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Santa Clara Cnty. Dep't of Family & Children's Servs. v. C.G. (In re I.G.)

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Jan 30, 2020
H046852 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2020)

Opinion

H046852

01-30-2020

In re I.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.G. et al., Defendants and Appellants.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. Nos. JD023784, JD024885)

C.G. (mother) and T.G. (father) appeal from the juvenile court's order terminating their parental rights to their daughters I.G. and H.G. and selecting adoption as the permanent plan under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. They contend that the juvenile court erred when it found that the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply. We affirm the order.

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

I. Statement of Facts

This court has taken judicial notice of the records in prior appeals (case Nos. H044946, H045169, H045337, H045730, and H046322). (Evid. Code, § 452.) --------

A. Background

The parents have an extensive child welfare history. The mother was " 'actively psychotic' " when she gave birth to I.G. in November 2011. The parents agreed to participate in voluntary services and the father agreed that he would not leave the mother alone with I.G.

In February 2013, the parents were arguing on a street about a quarter of a mile from their home. They had left 16-month-old I.G. alone at home and she was found near a heater and hazardous materials. I.G. was subsequently declared a dependent of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b) [failure to protect], and returned to the parents with family maintenance services. In February 2014, the juvenile court dismissed the case after the parents had completed their case plan.

However, referrals for neglect of I.G. continued. In June 2015, there were allegations of general neglect. After the situation "stabilized," the case was closed. In January 2016, general neglect was alleged and rotting food and human waste was found throughout the home. In February 2016, general neglect was alleged on three occasions. After the third referral, family maintenance services were ordered.

In March 2016, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children's Services (Department) filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b). In June 2016, the petition was amended and alleged: (1) the mother's mental health illness was poorly managed and she had been placed on a psychiatric hold in January 2016; (2) in February 2016, the mother hit the father's head; when the police arrived there was food and trash scattered about the home and there was an odor of decomposing trash in all the rooms; and (3) on February 2016, I.G. was found wandering alone in the street and the mother did not know that I.G. was missing from the home; and the police reported that there was a foul smell emitting from the bedrooms. In June 2016, I.G. was declared a dependent of the court and family maintenance services were ordered.

A year later, the social worker requested a protective custody warrant for I.G. The mother, who was pregnant, had been diagnosed with a serious mental illness, which impaired her ability to care for I.G., and she had been hospitalized. The psychiatrist stated: " 'I would not leave a child with this woman.' " The mother yelled at hospital staff, refused to take medication, and would not do anything for herself. The father threatened staff and used "his title of attorney as a means to have his wife discharged under his care and not be labeled a risk to the child." The father was not always able to take I.G. with him to work. Maternal relatives were unable to care for I.G. on a regular basis.

The social worker also contacted I.G.'s teachers, who stated that I.G. was " 'aloof' " and unable to focus in class. She displayed behaviors indicating worry, nervousness, and/or fear. She experienced difficulty in using language and engaged in odd behavior by "saying things that don't make sense and showing feelings that don't fit a situation." I.G. was not fully toilet-trained. Both parents denied or minimized I.G.'s developmental delays. Despite receiving over 12 months of services and referrals, the parents had failed to complete the case plan. The social worker concluded that I.G. was suffering severe emotional damage and the threat to her health required removal from the parents' custody.

On June 9, 2017, the Department filed a supplemental petition under section 387. The petition alleged that the mother's severe and untreated mental illness negatively affected I.G.; and the father continued to minimize the risks to I.G. and to neglect her emotional and developmental needs. It further alleged: that the mother denied that she was mentally ill and she failed to participate in psychiatric treatment; the father did not protect I.G.; I.G. was habitually late to school and clung to any adult who paid attention to her; the father refused to acknowledge that I.G. was not fully toilet-trained; and the father did not address her speech and language delays. On the same day, I.G. was taken into protective custody.

The section 387 petition was later amended to include allegations that the father had not been truthful about the mother's mental illness and that he lacked understanding regarding how to protect I.G.

