Opinion
No. CV 03 0195185
September 7, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Jacques Sanon, filed a two-count complaint against the defendants, Gina Maria Curcio and her father, Louis Curcio. This action arises out of personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff on May 18, 2001, as a result of a collision of his car with a motor vehicle operated by Gina Maria Curcio and owned by Louis Curcio, at the intersection of West Avenue and Reed Street in Norwalk.
In count one of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges common-law negligence, and the violation of certain motor vehicles statutes including driving at an unreasonable rate of speed in violation of General Statutes § 14-218a and operating recklessly in violation of General Statutes § 14-222(a). Count two alleges that the defendant driver operated her vehicle with reckless disregard and hence is liable under General Statutes § 14-295 for enhanced damages. The speeding and reckless statutes alleged in the first count are repeated in the second count as the basis for multiple damages. The plaintiff further contends that the owner of the vehicle, Louis Curcio, is also liable for General Statutes § 14-295 damages under the theory of vicarious liability.
The defendants filed motion #111 to strike count two of the complaint on the ground of failure to plead sufficient facts in support of the plaintiff's claim of statutory recklessness. The defendants also moved to strike count two on the ground that multiple damages are not recoverable against the owner of a vehicle under Connecticut law relating to vicarious liability.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a [pleading] challenged by a [party's] motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004). "[A motion to strike] does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "[The court] take[s] the facts to be those alleged in the complaint . . . and . . . construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bhinder v. Sun, Co., 263 Conn. 358, 366, 819 A.2d 822 (2003). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., Id., 292.
The defendants move to strike count two of the complaint on the grounds that the allegations in that count merely repeat the allegations in count one, which sounds in negligence. In count two of the complaint, the plaintiff incorporates paragraphs one through eleven of the first count in negligence, and further alleges in paragraph twelve that the defendant driver operated her vehicle in reckless disregard of General Statutes §§ 14-218a and 14-222, prohibiting speeding and reckless driving, respectively, and that each of these violations was a "substantial factor" in the injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff. The defendants point to the similarity of language used in the counts alleging negligence and recklessness. However, the plaintiff adds "deliberate disregard," in the second count, a claim not contained in the negligence count, thus alleging an extreme departure from ordinary care.
The defendants quote accurately two earlier decisions of the undersigned in 1992 and 1994 supporting their contention that the second count should be stricken. However, in more recent years, motions to strike such a count have been denied. See, for example, Goodyear v. Ali, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 01 0185809 (January 29, 2003, Lewis, J.). The reasoning behind the decision of Judge Shapiro in another case in early 2002 has also been a significant and persuasive factor in declining to strike similar motions. "[W]here the allegations of a count of a contested pleading support a cause of action of recklessness, the count sounding in recklessness may well be sufficient to withstand a motion to strike even though the allegations of reckless conduct are also alleged as a basis of negligent conduct in a count sounding in negligence . . . [T]here is no reason why the plaintiff, relying on the same set of facts in negligence counts, cannot set forth in separate counts, causes of action arising out of those same facts alleging recklessness . . . It is frequently urged on [the] Court that the similarity of allegations renders one cause of action (usually, of course, the recklessness one) invalid. But similarity cannot be the sole focus. To so consider would often require a plaintiff to ratchet down the negligence claim in order to render more visible the conceptual space between the counts. Focus must instead primarily rest on the recklessness-sufficiency of that count . . . Rather than follow a mechanistic approach . . . it seems more appropriate . . . to examine instead whether the facts that are alleged could, under any set of facts admissible under the pleadings, support a conclusion of recklessness." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Drennen v. Geist, Superior Court, judicial district of Middletown, Docket No. CV 99 0089114 (January 29, 2002, Shapiro, J.).
The defendants also move to strike count two of the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to allege statutory recklessness with the degree of specificity required by General Statutes § 14-295. That section provides in relevant part: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury . . . the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property." General Statutes § 14-295.
The degree of specificity needed to satisfy the pleading requirement of § 14-295 has not yet been addressed by the Connecticut appellate courts, and there is a split of authority among Superior Court judges. This court, however, has ruled on this issue in prior cases and, as noted above, agrees with the majority point of view which states that "a plaintiff, in addition to pleading facts constituting negligence, need only make the general allegations mentioned in General Statutes § 14-295: that the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the enumerated statutes, and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries . . . The majority view is based both on an analysis of the legislative history as well as a review of the statutory language of § 14-295 itself. These cases conclude that as long as the general requirements of the statute are met, such pleading is enough to survive a motion to strike and to state a cause of action under § 14-295." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Matwiejczuk v. Schatten, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. CV 02 514979 (January 29, 2003, Kocay, J.).
