. In September 2016 (one year after the assault), I.W. was again detained after making threats against his mother. I.W.'s probation officer established increased services to attempt to stabilize the family.
On October 3, 2016, mother changed the locks on her residence and refused to permit I.W. or twin I.W. to return to the home; she did so because she felt she was "unable to manage [their] verbal and physical aggressive behaviors." Mother made no other arrangements for the care of her twin boys. I.W. was required to make his own arrangements to stay with family friends.
The Department alleged further in the petition that mother had physically abused I.W. when he was younger, "including hitting him with her hand, a belt, and other objects, causing him pain and causing marks on his body." Mother had also permitted I.W.'s physical abuse at the hands of her then-boyfriend when I.W. was between seven and 14 years of age; the then-boyfriend had "grab[bed I.W.] by the neck and shove[d] him down, . . . drag[ged I.W.] by the ankle, and beat [I.W.] repeatedly with a belt, a stick, and other objects, sometimes until [I.W.] wet himself."
I.W. had also been exposed to domestic violence. While mother was pregnant with the twins and thereafter, father had assaulted mother. I.W. was repeatedly exposed to domestic violence from the time he was seven years old until he was 14, as a result of mother's then-boyfriend repeatedly calling her derogatory names, pushing her, slapping her, and strangling her, some instances having occurred in I.W.'s presence.
It was disclosed in an attachment to the petition that there had been 21 prior child welfare referrals involving the family. Additionally, there was a family maintenance case from October 2006 to March 2007 that mother had successfully completed.
The Department alleged that father's whereabouts were unknown, and he had failed to take steps to ensure I.W.'s safety and well-being. Father had failed to provide I.W. with support or to make arrangements for his care.
The Department alleged that the prior physical punishment of the minor and his exposure to domestic violence had resulted in I.W. "suffering trauma and emotional damage." As a result of these circumstances, the Department alleged that I.W. had suffered, or there was a substantial risk he would suffer, serious emotional damage as a result of the parents' conduct (§ 300, subd. (c)).
On November 4, 2016, the juvenile court ordered I.W. detained, with temporary placement vested with the Department.
On December 19, 2016, after a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations of the petition, as amended, true, and it found that I.W. was a person described under section 300, subdivision (c). It found by clear and convincing evidence that I.W.'s welfare required that he be removed from the custody of mother. It ordered that the Department retain custody, care and control over I.W., and that I.W. receive a psychological evaluation. The court also ordered that reunification services be provided to mother, father, and I.W.
B. Termination of Jurisdiction (March 2018)
The Department prepared a report dated January 25, 2018, in connection with an 18-month review hearing, and a supplemental termination of jurisdiction report dated January 24, 2018. It reported that I.W. and twin I.W. were living with father at a hotel in Campbell under an emergency hotel arrangement that would terminate in February 2018, when I.W. and twin I.W. turned 18.
I.W. was enrolled in the 12th grade at Morgan Hill Adult School as of November 15, 2017, needing approximately 35 units to graduate with a high school diploma. The school principal reported that I.W. either arrived late or did not show up for school. The principal had explained to I.W. what he needed to do to graduate, but he was still irregular in his attendance. Before enrolling at Morgan Hill Adult School on November 15, 2017, I.W. had been enrolled at Ann Sobrato High School. He had been suspended from that school for two days on August 31, 2017, for being verbally aggressive, destroying property, and making threats to the staff and school principal; I.W. thereafter stopped attending Ann Sobrato High School.
It was reported that I.W. had admitted to daily marijuana use but he had refused substance abuse services. He had also said he did not need individual therapy, anger management or to be seen by a psychiatrist. I.W. had a dedicated Matrix Team working with him since January 2017, but he had not completed the goals in his treatment plan. Due to I.W.'s ongoing aggressive behavior, the Matrix Team determined it would only have male facilitators and family specialists working with him. Despite the Matrix Team's efforts, I.W. had not engaged in any services it had offered to him over a period of 12 months.
Additionally, in November 2017—three months before he would turn 18—I.W. had refused to attend a meeting designed to assist his transition to adulthood and to address his eligibility for extended foster care. He had told the social worker he did not want to attend and that "he feels he is able to do everything on his own." I.W. had told the Department that he "want[ed] to be out of the system and just be left alone."
I.W. had been through multiple group home placements that had been terminated with 7-Day Notices due to behavioral issues, including placements that were terminated in October and November 2017. I.W. and twin I.W. had been moved to the present emergency hotel arrangement with father from their placement with Receiving Assessment and Intake Center (RAIC) due to their "displaying verbal aggression, making physical threats, and using their cell phones inappropriately. Their behaviors put other children in the RAIC at risk."
The Department concluded that I.W. did not meet the requirements for extended foster care. It stated that I.W. had not met schooling conditions because he was not meeting the requirements at Morgan Hill Adult School and had previously not attended school for approximately two months. I.W. was not then employed, had not provided verification of his prior employment with Jack in the Box, and had not provided verification of job search efforts. The Department also noted that I.W. had chosen not to avail himself of therapeutic services that had been offered by Matrix Services.
In its termination of jurisdiction report dated January 24, 2018, the Department stated that I.W. had "not provided proof of working 80 hours per month or removing barriers to employment." Additionally, he had not attended class regularly at Morgan Hill Adult School. The Department stated that I.W. had been "encouraged repeatedly" by the social worker and the Matrix Team, but he had not engaged in the services offered to him. And he had been unable to show that he could maintain a placement, having "had seven placement disruptions since he was placed in protective custody on 11/01/16. All of his group home placements . . . [had] ended with 7[-]Day notices due to his extreme behaviors (verbal threats, verbal aggressive behavior, property damage, and not following the group home rules)."
The Department concluded that I.W. did not meet the criteria for extended foster care, having failed to show proof of working 80 hours per month or proof of failing to remove barriers to employment. It therefore recommended that I.W.'s nonminor dependency case be dismissed. The Department concluded: "Unfortunately, [I.W.] chose to do what he wanted over the last 18 months, and he has not made any progress to address his needs and demonstrate he is working to become an independent adult."