The jurisdictional/dispositional report, dated July 3, 2017, recommended that the section 387 petition be sustained. The social worker had spoken with medical personnel about the mother, who exhibited mood disorder symptoms and was gravely ill. They were concerned that the mother could not adequately care for I.G., because her mental illness was untreated. The father continued to minimize the mother's condition. The treating physician opined that the mother could easily decompensate outside the hospital environment and she would be unable to recognize her decompensation if it occurred. He also told the father that I.G. should not be left unsupervised with the mother. However, a week after the father told the social worker that he would not leave I.G. alone with the mother, he asked her if he could do so.

The social worker spoke with the mother's psychiatrist, who stated that the mother's diagnosis was unclear, because she refused to provide her complete mental health history. When the social worker contacted him for additional information, he stated that the parents had revoked their authorization for the release of information.

Both parents completed domestic violence assessments, which revealed that intimate partner violence occurred in their relationship. Neither parent complied with the recommendations in the assessment.

The principal at I.G.'s school informed the social worker that I.G. had developmental and academic delays because she had difficulty following verbal directions and using words or sentences. I.G.'s behavior also required a behavior intervention plan. The CASA worker reported that I.G. was talking more after she was placed with the current caregivers.

During supervised visitation, the social worker observed that I.G. did not respond to the mother's commands and directions. She also expressed more affection towards the father than towards the mother. After the parents left, I.G. did not demonstrate any separation anxiety from the parents.

When the social worker was first assigned this case, I.G. was not toilet-trained. Though the parents claimed that she was, the house often reeked of urine. After reviewing the parents' history with the Department, the social worker stated that "this exact situation of unaddressed mental health, disorganized/dirty home, and the consistent minimalizing of mental illness keeps repeating itself." The social worker also saw "a pattern of moving to different counties after finding themselves under investigation."

The addendum report, dated July 12, 2017, stated that I.G. was thriving in her placement. The social worker also noted that the caregiver had reported that I.G. tried to kick their dog. When I.G. was asked why, she lied and said she was petting the dog. When she was asked again, she stated that "her dad hit and kicked her mom in the face."

The parents believed that I.G.'s need for therapeutic services stemmed from her removal from the family home and not from prior neglect and poor parenting. They refused to sign forms that would allow I.G. to receive these services. The "dynamic of power and control" between the parents during visitation also continued.

In August 2017, the juvenile court found that the allegations of the section 387 petition were true and the previous disposition had not been effective. I.G. remained in out-of-home placement. The juvenile court ordered reunification services for the parents and set the matter for an interim review hearing to assess compliance with the reunification plan. This court affirmed the dispositional order in In re I.G.; DFCS v. C.G. et al. (Oct. 19, 2018, H045169) [nonpub. opn.].

The report for the interim review hearing stated that the parents continued to resist case plan services. The social workers, who supervised the parents' visits with I.G., stated that the parents "were oppositional with visitation rules and confrontational and combative with the social workers when redirected and reminded of the rules."

In October 2017, the juvenile court held an interim review hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court ordered all previous orders to remain in effect. This court affirmed the order in In re I.G.; DFCS v. T.G. (Dec. 20, 2018, H045337) [nonpub. opn.].

In November 2017, H.G. was born. When she was six days old, the Department filed a petition alleging that she came within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged that the mother's untreated mental illness interfered with her ability to safely parent H.G. and the father minimized the mother's risk to H.G.; the parents failed repeatedly to attend to the child's basic needs; the parents resisted the efforts of hospital staff to coach them to safely care for H.G.; and H.G.'s sibling had been declared a dependent of the court and remained in foster care. The petition was later amended to include an allegation of abuse of sibling (§ 300, subd. (j).).

The jurisdictional/dispositional report included observations from hospital staff after H.G.'s birth. The mother did not feed H.G. or change her diapers and did not appear to be bonding with her. H.G. was left "unswaddled with low body temperatures" and the parents slept while H.G. cried. A nurse reported that the father did not know how to safely hold H.G. The parents " 'appear[ed] to be unable to be redirected or follow through on coaching advice.' " The social worker also observed that the parents had difficulty picking up and holding H.G. and that nursing staff were constantly intervening and redirecting the parents on how to care for H.G. H.G. was placed into protective custody.