In count two of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant driver deliberately or with reckless disregard violated two of the so-called trigger statutes enumerated in General Statutes § 14-295 and that these violations were a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. These allegations satisfy the pleading requirements of § 14-295 by stating that the predicate or trigger statutes were deliberately and recklessly violated and such violations were a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. Thus, the defendants' motion to strike the second count on the basis that it fails to properly allege a violation of § 14-295 is denied.
Count two further states that, pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295, the defendant owner of the vehicle driven by his daughter is vicariously liable for the statutory recklessness of the owner. The defendants move to strike the second count and the demand for relief accompanying count two on the ground that Connecticut does not recognize multiple or enhanced damages based on vicarious liability under either General Statutes § 52-183 against the owner of a motor vehicle for the reckless conduct of the nonowner operator or under General Statutes § 52-182, a similar statute involving a family car.
General Statutes § 52-183 provides that "[i]n any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption."
General Statutes § 52-182 provides that proof that the operator of a motor vehicle is the daughter of the owner "shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle . . . was being operated as a family car . . . within the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption."
In support of their position, the defendants rely on a recent decision of our Supreme Court that clarified a split of authority on the issue of whether General Statutes § 52-183 allows the imposition of double or treble damages. The Supreme Court stated: "In light of the language and limited purpose of § 52-183, we are not persuaded that it reasonably can be construed to authorize an award of punitive damages on the basis of vicarious liability. Nothing in the statute suggests that the nonoperator owner of a motor vehicle may be held liable for any damages other than those customarily assessed against an employer for the tortious conduct of an employee, namely, compensatory damages . . . [T]here is nothing in the statutory language [of § 52-183] to suggest that the liability of the vehicle's owner for the negligent or reckless conduct of the vehicle's operator is any greater than that of an employer for the tortious conduct of his employee. Because an employer is not vicariously liable for punitive damages arising out of the conduct of his employee, we see no reason to conclude that § 52-183 impliedly gives rise to such liability on the part of a nonoperator owner of a motor vehicle." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 840-41, 836 A.2d 394 (2003). Thus, damages, other than compensatory, are not permitted by § 52-183 or he similar statute, General Statutes § 52-182, which is applicable in this case, and the claim for enhanced damages directed against the owner of the motor vehicle, Louis Curcio, is stricken.
As the court stated in Lyte v. Kane, Docket No. CV 98 063138 (Aug. 25, 1998, Flynn, J., 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 136), "There is a statutory presumption under § 52-182 that the automobile being operated by a family member was being operated as a family car within the scope of general authority from an owner . . . the effect of the family car doctrine is to provide an exception to the general principle but one who permits another to drive his automobile does not become liable for the driver's negligence unless he is pursuing an agency or an employment for the owner . . . [T]his statutory presumption and its effect applies only to awards of compensatory damages, not the multiple statutory punitive damages authorized by § 14-295 of the Statutes . . . At common law no punitive or exemplary damages were accessible against owners for acts of their agents if the owner's liability was purely vicarious . . . civil or penal statutes passed in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed . . . In determining whether or not a statute abrogates or modifies a common-law rule the construction must be strict, and the operation of the statute in derogation of the common law is to be limited to matters clearly within its scope . . . The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that statutes must be construed to give effect to the intent of the legislature . . . Section 14-295 of the statutes unambiguously applies to vehicles operated by a defendant. There is no need for further construction. Punitive damages are therefore inappropriate given the language of the law which authorizes them. The purpose of statutory punitive damages is to deter egregious conduct . . . Imposing them in this case could not serve to deter the [owner] from conduct in the manner of `operation' of the motor vehicle by [the driver] which, albeit wrongful, [owner] did not cause or have reason to know about or expect."
Thus, count two of the complaint and its accompanying prayer for relief are stricken because the plaintiff is attempting to impose vicarious liability on the owner of the motor vehicle involved in this collision. The second count is stricken for this reason alone because, as discussed above, this count successfully alleges a cause in action under General Statutes § 14-295 for statutory recklessness.
So Ordered.
William B. Lewis, Judge