After a hearing on February 8, 2018, the court terminated reunification services and scheduled a further hearing on the issue of termination of jurisdiction. On March 8, 2018, the juvenile court, finding that I.W. had not met any of the statutory criteria for remaining in foster care as a nonminor dependent under juvenile court jurisdiction, adopted the Department's recommendations and terminated jurisdiction.
C. I.W.'s First Reentry Request (October 2018)
On August 13, 2018, I.W. filed a request (reentry request) that the juvenile court resume jurisdiction over his case as a nonminor dependent. In the request, I.W. indicated that he planned to work at least 80 hours a month.
In its September 2018 report concerning the reentry request, the Department advised the court that I.W. was at the time homeless; he had previously been living at Bill Wilson THP, but he had been terminated from the program on August 15, 2018, due to his having verbally threatened a number of members of the staff on multiple occasions. The Department advised I.W. that he had limited housing options and if he were not accepted into a THP Plus Foster Care program, his only option would be a Supervised Independent Living Placement (SILP); I.W. stated he had no family or friends with whom he could reside in a SILP.
I.W. advised the Department that he was employed by Labor Max, a staffing company, and he had been working full time at a sheet metal company, but he had been terminated on August 16, 2018, because he had failed to show up for work after having had a verbal altercation with a coworker who had been providing him transportation. He later provided paystubs showing a total of 54 hours worked. On August 30, I.W. informed the Department that he had obtained another fulltime job through Labor Max at a warehouse, starting September 3, and the job was projected to last six months.
I.W. also told the Department that he had not received a high school diploma, did not know how many units he still needed, and he wanted to return to Morgan Hill Adult School. On August 28, 2018, the Department assisted I.W. in obtaining an application to return to school through Opportunity Youth Academy (OYA). I.W. turned in his OYA application, and he was placed on a waiting list.
The Department also reported that I.W. had been arrested on August 22, 2018, for making criminal threats against his mother. He was released from jail after a hearing on August 24. At that hearing, the criminal court ordered I.W. to complete a 16-week domestic violence class and to report weekly to a pretrial services officer.
The record reflects that, as of September 2019, there was an active restraining order pending against I.W. to protect mother.
The Department recommended that the hearing on I.W.'s request be continued 30 days to give I.W. the opportunity to provide verification of employment and/or school enrollment.
In an October 10, 2018 addendum report, the Department advised that I.W. had failed to attend scheduled meetings with the Department to determine his progress toward compliance with extended foster care requirements, and he had berated the assigned social worker. It reported that I.W. was homeless and he had declined the Department's referrals to shelters and other homeless resources. I.W. had not been working since mid-August; he had not gotten the job he had told the Department about previously that had a start date of September 3.
The Department also noted in its addendum report that in August 2018, I.W. had caused a disturbance at the HUB, shoving a table against a wall and making threats to "shoot everyone at the HUB." Prior to a court hearing on September 6, I.W. had berated the case worker, calling her "a 'stupid white bitch' numerous times," and he had threatened to " 'shoot up the courtroom' " " '[i]f that bitch judge cut [him] off.' " As a result, the Department scheduled a security meeting and concluded that all future meetings with I.W. and the case worker would take place at the Department's offices with another person present. On September 20, ten days after the staffing meeting, at least five persons from the Department met with I.W., who was presented with a formal letter addressing the potential legal consequences of his behavior, including his threats to the case worker. I.W. had sworn loudly throughout the meeting, at one point he had left the meeting, and he had been unwilling to discuss safety concerns or to acknowledge responsibility for his behavior. Since the meeting, I.W. had continued to curse and berate the case worker in text messages.
The Department concluded that I.W. had failed to provide verification that he had met extended foster care criteria. It therefore recommended that the request be withdrawn and the proceeding remain dismissed.
On October 11, 2018, the juvenile court denied I.W.'s reentry request.
D. I.W.'s Second Reentry Request (February 2019)
On January 29, 2019, I.W. filed a second reentry request seeking an order that the juvenile court resume jurisdiction. He stated that he planned to resume school and planned to work at least 80 hours per month.
The Department in its reentry report dated February 6, 2019, advised the court that I.W. was homeless. Since August 2018, he had been sleeping in a car outside the home of the parents of a friend. But I.W. had been approved for room rental with a move-in date dependent upon receipt of funding; he had not yet, however, found a room. Because I.W. had been "previously denied from all [housing] programs due to his threatening behaviors," he was interested in locating a SILP, and the social worker indicated she would assist him in those efforts.
I.W., as of January 21, 2019, had a fulltime job through an agency, and he was working for Suddath Relocation Services (Suddath); his first paystub reflected he had worked 33.5 hours. I.W. also told the Department that he had not completed high school, he was uncertain of the number of remaining credits required, and he wanted to reenroll in Morgan Hill Adult School.
The Department advised the court: "It is evident that [I.W.] faces significant barriers with his anger and mental health. However, [I.W.] has been willing and open to feedback from this Social Worker. In spite of the various barriers [I.W.] faces, he has put forth significant effort in the last two months to get back on track by working, searching for housing, and maintaining regular communication with this social worker to meet Extended Foster Care criteria." The Department recommended that I.W.'s second reentry request be granted.
On February 7, 2019, the court granted I.W.'s second reentry request, finding that I.W. intended to satisfy the condition of foster care that he be employed a minimum of 80 hours per month.
E. Order Dismissing Nonminor Dependency (November 2019)
1. Department's May 2019 Report
In its May 31, 2019 status report, the Department disclosed that, as of March, 2019, I.W. was renting a room that was a SILP. He had not attended school, and he was not working at the time of the report. He worked at Suddath from January 31 to March 1, 2019; he was terminated because of three absences. He provided the Department with records showing that he had spent 88 hours in March 2019 looking for employment. In April 2019, I.W. worked 24 hours at the Convention Center, and he provided proof of having spent 72 hours looking for work. An employment agency informed I.W. in April that it would be unable to move forward with his employment application because "he had a pending felony on his record." In May, I.W. told the Department he did not want to apply for positions because of the pending felony proceedings. The Department advised him that there were a number of available employment opportunities despite his felony record. I.W. stated that he would wait to see what occurred at his criminal hearing on June 5, 2019, which proceeding related to his arrest in August 2018 for making criminal threats against his mother. Additionally, there was an incident in January 2019 involving I.W.'s having been verbally aggressive with his youth engagement specialist that had resulted in his having been banned from the HUB for a period of six months.