The father initially told the social worker that they were interested only in visitation and would not discuss the case. He asserted that "they did not have any problems." The parents visited the children once per week for two hours and were appropriate during visits. The social worker acknowledged that the parents loved H.G. and were willing to engage in services. She also noted that, with the exception of their parent orientation, the parents had failed to complete any of the other services in their current case plan with I.G.

The addendum report recommended that the amended petition be sustained and the parents be offered reunification services. The parents were now visiting I.G. and H.G. together twice a week for two hours. They continued to be affectionate with them. However, the parents still needed "a lot of redirecting and coaching when handling [H.G.] in regards to her feedings, diaper changes, and overall handling." H.G.'s clothes were soaked in urine and she was wrapped in a blanket that was covered with feces when she was returned to her placement. There was one visit in which the mother had " 'a flat [a]ffect, slurred speech, bad odor, and inability to stay focused . . . [and] could not follow directions correctly and she did not make any sense when she spoke.' " The mother had displayed some of these behaviors during past visits, but her behavior during this visit was " 'extreme.' "

At the jurisdictional hearing on January 26, 2018, the parties agreed to amendments to the first amended petition. With these amendments, the petition alleged in part: "[T]he mother has a severe mental illness that negatively impacts her ability to parent the child. The mother has been diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and bi-polar disorder with mixed episodes. The mother experiences escalating mood swings, delusions, and paranoia. She continues to deny mental illness and has failed to participate in any mental-health related services. . . . The mother's inability to appropriately manage her severe mental illness and her continual unpredictable and neglectful behaviors places the newborn at substantial risk of harm." It was also alleged that "the father minimizes the risk that the mother's behavior poses to the infant." The petition further alleged that "in the days following the child's birth, the parents struggled with providing care for the infant and meeting her basic needs. . . . [¶] . . . Medical staff expressed strong concerns that if the infant were discharged from the hospital into the parents' care, she would be at risk of serious harm or that injury would occur to the infant."

The juvenile court found that the allegations of the first amended petition as amended that day were true and declared H.G. a dependent of the court.

In February 2018, the addendum report recommended that the parents be offered family reunification services. The parents continued to struggle with following directions during visits. Though the parents repeatedly claimed that H.G. had suffered abuse, physicians confirmed that H.G. had not. It appeared to the social worker that the parents were trying to sabotage H.G.'s placement.

The mother's therapist informed the Department that " 'it was evident that the mother has major mental health issues and that she denied all the allegations against her regarding her dependency case due to believing that they were lies.' " She also indicated that there "could be a high level of domestic violence in the family [because the mother] informed her that 'she would not disclose her husband's domestic violence behaviors because of the dependency case . . . .' "

Following the dispositional hearing in March 2018, the juvenile court concluded that H.G. could not be safely maintained in the family home and found by clear and convincing evidence that her physical custody had to be taken from the parents. The court also found that there had been reasonable efforts to prevent removal of H.G. from her parents' care and ordered reunification services. This court affirmed the order in In re H.G.; DFCS v. C.G. et al. (Apr. 16, 2019, H045730) [nonpub. opn.].

In May 2018, the mother's psychological evaluation stated that "the patient is negatively impacting her daughter's emotional life, but . . . the patient does not seem to have the insight into how she is negatively impacting her daughter's emotional experience, which likely has impacted their relationship." In June 2018, the social worker authorized unsupervised visits between the father and I.G. The social worker intended to allow the mother to also attend these visits when she was supervised by the father and she appeared to be well. Unsupervised visits were not authorized for H.G. due to the parents' inability to appropriately care for her during supervised visitation.

