Our supreme court has interpreted section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) as "clearly distinguish[ing] an order assigning liability for restitution from a determination of the amount of restitution for which the defendant is liable." Sanoff v. People , 187 P.3d 576, 578 (Colo. 2008) (emphasis added). As noted before, the version of the restitution statute in effect at the time Tennyson was sentenced required the determination of a restitution amount within ninety days after sentencing.

¶ 9 Subject to constitutional limitations, it is the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and prescribe sentences. Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576, 577 (Colo. 2008). The statutes of this jurisdiction had long provided for the payment of restitution as a condition of such alternatives to incarceration as probation and parole, and this court had long construed those statutory provisions broadly to obligate sentencing courts to order the payment and fix the amount of restitution as part of the judgment of conviction, whenever the defendant's criminal conduct had caused pecuniary damages.

Pineda-Liberato v. People , 2017 CO 95, ¶¶ 32-33, 403 P.3d 160. Given that restitution can be enforced after completion of a deferred sentence, and restitution is a separately appealable order, see Sanoff v. People , 187 P.3d 576, 578 (Colo. 2008), it follows that a defendant does not waive his right to appeal a restitution order by withdrawing his guilty plea. ¶ 10 Furthermore, the terms of the plea agreement did not indicate that defendant waived his right to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues related to the restitution order.

¶ 22 Our supreme court has never been directly asked to resolve the issue as to whom the ninety-one-day deadline applies, but has made observations similar to those in Weeks , Harman , Turecek , and Knoeppchen reflecting at least an assumption that the deadline in section 18-1.3-601(1)(b) applies to the court. ¶ 23 For example, in Sanoff v. People , 187 P.3d 576 (Colo. 2008), the court explained that this provision, originally enacted in 2000, altered the statutory process for establishing criminal restitution. Id. at 578.

While every order of conviction must include consideration of restitution, section 18-1.3-603(1)(b), C.R.S.2010, "expressly permits the sentencing court to merely order that the defendant be obligated to pay restitution and postpone a determination of the specific amount of restitution." Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576, 578 (Colo.2008). Thus, "the amount of the defendant's liability no longer [is] a required component of a final judgment of conviction."

¶31 First, a district court may well retain jurisdiction over Crim. P. 35(c) arguments that are unrelated to the illegal sentence because the doctrine of divestment only prevents a lower court from entering "rulings affecting the judgment subject to appeal. " Sanoff v. People , 187 P.3d 576, 578 (Colo. 2008) (emphasis added); see also id. (noting that "the filing of a valid notice of appeal does not automatically strip the trial court of jurisdiction to take any further action"); People v. Stewart , 55 P.3d 107, 126 (Colo. 2002) ("A trial court retains jurisdiction to act on matters that are not relative to and do not affect the judgment on appeal."); Molitor v. Anderson , 795 P.2d 266, 269 (Colo. 1990) ("[T]he filing of a notice of appeal divests a trial court of authority to consider matters of substance affecting directly the judgment appealed from.").

And the court can only enter such an order if the prosecution has made a motion for restitution. In Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576, 578-79 (Colo. 2008), we determined that, since a judgment of conviction becomes a final and appealable order with the inclusion of any of the four types of restitution orders enumerated in subsection (1), a defendant's conviction becomes a final and appealable judgment of conviction upon entry of a preliminary restitution order under subsection (1)(b), even though the order doesn't include the amount of restitution. We further concluded there that the restitution statute necessarily contemplates the possibility of a second proceeding —within either ninety-one days or, upon a showing of good cause, a longer time period — that would produce a second final, appealable order.

As we described more fully in Meza v. People, 2018 CO 23, ––– P.3d ––––, also reported today by this court, the current statutory scheme permits a criminal court, under certain circumstances, to order a defendant obligated to pay restitution and yet order that the specific amount of restitution be set within ninety-one days, or to order the defendant to pay restitution covering the cost of specific future treatment of any victim, in addition to or in place of ordering a specific amount of restitution at sentencing. See § 18–1.3–603(1)(b), (c); see also Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576, 577–78 (Colo. 2008) (describing the pre–2000 requirement to order an amount of restitution and place it on the mittimus). The current statutory scheme also permits the criminal court to order an increase in restitution, but only for victims or losses not known at the time of sentencing and, even then, only if the "final amount" of restitution has not yet been set by the court. § 18–1.3–603(3).

For criminal cases, we have consistently held that a judgment comes when “the defendant is acquitted, the charges are dismissed, or the defendant is convicted and sentence is imposed.” Guatney, 214 P.3d at 1051; accord Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576, 577 (Colo.2008); Gallegos, 946 P.2d at 950. The dismissal of all charges in a criminal prosecution clearly ends the particular action in which the order of dismissal is entered and therefore constitutes a final judgment for purposes of the appellate review of any ruling in the case.

Because a judgment of conviction includes the defendant's sentence, see Crim.P. 32(b)(3), we have also held that a final judgment in a criminal case does not come until the defendant is acquitted, the charges are dismissed, or the defendant is convicted and sentence is imposed. Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576, 577 (Colo. 2008); People v. Gallegos, 946 P.2d 946, 950 (Colo. 1997).