Although the criminal court had ordered I.W. in August 2018 to participate in a 16-week domestic violence class and to report weekly to an SORP officer, as of May 2019 (nine months later), I.W. had completed only two of the 16 weeks of classes; he had reported to his SORP officer on a weekly basis.
I.W. had a transitional independent living plan (TILP), dated January 10, 2019, that called for him to (1) obtain stable housing, (2) obtain stable work, (3) graduate from high school and go to college, and (4) obtain a car and getting a driver's license.
The social worker stated that she and I.W. had developed "a strong rapport" over six months, and that, although I.W. was distrustful of authority, he had made significant efforts to maintain a relationship with the social worker. The social worker reported that I.W. had "been able to be reflective, open to feedback, and communicative with [her]. [I.W.] is a very capable and independent young man that is yearning for stability and familial support. This Social Worker is hopeful that as [I.W.] continues to work towards stability, he will continue to make progress with his personal and working relationships." The Department recommended that the status hearing be continued for 30 days to permit I.W. to demonstrate how he intended to comply with extended foster care requirements.
2. Department's July 2019 Report
The Department stated in a July 8, 2019 addendum report that I.W. had been living with his mother for approximately one month. The Department was in the process of assigning a new case worker because I.W.'s prior case worker was on leave. Because the case worker was on leave and the Department was unable to reach I.W., it had no information as to I.W.'s current employment status.
3. Department's August 2019 Report
The Department stated in an August 21, 2019 addendum report that I.W. had failed to provide it with written verification of his activities supporting his eligibility for extended foster care. I.W. had unapproved temporary housing in Vallejo. He was not enrolled in school, and he had not obtained a high school diploma or a GED. He stated that he needed 14 credits to graduate, and that he wanted to enroll in the OYA independent studies program. He had picked up an enrollment packet from OYA in August 2019. The Department was assisting him in the enrollment process. I.W. advised the Department that he had completed three job assignments in July and August that had been arranged through a staffing agency. He told the Department he had worked four hours in July, and he had two assignments in August that would give him a total of 66 hours for that month. I.W., however, had not provided any written verification of the employment. The Department recommended that the court set a hearing on termination of jurisdiction.
4. Interim Hearings
On August 22, the juvenile court set a hearing for September 26, 2019, to consider termination of jurisdiction. Based upon I.W.'s requests to the court, the hearing was twice continued by the court—from September 26 to October 3, and from October 3 to November 7, 2019.
At the September 26 hearing, I.W.'s counsel indicated that I.W. had worked 23.75 hours in September for which there was written verification, and I.W. was scheduled to complete sufficient work in the remaining days of the month to reach the 80-hour threshold. At the hearing on October 3, the Department confirmed that, although it was awaiting paystub verification, it appeared that I.W. had satisfied the 80-hour requirement for work for the month of September, but that his "job opportunity [had] ended." The Department acknowledged that I.W. had two potential jobs available, but that he would first need to interview for them. In response to inquiries of the court, the Department advised that I.W. had not been in compliance with the 80-hour work requirement for the months of June, July, and August, and that he was not "close" during those months. The minor explained to the court that the fact that a criminal history appeared on his record had made it difficult to secure work. The juvenile court continued the hearing for approximately one month on what it characterized as a "month-to-month lease" to determine whether I.W. could "get the hours for October." The court emphasized that I.W. had not been consistent prior to September, and that it intended to close the case if I.W. did not meet the 80-hour work criteria for October.
5. Department's Termination of Jurisdiction Report
In a report concerning termination of jurisdiction dated September 13, 2019 (filed November 7, 2019), the Department reiterated its recommendation that I.W.'s status as a nonminor dependent be terminated. The Department described an August 2019 telephone conversation between I.W. and the case worker in which the latter had discussed I.W.'s housing options. During the conversation, I.W. was upset that his previous housing arrangement had been terminated by the social worker. I.W. used inappropriate language and told the social worker, " 'I swear, if I do not get my SILP stipend, I am going to kill all of you[.]' '[I]f I am going back to the streets, you can all die' and 'I will dig your own grave.' " The report concerning termination of jurisdiction did not include a discussion of whether continuation of the dependency was in I.W.'s best interests. (See § 391, subd. (d)(2), (3).)
6. Department's November 2019 Report
In its November 5, 2019 addendum report, the Department advised that I.W. continued to work part-time through a staffing agency. I.W. told the Department in early October that he had been advised by a potential employer with whom he had interviewed that although they had wanted to offer him a position, they could not do so because of I.W.'s pending criminal charges. In this regard, the Department observed that "[I.W.] was . . . not consistently participating in the 16-Week Accountability course required to remove the pending criminal charges from his record." The Department indicated later in the report that I.W. had attended domestic violence classes between September 10 and October 9; as of the later date, he required only two more hours of class. I.W. had been scheduled to complete the last class on October 16, but he had elected instead to go on a one-week trip to Sacramento. On October 23, I.W. completed his 16-week domestic violence course requirement.
I.W. advised the Department later in October that although he had been in contact with the placement agency, it had not offered any jobs to him until late October, when it indicated it had a three-day job available; I.W. did not take the assignment because of a conflict with a hearing in his criminal proceeding. I.W. provided the social worker with written proof of a job commencing October 31 with no end date set. He later advised the Department that he had worked more than eight hours per day on October 31, November 1, and November 4, and that he would receive his first paystub on November 14.