Shortly after authorization of unsupervised visitation for the father, the mother engaged in "erratic behaviors" during one of the visits. Her speech was slurred, her gaze was unfocused, and she spoke about suicide. She accused a social worker of asking the father to "commit adultery" and stated that "the feds are aware of this threat." As a result, the social worker notified the parents that the mother could not participate with the father in unsupervised visitation. After the mother accompanied the father to an unsupervised visit, the social worker concluded that the father could not safely visit either child without supervision due to the enmeshment between the parents.

In August 2018, the social worker recommended termination of reunification services as to H.G. She subsequently made the same recommendation as to I.G. The parents reported that they had completed all of their court-ordered services, but the social worker was unable to confirm this information because they did not provide signed releases to allow her to communicate with the service providers. Though the parents completed a parenting class and engaged in therapy, they remained unable to change their behavior. The social worker noted that the parents loved the children, but they failed to acknowledge that their behavior had a negative impact on their children.

At the review hearing in October 2018, the social worker testified that she did not believe that I.G. had a close relationship with the mother. Both parents were inappropriate during visits when they discussed the case with I.G., who became distressed. When the mother upset I.G. during visits, the father's attempts at intervention were unsuccessful. The parents required prompting to feed the children and change H.G.'s diaper during visits. The previous social worker testified that the parents often missed visits for various reasons, including " 'no shows and no calls.' " According to this social worker, the father was denied unsupervised visitation due to his lack of awareness of I.G.'s emotional needs and engagement in unsafe interactions with H.G.

The juvenile court adopted the Department's recommendations, terminated reunification services as to both children, and ordered a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26. This court denied the petitions for extraordinary writ filed by each parent in T.G. et al. v. Superior Court (Jan. 18, 2019, H046322) [nonpub. opn.].

B. The Selection and Implementation Hearing

The section 366.26 report, which was dated February 22, 2019, recommended that parental rights for I.G. and H.G. be terminated so that they could be adopted by their maternal aunt and uncle. The children had been living with these relatives in New Jersey since October 2018. In addition to summarizing the parents' history with the Department, the social worker noted that I.G. had made "a lot of progress" in the preceding year and a half and had no developmental delays. She was also attending school regularly and doing very well. I.G. had a strong bond with her maternal aunt and uncle. H.G. was late in meeting some development milestones, but she was slowly catching up. There were no concerns about her ability to bond with others.

The social worker reported that I.G. became moody and frustrated during phone visits if she could not understand what her parents were asking her. Though I.G. had told the mother that she did not want to talk about the mother's pregnancy, the mother continued to bring up the subject.

The parents visited the children "fairly regularly" and had missed one visit since the contested hearing in October. The parents had phone/video calls twice a week. Sometimes the parents were not available for these calls. Calls were missed at other times due to technical difficulties, staff being out sick, or the parents' travel schedule to and from New Jersey. I.G. and the parents greeted each enthusiastically and I.G. shared what she was learning in school. I.G. enjoyed the phone visits unless the parents introduced a topic that made her uncomfortable, such as when the mother discussed her pregnancy. I.G. sometimes told the parents early in the conversation that she wanted the call to be short. H.G. did not participate in the calls due to her age.

The in-person visits twice a month were positive when the parents interacted and played with the children. There was some concern that the mother brought up topics which she had been told were "off limits." At these times, I.G. became withdrawn and quiet. I.G. declined the mother's expressions of affection. I.G. stated that she found the visits boring at times. H.G. seemed fine during visits, but the parents often needed prompting to care for her.

I.G. told the social worker that she wanted to stay with her aunt and uncle. The social worker explained about a "forever home, which [I.G.] understood but the term adoption still seem[ed] confusing." When she asked I.G. if she understood, she replied, "Sorta. I just wanna be a kid." The social worker recognized that the parents loved the children and that I.G. had a bond with the parents. H.G. did not seem to be as bonded. However, the social worker concluded that the benefits of adoption outweighed any detriment of terminating parental rights.

The addendum report, which was dated February 22, 2019, provided the court with copies of six e-mails that the mother sent to various individuals, including the maternal uncle who was the current caregiver for the children. He forwarded the e-mails to the social worker and asked that they be given to the juvenile court. The e-mails, which were sent between January 9 and February 6, 2019, sought the Pope's help in the return of the children, referred to visions of Jesus and the Virgin Mary, and mentioned the father's involvement with a "buddhist half Mexican thai girl."

The second addendum report, which was dated March 22, 2019, stated that the children continued to do well in their placement. The parents continued to regularly visit the children. Though the parents had been counselled not to discuss where the children should live or the case during visits, they continued to do so. The phone visits went well when games were played or toys were shared. The social worker recognized that the parents loved the children, but they had not addressed the issues that brought the children into dependency proceedings.

Visitation logs for the supervised visits and phone/video visits were attached to the report. These logs established that the interactions between the parents and the children during the visits were generally positive. They played games and. I.G. shared information about school and other aspects of her life. She was usually upbeat and talkative. The parents expressed their love for the children and I.G. expressed her love for them. However, I.G. sometimes displayed emotional distance towards the parents. For example, she told them that she wanted a short call on a couple of occasions. She also asked the parents to stop asking her so many questions. In response to several of the mother's requests, I.G. declined to hug the mother, to hold her hand, or to sit on her lap. Both parents occasionally talked about the dependency case in front of I.G. Neither parent seemed competent holding H.G. and both parents "lost track" of H.G. on two occasions during one visit. On another visit, "[n]either parent seems to know how to engage her or meet any of her needs." During a visit at a Burger King, the parents walked away from H.G., who was in a stroller, and the supervising social worker needed to remind them of her presence.

The contested selection and implementation hearing was held on March 27 and April 23, 2019. The juvenile court admitted into evidence the social worker's report, which was dated February 22, 2019, and the addendum reports, which were dated February 22 and March 22, 2019.

Michele Dove, the social worker, testified that there had been an assessment of the maternal aunt and uncle and they were found to be appropriate. They opted for adoption rather than guardianship. I.G. was "thriving quite well" in her placement with them. "[G]iven the history of being in and out of [the parents'] care and the mental health issues within the family, [I.G.] does present as a parentified child in many ways. She has to be more careful of setting boundaries herself instead of, for example, relying on her parents. She's learning to rely on her caregivers more. She's trusting them . . . what [I.G.] really wants is to stay where she's at and . . . she just wanted to be a kid." I.G. had been doing better after she was removed from the parents' custody and her health had improved.

Dove did not think that I.G. had a very strong bond with the parents. She explained that I.G. set a lot of boundaries with the mother by not wanting to hold her hand or sit in her lap. I.G. had more of a bond with the father, but it was "more of a playful bond." Dove would not characterize it as a "strong bond because there's some insecurity with the parental bond that [the father has] with her given the history with the family and the multiple removals and the circumstances in which she was removed during this dependency." Dove also pointed out that I.G. had more behavioral issues after the visits.

When asked by the father whether these "insecure bonds" could be attributed to the fact that I.G. was "across the country living with an aunt and uncle," Dove did not think that her living situation was a factor. Dove explained that the history of the visits demonstrated that I.G. had an insecure bond with the parents. When I.G. was living in California, she locked herself in the bathroom during a visit and refused to come out. There were also times when the social worker picked her up at the foster home and I.G. did not want to go to visits with the parents. Dove also opined that I.G.'s behavioral issues after visits was not evidence of a strong bond with the parents. Dove noted that I.G. had stated that she doesn't "really feel like talking today" during phone calls and had announced that she only has a few minutes to talk.

I.G. understood that the "current placement would be her forever home." Dove and I.G. discussed "a little bit" about visits with the parents and I.G. seemed "somewhat ambivalent . . . ." Dove acknowledged that I.G. seemed to look forward to the parents' visits in New Jersey, but she did not always look forward to the parents' phone calls.