I.W. submitted an application to OYA in mid-September, and he was placed on a waiting list; he was enrolled in the OYA independent studies program on October 14. Although OYA had not received all of I.W.'s transcripts, it appeared that he needed more than 60 credits to obtain a high school diploma. OYA advised the Department that I.W. was required to complete at least 20 hours per week of online coursework to remain eligible for the independent studies program; records indicated that I.W. had completed 18 hours over a three-week period.
It was also disclosed in the November 5 report that I.W. had been living at an approved SILP home in Vallejo since August 2019. He had not completed the arrangements for a visit by the social worker to renew approval for the housing during the month of October, despite multiple efforts by the social worker to arrange for such a meeting. I.W. reported on November 4 that he had been staying in San Jose because his job was located there.
Based upon its conclusion that I.W. had not regularly maintained his eligibility for extended foster care, the Department recommended that I.W.'s status as a nonminor dependent be terminated.
7. November 7 , 2019 Hearing
The juvenile court conducted a hearing on November 7, 2019. The Department argued that I.W. had not met the minimum requirements for extended foster care, and therefore jurisdiction should be terminated. It asserted that the Department had made efforts to assist I.W. in supplementing his hours worked, including the social worker's attempts in August 2019 to connect I.W. to the RESET program, which assists youths with criminal backgrounds to obtain employment; I.W. had declined, indicating that he was only interested in paid employment opportunities.
The Department also emphasized I.W.'s limited participation in the OYA program since it had assisted I.W. in obtaining enrollment effective October 14. It noted that OYA had a 20-hour weekly requirement for its online program. I.W. had not completed any coursework until 10 days after enrollment, and he had completed only 18 hours of total work in the 24 days since his October 14 enrollment. Further, the Department explained that its efforts to assist I.W. had been impacted by the fact that "his tolerance for stress is extremely low and it takes multiple phone calls and texts throughout the day to address even one thing. And . . . [the social worker] has had to end phone calls multiple times due to [I.W.'s] inappropriate language towards her."
I.W., through counsel, requested a continuance. Counsel argued that I.W. had, in fact, met the work hours' requirement for September. Counsel acknowledged that I.W. had worked only one day (the 31st) for the following month. Counsel argued that the pendency of the criminal proceedings had been a significant obstacle for I.W. in obtaining work, and that now that the matter had been dismissed, he anticipated that I.W. would have more work assignments and hours worked. Counsel stated that I.W. was then working fulltime with overtime opportunities, and there were prospects that the job would last into December. He stated that I.W. believed he would meet the 80-hour work requirement for November.
I.W. did not attend the hearing because he was working.
I.W.'s counsel also responded to the Department's contention that I.W. had refused its efforts to enroll I.W. in the RESET program. Counsel asserted that I.W. could not afford to participate in the RESET program because it meant he would go unpaid for three months.
As for academic participation through OYA, I.W.'s counsel contended that I.W. had not done his coursework for the first week because he had anticipated receiving a job assignment. I.W. had completed his coursework for the second week, and he was employed fulltime during the third week.
I.W.'s counsel also advised the court that I.W. had done what was required, including completion of domestic violence courses, to obtain in October the dismissal of the criminal case against him; these efforts also resulted in the dissolution of the protective order involving mother that had issued previously. Concerning stable housing, I.W.'s counsel argued that, now that the protective order had been dissolved, I.W. could use mother's residence as a SILP, an arrangement to which mother had agreed.
After hearing argument, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, concluding that I.W. had not met the requirements of extended foster care. The court left open future consideration of a reentry request if I.W. were able to demonstrate current compliance with extended foster care requirements.
As disclosed in a motion to dismiss appeal filed by the Department, which motion was denied, I.W. filed a third reentry petition in November 2019, and on February 28, 2020, the juvenile court granted that petition. We take judicial notice of I.W.'s third reentry petition and the order granting the petition.
I.W. filed a timely notice of appeal from the order terminating jurisdiction.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Extended Foster Care
We apply to the circumstances of the nonminor dependent in this case, I.W., the California Fostering Connections to Success Act (the Act). (Assem. Bill No. 12 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.); Assem. Bill No. 212 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.)). By way of background, "[i]n 2008, the federal government enacted the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act (the Federal Act), which allowed youths in foster care to continue receiving assistance payments after they turned 18. [Citation.] The Federal Act requires that states implementing its programs provide assistance and support in developing a personalized transition plan for all youths before they age out of foster care. [Citation.] [¶] Effective January 1, 2012, California enacted the Act, which extended the California foster care program to age 21 in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Act. [Citation.]" (In re K.L. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 632, 637.)
Under the Act, a nonminor dependent is "a foster child . . . who is a current dependent child or ward of the juvenile court . . . who satisfies all of the following criteria: [¶] (1) [He or she] has attained 18 years of age while under an order of foster care placement by the juvenile court . . . . [¶] (2) He or she is in foster care under the placement and care responsibility of the county welfare department. . . . [¶] (3) [He or she is participating] in a transitional independent living case plan . . . as described in Section 11403." (§ 11400, subd. (v).) A transitional independent living case plan (TILP) is "the nonminor dependent's case plan, updated every six months, that describes the goals and objectives of how the nonminor will make progress in the transition to living independently and assume incremental responsibility for adult decisionmaking, the collaborative efforts between the nonminor and the social worker . . . and the supportive services as described in the [TILP] to ensure active and meaningful participation in one or more of the eligibility criteria described in . . . subdivision (b) of Section 11403, the nonminor's appropriate supervised placement setting, and the nonminor's permanent plan for transition to living independently, which includes maintaining or obtaining permanent connections to caring and committed adults, as set forth in paragraph (16) of subdivision (f) of Section 16501.1." (§ 11400, subd. (y).)