The mother testified that she and I.G. "were very close." She described herself as the primary parent and caregiver for many years. According to the mother, I.G. is "really a Daddy's girl" and they have a "very deep and close, loving important relationship." I.G. told the mother "everything" and I.G. "knows only to really trust" the parents. The mother believed that Dove's testimony was "so offensive . . . blatantly untrue" since I.G.'s worst fear is losing the parents. I.G. asked the mother if she was "going to be able to get [her] out of this situation." The mother referred to an incident in the park when I.G. asked the social worker if she could go with the parents. The social worker told her harshly that she was going with her uncle. On another occasion, I.G. "tried to sneak in with [the parents] to the car to escape this situation." She thought I.G. wanted an ongoing relationship with the parents. During visits, I.G. told the mother that she loved her, hugged her, kissed her, and sat on her lap. They are a very affectionate family.

The mother testified about the activities that I.G. participated in before she was removed from the parents' custody. She was enrolled in an online course and attended preschool. The mother read to her and took her swimming and to the gym. She also encouraged her artistic ability.

The mother was also very close to H.G. H.G. was always comfortable with the mother and enjoyed playing with her. According to the mother, she knows how to handle children who are H.G.'s age. H.G. was also bonded to the father and called him "[d]addy." H.G. looked at the parents during visits and engaged with them.

The father testified that the parents had a "really good relationship" with I.G. when she was in their care. They took her to "the park or the beach or someplace like that that children like." He also took I.G. to "all of the courts in the Bay Area that have children's centers" because they were "very close" to each other. He also took her to daycare and preschool. The father taught I.G. to write her name and read to her "[a]ll the time." She was an inquisitive child and he taught her about scientific subjects. They made a kite together and took it to the park to fly it. He tried to make every interaction into a learning experience. I.G. brought the father drawings at the visits. She also shared positive and detailed memories during the visits. The father has a "very close bond" to both children. He loves both children and they love him.

David Brodzinski testified as an expert on the issue of the impact of adoption on children. He had never met I.G. or H.G. and did not offer an opinion as to how adoption might affect them. He testified about the losses associated with adoption, which included the loss of birth parents, extended birth family, and non-biological caregivers. There is also the loss of "meaning maker[s]" who can tell the child what she or he was like when they were younger. This information impacts the developing sense of identity. Even when a child is placed with relatives, there is a "less easy fit for the child in the family. There is a loss of status." He noted that there was less of an adjustment in kinship adoptions.

Paul Kangas, a private investigator, testified that he has known I.G. since she was born. He viewed her relationship to the parents as "close."

C. The Juvenile Court's Ruling

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that both children were adoptable and terminated parental rights. The juvenile court acknowledged the parents' love for the children, particularly I.G., and the bond between them. However, the juvenile court found that the parents had not met their burden to establish the beneficial parental relationship exception.

II. Discussion

The parents contend that the juvenile court erred when it found that the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply. They contend that they consistently visited the children and the children would benefit from continuing the relationship.

"Adoption must be selected as the permanent plan for an adoptable child and parental rights terminated unless the court finds 'a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. . . . ' (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) '[T]he burden is on the party seeking to establish the existence of one of the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) exceptions to produce that evidence.' " (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 (Bailey J.).)

"[T]he existence of a beneficial parental or sibling relationship . . . is a factual issue [so] the substantial evidence standard of review is the appropriate one to apply to this component of the juvenile court's determination. Thus, as this court noted in In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, a challenge to a juvenile court's finding that there is no beneficial relationship amounts to a contention that the 'undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion.' [Citation.] Unless the undisputed facts established the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, a substantial evidence challenge to this component of the juvenile court's determination cannot succeed." (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)

"The other component of . . . the parental relationship exception . . . is the requirement that the juvenile court find that the existence of that relationship constitutes a 'compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental.' (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added.) A juvenile court finding that the relationship is a 'compelling reason' for finding detriment to the child is based on the facts but is not primarily a factual issue. It is, instead, a 'quintessentially' discretionary decision, which calls for the juvenile court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the child of adoption. [Citation.] Because this component of the juvenile court's decision is discretionary, the abuse of discretion standard of review applies." (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1315.) " ' "The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court." ' [Citation.]" (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)

" 'The factors to be considered when looking for whether a relationship is important and beneficial are: (1) the age of the child, (2) the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, (3) the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and the child, and (4) the child's particular needs.' [Citation.] 'Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. The significant attachment from child to parent results from the adult's attention to the child's needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. [Citation.] The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. [Citation.] The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.' [Citation.] Evidence of 'frequent and loving contact' is not sufficient to establish the existence of a beneficial parental relationship." (Bailey J. supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1315-1316.)