A nonminor dependent must satisfy at least one of five statutory conditions to be eligible for financial support consistent with his or her TILP between the age of 18 to 21 under the Act. These conditions are: "(1) The nonminor is completing secondary education or a program leading to an equivalent credential. [¶] (2) The nonminor is enrolled in an institution which provides postsecondary or vocational education. [¶] (3) The nonminor is participating in a program or activity designed to promote, or remove barriers to employment. [¶] (4) The nonminor is employed for at least 80 hours per month. [¶] (5) The nonminor is incapable of doing any of the activities described in subparagraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, due to a medical condition . . . ." (§ 11403, subd. (b) (hereafter, § 11403(b).) The child welfare agency is required to work with the nonminor dependent to ensure his or her ongoing eligibility for assistance under the Act. (§ 11403, subd. (a).) "All case planning shall be a collaborative effort between the nonminor dependent and the social worker . . . , with the nonminor dependent assuming increasing levels of responsibility and independence." (Ibid.) It has been held that there is an emphasis under the Act for "flexibility and support for the nonminor's achievement of his or her goals," such that "[a]s long as the [nonminor dependent is] . . . still working toward [his or her] goals, . . . a setback does not automatically disqualify [him or her] from the program." (In re R.G. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1098-1099.)
Under section 391, the juvenile court must continue dependency jurisdiction over a nonminor dependent unless (1) he or she does not wish to remain under such jurisdiction, or (2) the nonminor dependent is "not participating in a reasonable and appropriate transitional independent living case plan." (§ 391, subd. (e)(1)(A), (e)(1)(B).) The failure to satisfy at least one of the five conditions of eligibility provided in section 11403(b) is a failure to participate in the nonminor dependent's TILP. (In re Aaron S. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 507, 516 (Aaron S.).)
The juvenile court must conduct a review hearing at least every six months at which "[t]he social worker . . . shall verify and obtain assurances that the nonminor dependent continues to satisfy at least one of the [five section 11403(b)] conditions." (§ 11403, subd. (c).) Further, the court may not terminate jurisdiction over a nonminor dependent unless and until it conducts a hearing meeting certain statutory procedural requirements. (§ 391, subds. (d), (h); see In re Shannon M. (2012) 221 Cal.App.4th 282, 297-298.)
The agency is required to prepare a report in connection with the termination hearing that includes a description of whether continuation of the dependency is in the nonminor dependent's best interests, and, if the agency recommends termination, submission of documentation establishing it has taken reasonable steps to assist the nonminor in meeting or maintaining section 11403(b)'s eligibility conditions. (§ 391, subd. (d)(2), (3).) Further, rule 5.555(c) of the California Rules of Court includes specific requirements for the agency's report for a termination hearing. The juvenile court at the termination hearing "shall continue dependency jurisdiction over a nonminor who meets the definition of a nonminor dependent as described in subdivision (v) of Section 11400 unless the court finds either of the following: [¶] (A) That the nonminor does not wish to remain subject to dependency jurisdiction. [¶] (B) That the nonminor is not participating in a reasonable and appropriate transitional independent living case plan." (§ 391, subd. (e).) And under rule 5.555(d), the juvenile court is required to make various findings and orders after a termination hearing, including a finding as to "[w]hether remaining under juvenile court jurisdiction is in the nonminor's best interests and the facts in support of the finding made" (rule 5.555(d)(1)(B)), and "[w]hether the nonminor meets one or more of the eligibility criteria in section 11403(b) to remain in foster care as a nonminor dependent under juvenile court jurisdiction and, if so, the specific criteria in section 11403(b) met by the nonminor" (rule 5.555(d)(1)(C)).
Further unspecified rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
"Even if the court terminates dependency jurisdiction, it retains 'general jurisdiction over the nonminor to allow for the filing of a petition to resume dependency jurisdiction under subdivision (e) of Section 388 until the nonminor attains 21 years of age.' [Citation.]" (Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 516-517; see § 391, subd. (g).) The nonminor dependent may bring such a reentry petition under section 388, subdivision (e), where the nonminor dependent makes a showing, inter alia, that "[h]e or she intends to satisfy at least one of the conditions set forth in paragraphs (1) to (5), inclusive, of subdivision (b) of Section 11403." (§ 388, subd. (e)(2)(A)(ii).)
B. Standard of Review
The juvenile court's decision to retain or terminate jurisdiction is " 'within the sound discretion of the juvenile court.' [Citation.]" (In re Nadia G. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The court's decision terminating jurisdiction as to a nonminor dependent is thus reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re H.C. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1266.) An appellate court will not find an abuse of discretion with respect to a juvenile court's order terminating " 'unless the court " ' "exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination [citations]." ' " ' [Citation.]" (In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 902.) In determining whether the juvenile court has abused its discretion regarding its decision to terminate jurisdiction, the appellate court considers the evidence in the record to assess whether it supports the juvenile court's findings, such as the finding that the nonminor dependent has not reasonably participated in his or her case plan. (In re Nadia G., supra, at pp. 1119-1121.)
C. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Terminating Jurisdiction
I.W. presents six discrete arguments in support of his contention that the juvenile court erred in terminating jurisdiction. They are (1) the court erred in concluding that I.W. had not met the criterion of working 80 hours per month (§ 11403(b)(4)); (2) the court erred in concluding that I.W. had not met the criterion of working toward completion of secondary education (§ 11403(b)(1)); (3) the court erred in concluding that I.W. had not met the criterion of having removed a barrier to employment (§ 11403(b)(3)); (4) the court erred in failing to consider all activities of I.W. under section 11403(b), which, if considered would have led to the conclusion that he was eligible for extended foster care; (5) the court misapplied the law by requiring that I.W. have devoted at least 80 hours per month of effort for a combination of activities under the criteria of section 11403(b); and (6) the court made no findings as to whether termination of jurisdiction was in I.W.'s best interests and such termination was not in fact in his best interests. We address each of these arguments below.
1. Work Criterion (§ 11403(b)(4))
I.W. asserts that the juvenile court erred in finding that he had not qualified for extended foster care by being "employed for at least 80 hours per month." (§ 11403(b)(4).) He contends that the evidence showed that he had satisfied the 80-hour threshold for September 2019, and that, given that he had started a fulltime job on October 31 that had no end date, he would have satisfied the 80-hour requirement for the month of November. I.W.'s contention is without merit.
The record showed that in the six months preceding the original date of the termination hearing (September 26, 2019), I.W. had reached the 40-hour per month work threshold in only one month, September. Based upon the record before us, his hours for the months preceding September were as follows: March (0 hours); April (24 hours); May (0 hours); June (0 hours); July (4 hours [not verified]); August (66 hours [not verified]). As reflected in the record, and as noted by the social worker at the October 3 hearing, I.W. was not "close" to compliance in the months preceding September. Further, as noted by the Department, for a portion of that time—May and June 2019—I.W. chose not to apply for any jobs at all because of his pending criminal proceedings.
The record shows that I.W. was fired from his job at Suddath on March 1. There is no record that he worked on March 1; if he did, his total time for March would have been presumably no more than eight hours.
I.W.'s counsel did not rebut this statement at the hearing.
It was within the discretion of the juvenile court to consider I.W.'s overall compliance during the reporting period with the 80-hour monthly work criterion of section 11403(b)(4). The fact that the court did so at the November 7 termination hearing should not have been surprising to I.W.—especially in light of the court's comments at the October 3 hearing that, in granting I.W.'s request for a one-month continuance of the hearing, it was treating the ongoing proceedings as a "month-to-month lease" in determining whether I.W. could "get the hours for October." I.W. is to be commended for meeting the hours requirement for September and for securing employment on October 31 that would potentially lead to 80 hours of work for November. But, based upon I.W.'s noncompliance with the 80-hour-per-month work criteria for April, May, June, July, August, and October, the court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting I.W.'s claim that he was in compliance with section 11403(b)(4).
2. Secondary Education Criterion (§ 11403(b)(1))
I.W. also claims error because the juvenile court did not recognize his compliance with the education criterion under which he was "completing secondary education or a program leading to an equivalent credential." (§ 11403(b)(1).) He argues that at the time of the November 7 hearing, he was enrolled in and was attending an online studies program through OYA, had completed 18 hours of coursework, and was thus working toward the completion of his secondary education or its equivalent credential.
It was clear from the record that, for various reasons provided by I.W., he showed a limited commitment to completing his secondary education, including completion through the online OYA program in which he was enrolled in October 2019. Beginning in August 2018, I.W. had indicated he wanted to return to school, and the Department had assisted him through contacts with OYA. As of January 2019, he had still not enrolled in school, again telling the Department that he desired to do so. He had not enrolled as of August 2019; at that time, he indicated to the Department that he was interested in enrolling in the OYA program and he had picked up an enrollment packet. I.W. did not submit his application until mid-September, and his enrollment was not effective until October 14. He was required by OYA to complete 20 hours of coursework per week. In more than three weeks before the November 7 hearing, however, I.W. had completed only 18 hours, i.e., less than one-third of the amount of coursework required to maintain eligibility for the OYA independent studies program.
Based upon the record before us, the juvenile court did not err in its implicit conclusion that I.W.'s efforts did not constitute "complet[ion of] secondary education or a program leading to an equivalent credential" in compliance with the criterion specified in section 11403(b)(1). The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by terminating jurisdiction based in part upon the implied finding that there was an absence of compliance with this statutory condition.
3. Removal of Work Barrier Criterion (§ 11403(b)(3))
I.W. also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that he had not met the qualifications for extended foster care under the criterion that he was "participating in a program or activity designed to promote, or remove barriers to employment." (§ 11403(b)(3).) He asserts that his actions "in completing diversion and having the felony dismissed in October constituted removal of his most significant barrier to employment."
The argument of I.W. in support of this contention consists of one short, four-sentence paragraph. It provides no specifics, citations to the record, or legal authority regarding the contentions that the felony constituted a significant barrier to his becoming employed or that his conduct represented compliance with the section 11403(b)(3) criterion. An appellate court has no obligation to "develop the appellants' argument for them." (Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1; see also Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [conclusory presentation in appellate brief will be deemed abandoned].) And a party to an appeal, under rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), must provide citations to the record in support of points made in the brief, and the appellate court may disregard any unsupported contentions. (City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239.) We deem I.W.'s conclusory, unsupported argument abandoned.
The paragraph of I.W.'s brief reads as follows: "For months, the pending felony on I.W.'s criminal record had caused him to lose or be ineligible for several jobs. In October 2019[,] I.W. removed his most significant barrier to employment by completing his criminal court diversion requirements and attending court to have the criminal case dismissed. His accomplishment in completing diversion and having the felony dismissed in October constituted removal of his most significant barrier to employment. Therefore, he should be credited as having engaged in the criteria of removing significant barriers to employment."
Even were we to address the merits of I.W.'s undeveloped argument, we would conclude that it is not persuasive. The criminal court, by order on August 24, 2018, required that I.W. complete a 16-week domestic violence class as part of a felony diversion program. As of May 2019, nine months after his arrest, I.W. had completed only two weeks of the 16-week class. There is no indication that I.W. completed any additional classes as part of the diversion program between May and August 2019. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the 16-week domestic violence course requirement was imposed by the criminal court as a condition of his diversion program in August 2018, I.W. had shown only a nominal interest in satisfying the condition, having completed only two weeks of classes in the succeeding 12 months.
Further, the extent to which the pending felony impeded I.W.'s ability to obtain work was not well-developed below by I.W. I.W. had indicated to the Department that one employment agency had advised him that it would not move forward with his employment application because "he had a pending felony on his record." There is no record that the employment agency corroborated this statement. Nor was there evidence of the likelihood the agency, had it accepted I.W.'s application, had suitable job placements to offer I.W. There was also no evidence as to whether there were other placement agencies that would have accepted I.W., had he applied to them. And the evidence was that for at least May and June 2019, I.W. had not applied for employment at all, and he had rebuffed the Department's suggestion that, notwithstanding his felony record, there were available jobs for him.
The juvenile court was not compelled to ignore this entire context—including I.W.'s lack of commitment to completing the domestic violence classes necessary to successfully complete his felony diversion program and his lack of proof of the nature and extent to which the pending felony proceedings had impacted his employment opportunities—in determining whether I.W. had complied with the condition of participating in a program to promote or remove barriers to employment under section 11403(b)(3). The court did not abuse its discretion in terminating jurisdiction based in part upon the implied finding that I.W. did not comply with this statutory condition.