I.G., who was seven and a half years old when parental rights were terminated, had spent five and a half years of her life in the parents' custody. We disagree with the parents' portrayal of "[h]er life at home [as] meaningful and largely positive." The parents had a lengthy history of neglecting her. One prior dependency arose from the parents' neglect. After receiving family maintenance services, the referrals for neglect continued. The present dependency case was initiated due to the mother's failure to address her mental health issues, domestic violence in the home, a house that was in an unsafe and unsanitary condition, and I.G. wandering alone in the street. When I.G. was taken into protective custody, she had suffered from this neglect. She was delayed in developing speech and language, was not toilet-trained, and engaged in odd behavior. Though the parents had consistently visited I.G. and were affectionate towards her as she was towards them, the bond between I.G. and the parents was not strong based on the parents' history of neglecting her. During the visits, I.G. placed limits on her interactions with the mother and had merely "a playful bond" with the father. I.G. needed the love, care, and attention of parents, which the maternal aunt and uncle provided for her. Thus, the undisputed evidence did not establish that the parents had a beneficial parental relationship with I.G.

We reach the same conclusion with regard to H.G. H.G., who was one and a half years old when parental rights were terminated, was removed from the parents' custody shortly after birth and had never lived with the parents. Despite parenting classes and other services, the parents were sometimes unable to provide basic care for H.G. during supervised visits. Though the parents expressed affection towards her and occasionally played with her, they were largely disengaged from H.G. during visits. As a result, H.G. did not have a significant attachment to them. Thus, the undisputed evidence did not establish that the parents had a beneficial parental relationship with H.G.

As to both children, the parents cite to other portions of the record to support their positions. But this court must resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the Department under the substantial evidence standard. Accordingly, we reject the parents' contentions.

The parents' reliance on In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 is misplaced. In S.B., the father was the child's primary caretaker for three years; he maintained consistent and appropriate visitation with his daughter; and after she was removed from his care, he immediately acknowledged that he could not continue using drugs, began services, maintained sobriety, and complied with all the requirements of his case plan; and the child consistently displayed a strong attachment to him. (Id. at p. 298.) The Court of Appeal concluded that there was no evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the father did not have some type of parental relationship with the child. (Ibid.) It also rejected the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency's argument that the beneficial relationship exception was inapplicable unless the juvenile court found that the child had " 'a primary attachment' to the parent." (Id. at p. 299.) The S.B. court further found that the juvenile court had erred in basing its decision to terminate parental rights in part on the relatives' willingness to allow the parent to visit the child. (Id. at p. 300.) Based on this record, the Court of Appeal reversed the order terminating parental rights. (Id. at pp. 300-301.) S.B. is distinguishable from the present case. First, in contrast to S.B., here, the parents did not comply with most of the requirements of their case plan and continued to deny the mother's mental health illness. Second, unlike the child in S.B., I.G. was "somewhat ambivalent" about seeing the parents after adoption. Third, unlike in S.B., here, the juvenile court did not base its determination on the willingness of the aunt and uncle to allow the parents to visit the children.

Since there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that there was no beneficial parental relationship, we need not consider whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it found that there was no compelling reason for determining that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the children.

III. Disposition

The juvenile court's order is affirmed.

/s/_________

Mihara, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Premo, Acting P. J. /s/_________
Bamattre-Manoukian, J.


Summaries of

Santa Clara Cnty. Dep't of Family & Children's Servs. v. C.G. (In re I.G.)

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Jan 30, 2020
H046852 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2020)
Case details for

Santa Clara Cnty. Dep't of Family & Children's Servs. v. C.G. (In re I.G.)

Case Details

Full title:In re I.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SANTA…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Date published: Jan 30, 2020

Citations

H046852 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2020)