4. Consideration of All Activities under § 11403(b)
Citing In re R.G., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th 1090, I.W. argues that a flexible approach should have been employed by the juvenile court in looking at his nonwork-related activities to support a finding that he was in compliance with the requirements of extended foster care. I.W. asserts that "[o]ver the review period, [he] engaged in multiple eligible activities to meet the criteria of section 11403, subdivision (b)." I.W. lists other activities from February to the November 7 hearing besides work performed, including job search efforts; contacts with his criminal attorney; attendance at domestic violence classes; submitting an application for, and being accepted in, OYA's independent studies program; attending a criminal court hearing; and maintaining regular contact with the social worker. I.W. also notes that during the review period, he had made progress with respect to obtaining stable housing, stable employment, and completion of his secondary education.
I.W. states in his brief that he began his domestic violence course in July 2019. The citation to the record in support of this statement is to a July 8, 2019 report, in which the Department notes that "Mr. Gutierrez [I.W.'s ILP case manager] informed Ms. Coscarelli [the case worker's supervisor] that [I.W.] did start his domestic violence classes for criminal court, but that he did not believe he was attending them."
While I.W. emphasizes certain activities he contends connote constructive efforts to participate in his plan, there were significant aspects to each that were not positive. Although there is some evidence that I.W., at certain times, provided the Department with substantiation of job efforts—specifically in March and April 2019—there were significant periods for which there was an absence of substantiated job search efforts. This includes May and June 2019, a period for which I.W. advised the Department that he would not apply for jobs because of his perception that pending felony proceedings negatively impacted his prospects.
As discussed, ante, I.W.'s efforts to complete the 16-weeks of domestic violence classes as required by the criminal court as part of his diversion program were less than positive. While he ultimately—14 months after the criminal court order—completed the course, after 12 months, he had only completed two weeks of classes.
Similarly, as also discussed above, I.W.'s efforts to complete his secondary education showed a limited commitment. Despite having repeatedly stated to the Department—beginning as early as August 2018—that he wanted to reenroll in school, and despite the Department having referred him to OYA as early as August 2018, I.W. was not enrolled in the OYA independent studies program until October 14, 2019. And in the more than three weeks after that enrollment, he had completed only 18 hours, less than one-third of the amount of coursework required to maintain OYA eligibility.
With respect to I.W.'s efforts to achieve stable housing, the record showed that while he was no longer homeless as of the November 7 hearing, he had not yet obtained long-term stable housing. I.W.'s history, unfortunately, was one of unstable housing. As noted by the Department, before turning 18, I.W had seven placement disruptions in approximately one year that were each the result of his "extreme behaviors." He was again terminated from a housing program in August 2018 because of his having made multiple threats to staff members. Thereafter, I.W. was homeless until March 2019. And as of the time of the November 7 hearing, although I.W. (since August) had approved SILP housing in Vallejo, he was apparently living mostly in San Jose.
Lastly, I.W. emphasizes his frequent contacts with his social worker. His relationship with representatives of the Department and with the juvenile court was combative and was the subject of significant concern, as expressed by the juvenile court at the November 7 hearing. The record is replete with disturbing reported incidents involving I.W. His threatening actions in August 2018 and January 2019 at the HUB had resulted in I.W.'s having been barred from the facility for one month and six months, respectively. He had repeatedly berated a case worker in or about September 2018, calling her "a 'stupid white bitch' numerous times." At or about the same time, I.W. had threatened to " 'shoot up the courtroom' " " '[i]f that bitch judge' " dismissed his case. As a result of this conduct, the Department had implemented a safety plan under which all meetings with I.W. would occur at its offices with multiple agency representatives present. The record reflects some improvement in 2019 in his relationship with a successor case worker. But as of the November 7, 2019 termination hearing, the Department reported that I.W. continued to have problems in his interactions with case workers. The supervisor advised the court that it required extraordinary effort by the case worker to get I.W. "to address even one thing[, a]nd [the case worker] has had to end phone calls multiple times due to [I.W.'s] inappropriate language towards her."
The juvenile court judge observed that I.W. had not had good relationships with the social workers, and he had "been threatening and menacing to various females"; the judge summarized that "[I.W. is] a tough kid to work with." She stated that she had observed him in court and he had "been menacing" and disrespectful, having "flipped [the judge] off during the hearing, with his finger on the side of his head thinking [she] wasn't going to notice." The juvenile court judge remarked further that I.W. had "threatened to shoot up the courtroom if [she] closed his case." The court also noted that because of I.W.'s threatening behavior, the social workers were not permitted to work with him alone because of a safety plan that had been implemented.
I.W. asserts that, while "his participation was not perfect and not without problems," he "had made significant inroads in his transitional independent living plan" that precluded termination of jurisdiction. I.W. relies on In re R.G., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at page 1099, in which the court held that "a setback does not automatically disqualify [nonminor dependents] from the [extended foster care] program." The court there noted that "there will be times when [nonminor dependents] will be in transition" and may, for example, "lose a job or have a medical crisis and have to quit school." (Id. at pp. 1098-1099.) In contrast, here, I.W.'s lack of engagement was not a brief "transition" between participation activities. Rather, there was evidence he failed to adequately work toward his TILP goals during much of the time that he was a nonminor dependent. As the juvenile court judge noted: "I just feel like [I.W.] has had an opportunity to kind of make some choices to be in compliance but he sort of wants to do it his way, which is a job."
The juvenile court, in viewing I.W.'s performance under his case plan in its entirety, did not abuse its discretion by impliedly finding that his activities did not constitute compliance with section 11403(b).
5. Claimed Misapplication of the Law
I.W. contends that the juvenile court erred by misapplying the law, in that it perceived that I.W. was required to satisfy, in the aggregate, 80 hours of monthly effort toward work, school, and removing barriers to employment. He argues that the 80-hour requirement, as specified under section 11403(b), applies only in the instance where the nonminor dependent seeks to qualify for having worked 80 hours in a month as provided under section 11403(b)(4).
We agree with I.W. that the 80-hour-per-month requirement applies only if the nonminor dependent is claiming eligibility for extended foster care because he or she had worked for 80 hours per month. (§ 11403(b)(4).) The statute does not provide that a nonminor dependent, to establish eligibility not based upon subdivision (b)(4), must show that his or her activities, such as educational efforts or working to remove employment barriers, must collectively meet an 80-hour-per-month threshold. But we disagree with I.W. that the juvenile court's holding here was based upon a misapplication of the law.
An appellate court applies "the general rule 'that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law. [Citations.]' [Citations.] This rule derives in part from the presumption of Evidence Code section 664 'that official duty has been regularly performed.' Thus, where a statement of reasons is not required and the record is silent, a reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper basis for a particular finding or order. [Citation.]" (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 (Stowell).) This presumption, however, is rebutted where "the record demonstrates the trial court was unaware of its discretion or that it misunderstood the scope of its discretion under the applicable law" (Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 299, 334 (Barriga).) Thus, "a discretionary decision may be reversed if improper criteria were applied or incorrect legal assumptions were made. [Citation.] Alternatively stated, if a trial court's decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, it cannot be said the court has properly exercised its discretion under the law. [Citations.] Therefore, a discretionary order based on the application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal even though there may be substantial evidence to support that order. [Citations.]" (F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 15-16, original italics.)
We therefore presume here that the juvenile court properly understood and followed the law, and it did not base its decision upon improper criteria or a misapprehension of applicable law. (See Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1114; F.T. v. L.J., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 15-16.) We have carefully reviewed the record, and we conclude that the juvenile court did not base its decision upon an erroneous view of the law, i.e., that I.W. was required to show that his activities related to employment, education, and removing barriers to employment consisted of a total of at least 80 hours per month. Rather, it is clear from the record that the juvenile court, faced with I.W.'s failure to satisfy the criterion of working 80 hours per month under section 11403(b)(4), looked to I.W.'s other activities to assess whether I.W. had been sufficiently participating in his TILP to justify continuing jurisdiction in the case. In considering I.W.'s other activities, the court considered the number of hours devoted to them as an aid to determining I.W.'s level of commitment to his case plan. The record does not support the conclusion that in doing so, the juvenile court applied a hard-and-fast 80-hour monthly minimum number of hours for I.W.'s aggregated activities, or that it perceived that the law required such an aggregate hours-per-month commitment. In short, the presumption that the juvenile court here understood and followed the law was not rebutted because "the record [does not demonstrate[] the trial court was unaware of its discretion or that it misunderstood the scope of its discretion under the applicable law" (Barriga, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 334.)
6. Best Interests Finding
I.W., lastly, contends that he was meaningfully participating in his TILP and that termination of his nonminor dependent status was not in his best interests. He asserts that the Department had the burden of establishing that termination of extended foster care was in the nonminor dependent's best interests. I.W. contends that the order should be reversed because of an absence of evidence showing that termination of extended foster care was, in fact, in his best interests.
The Department in its termination of jurisdiction report was required to include a description of "whether it is in the nonminor's best interests to remain under the court's dependency jurisdiction." (§ 391, subd. (d)(2).) None of the five reports submitted by the Department—including the September 13, 2019 termination of jurisdiction report—includes any discussion regarding the best interests of the nonminor dependent, I.W., regarding the continuation of dependency proceedings. Further, there was no argument presented at the November 7 hearing—and no mention made by the juvenile court—as to whether termination of jurisdiction was in I.W.'s best interests. And when the juvenile court announced its decision and provided its reasoning therefor, it did not address the best interests issue. (See rule 5.555(d)(1)(B) [court finding as to "[w]hether remaining under juvenile court jurisdiction is in the nonminor's best interests and the facts in support of the finding made"].)
Although there were no findings on the record concerning I.W.'s best interests made by the juvenile court at the November 7, 2019 termination hearing, there was a written Judicial Council form order signed by the court. (The order has an apparent typographical error, indicating that it related to a hearing of "2/26/19.") The order has the box checked "is" in the findings section reading "[r]emaining under juvenile court jurisdiction [is] [is not] in the nonminor's best interests. The facts supporting this determination were stated on the record." However, there was (1) no best interests discussion in the Department's reports, (2) no argument concerning best interests at the hearing, (3) no best interests finding made by the court on the record, and (4) no facts recited at the hearing concerning a best interests finding.
It is true that "[t]he principal question to be addressed when deciding whether to terminate jurisdiction over a child in long-term foster care is the best interest of the child. [Citation.]" (In re Nadia G., supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1118-1119.) As a panel of this court observed, "[a]ll dependency cases involve consideration of the best interests of the dependent." (Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 519.) The Department and the juvenile court should have directly addressed this best interests issue in their analysis of whether termination of jurisdiction was appropriate. Nevertheless, on the record before us, we conclude that reversal of the juvenile court's order is not warranted. Although section 391, subdivision (d)(2) requires the agency's report to describe—and the juvenile court to consider—" 'whether it is in the nonminor's best interests to remain under the court's dependency jurisdiction' " the juvenile court is "authorized to terminate jurisdiction over a nonminor dependent if he or she is not participating in his or her case plan. [Citations.]" (Aaron S., supra, at p. 519.) "As it is axiomatic that it would be detrimental for any nonminor dependent to stop receiving services, the mere assertion of such detriment without any proof of reasonable participation by the nonminor in his or her case plan does not demonstrate that the court abused its discretion." (Id. at pp. 519-520, italics added.)
Although the record shows some engagement by I.W. in his TILP, it does not show that he satisfied at least one of the five conditions of eligibility under section 11403(b) for extended foster care. The absence of I.W.'s satisfaction of any of these conditions results in the conclusion that he failed to participate in his case plan. (Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 516.) The juvenile court therefore did not abuse its discretion in terminating jurisdiction.
III. DISPOSITION
The order of November 7, 2019, terminating dependency jurisdiction over I.W. as a nonminor dependent is affirmed.
/s/_________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
ELIA, ACTING P.J. /s/_________
DANNER, J.